The Nexus Between Weak Social Contracts and Citizen Quiescence in Kenya
Abstract
Plunder and mismanagement of public resources is an intractable problem that emasculates public sector service delivery in Kenya. It undermines efforts by the national and county governments to deliver public goods and services. Unfortunately, as the plunder of public resources happens driven by a predatory elite, the citizens tend to remain passive, disinterested, and quiescent in demanding public accountability from their leaders. A social contract exists between citizens and their rulers. Social contractarian theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Rawls, and John Locke construe social contracts as explicit or implicit agreements between the ruled and rulers, in which case, the governed cede some of their freedoms and liberties in exchange for protection and public goods by the rulers. Ostensibly, social contracts define the moral duties of citizens and the moral duties of rulers. However, a disequilibrium emerges when any party fails to fulfil its moral duties, causing the social contract to weaken. In retrospect, this study aimed to establish the nexus between citizen quiescence in holding leaders accountable and weak social contracts. The researchers conducted a mixed-method survey involving 100 respondents from Nairobi City County to determine the relationship between citizen quiescence and weak social contracts. The findings were R (98) = 0.764, p<0.05, R2 .579, indicating a positive correlation between weak social contracts and citizen quiescence (inaction) in demanding public accountability. Besides, the coefficient of determination R2 of 0.579 suggests that all factors held constant; weak social contracts could explain 57.9% of citizen quiescence or lethargy in Kenya at a 95% confidence level. Based on these results, it is plausible to conclude that there is a nexus between weak social contracts and citizen inaction (quiescence) in demanding public accountability. However, extensive research is necessary to establish other variables that could explain the variability using a large N sample.
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Copyright (c) 2023 Richard Kyalo Mutuku, Solomon Otieno Owuoche, PhD, Fred Opiyo Jonyo, PhD
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