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Foreign Military Bases (FMBs) and Economic Security in Africa: Overview of FMBs in Djibouti

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Geostrategic Location,

Premium,

Rent.

The importance of military bases for the economy and security of nations is enormous and serves different purposes. Thus, this study evaluates the impact of foreign military bases and economic security in Djibouti. This country in the Horn of Africa region was chosen because of its geostrategic location and because it currently hosts five foreign military bases in its small landmass. The specific objectives of the study are (i): to determine whether the geostrategic locations of these foreign bases in Djibouti are driven by the economic interests of the foreign countries and (ii) to ascertain whether the rent/premium on these bases has any significant impact on the economic development of Djibouti. The theoretical framework used in this study is the realist theory, while the method of data collection is the documentary method. The data collected were analysed using the qualitative descriptive method of data analysis that involves the explanation and description of the secondary sources of data. From this study, we observed that the geostrategic position of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa that hosts these foreign military bases drives its economy from premium and rent. Consequently, major findings include the locations of five military bases (US, France, Japan, China, and Italy) on the country's landmass which are driven by economic/national interests. Again, the premiums/rents paid on the military bases have not significantly increased the economic development of Djibouti. The study, therefore, recommends that Djibouti should explore other uses of its geostrategic location from hosting military bases to tourism. Again, the country should step up to take charge and control such regional economic routes around its maritime corridor.

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INTRODUCTION

In order to understand the significance of foreign military bases in global politics, it is necessary to understand what they mean, and this will be done through an overview of its historical deployment on one hand and the politics of national interests of various countries of the world in international politics, on the other. By definition, a military base is an installation created to serve as support for military operations and logistics (Glebov & Rodrigues, 2009). Consequently, these facilities can play different roles as it is related to several types of bases, such as navy, land, or airbases. There are many functions these settlements can exert, such as intelligence operations, platforms for military operations, weaponry stock, or even as hosts for military corps. From the historical perspective, Hakavy (1989) avers that the presence of foreign troops on the soil of sovereign nations is unusual and an uncomfortable reality as can be observed back in ancient Greece and its city-states. This is true because such military settlement daunts the sovereignty of the host nation. In the same vein, Simao and Santos (2014) observed that the first written sources related to military bases could be found in the writings of Thucydides, which was about the Peloponnesian War of the Fifth Century BC. He wrote about how the Athenian empire established the Delian League, a military alliance that built Athens' navy and therefore, its power and importance throughout territorial issues.

Coming to the issue of national interests in the establishment of these bases, the definition becomes problematic. For example, the building up of a strong nuclear base at Diego Garcia was justified by the US to protect her interests in the Indian Ocean as opposed to the erstwhile USSR (Blake, 2016). Similarly, during the period 1979-1989, the defunct USSR justified its intervention in Afghanistan in the name of Soviet national interests (Khristoforov, 2022). Therefore, the issue of the establishment of foreign military bases on foreign soil becomes an issue of international politics when it is associated with national interests and military alliances (1st and 2nd World War). Cadler (2007) observed that it is from the late 1930s that oversea military bases in other sovereign nations gradually became a more acceptable reality for both Americans and other states. In the words of Lachowski (2007),

The period of East-West confrontation that started in the late 1940s was exceptional. It led to the unprecedented consolidation of two alliances and to the rivalry between two superpowers (...) for global supremacy, containment, control of satellite states, and access to sources of energy (p. 2).

Inherent in the above assertion are some of the reasons for the establishment of FMBs in a sovereign state. In addition to this, the Cold War also contributed to this quest for the acquisition of FMBs. Simao & Santos (2014) noted that the Cold War period which was characterised by the dispute between two poles gave credence to the use of

military bases abroad to deepen the importance of alliances and enhance the balance of power in a bipolar system.

On the regional level and after the establishment of the African Union (AU) in May 2001, issues of human security and counterterrorism were globally and continentally addressed referring to the conflicts in Sierra Leone and some other regions of Africa. Shortly after the creation of the AU, the September 2001 World Trade Centre bombings in New York took place, forcing and making it imperative for AU to practicably adopt measures of counterterrorism to ensure adequate human security (AU, 2016). Coordination on counterterrorism has thus been marked with the direct deployment of troops from foreign powers – especially the US and France. Dufour (2007) observed that in an attempt to justify their military interventions in different parts of the world, the US conceptualised “the Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) of which their major elements include taking command of the global economy and its financial markets, as well as acquiring all natural resources including primary resources and non-renewable energy sources. (Dufour 2007, para 6). Based on the historical analogy discussed above, the matter of establishing foreign military bases on a sovereign state has introduced new dimensions to global security (such as fighting a distant enemy), the economy (including market expansion), and matters related to national and economic interests. Consequently, one of the military strategies which involves ‘reducing the tyranny of distance’, gave rise to the establishment of bases for the deployment of both troops and equipment, for quicker response, and for shortening distance (O’Mahony et al., 2018)

At present, foreign military bases, port facilities, and fuel bunkers are in about twenty-four African countries, some of which are; the US Camp Lemonnier Djibouti base in Djibouti, Chinese Base in Djibouti, UAE bases in Somaliland, French base in Niger, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Algeria amongst others. However, the ICG report of 2013 revealed

that there are other interests, such as France’s bases in Niger and French interests around Niger’s vast uranium resources that implicates French economic interests in Africa (ICG 2013, para 12). Other economic implications of these FMBs in Africa include; rent on a lease, the strategic location of these bases (nearness to ports/ sea), and the landmass occupied by these bases.

More so, in the year 2017, China completed the construction of its base in Djibouti thereby establishing a military presence there (Headely, 2018). The geostrategic position of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa region has revealed some economic benefits of being adjacent to the Bab Al-Mandab and Hormuz straits, through which over twenty per cent of world trade traverses (Raga, 2020). From the foregoing, it becomes pertinent to examine the economic interests associated with the establishment of FMBs in Africa and Djibouti in particular.

Brief Overview of Djibouti’s Background

Djibouti gained independence from France in 1977. As a result, the French army provided its government’s core finance and guaranteed external defence in exchange for military bases and extensive training facilities (CIA, 2016). Djibouti's status in the region is elevated as it serves as the host country for the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organization that connects all the states in the wider Horn of Africa area. Furthermore, Djibouti's altered strategic choices stem from various factors beyond the increase in piracy activity along the Gulf of Aden and Somali shorelines (Ilyasmoussa, 2012; Styan, 2013). Other socioeconomic activities that go on in this country have exposed the strategic position and location of the country because it now serves as a route for the handling of transshipments of containers across the maritime routes of Gulf Aden and across the Horn of Africa region. Consequently, Djibouti’s ports are key to its geostrategic importance in the military, and economic terms and

also as a platform for the transshipment of goods. (IMF, 2012; EIU, 2016).

Statement of the Problem

A lot has been done in the establishment of military bases around the globe. This is often viewed as a way of ensuring military alliance (Intelligence sharing and cooperation), quick response to counterterrorism, ensuring effective peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian assistance in periods of conflict, war, and natural disaster.

In Africa, this has socioeconomic implications beyond the above-listed reasons. The media presentation of the establishment of these bases in Africa does not adequately assess these socio-economic and political implications. Accordingly, Ferras (2016) observed that the US military base that is located adjacent to Djibouti City's main commercial runway exposes it to threats. In extension, Alison (2018) observed the proximity of these bases to each other when he enumerated thus; "Next to the Americans are the French, who operate an additional naval base a few miles away, on the Heron peninsula. Across the runway are the Japanese, whose Self Defence Force is there to self-defend the Japanese ships that makeup 16% of the world's cargo fleet. A few hundred meters from there, Italy runs a military facility that can accommodate 300 soldiers, although the usual complement is only about 80" (Allison, 2018, p. 1). These observations of the proximity of these bases have security implications in times of conflicts or disagreements. In the same vein, Lee (2015) observed that China as the latest superpower to build a base in Djibouti had identified its maritime security interest in the country and region. In line with the establishment of the Chinese base, Kathrina (2017) avers that "the basic purpose of this military facility is for logistics supporting Chinese humanitarian and anti-piracy operations in this

region including anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden and the evacuation of Chinese and foreign nationals from Yemen, among others (p. 6)". However, this goes beyond humanitarian and anti-piracy operations to economic interests.


Consequently, Djibouti's strategic location in the Horn of Africa has made it a hub of many military bases of the superpowers. The economic impact of these bases is implicated in their strategic locations, the economic rent paid, and its effect on the socioeconomic development of a country of less than a million inhabitants. Sequel to this, the study primarily involves identifying the problems associated with the establishment of foreign military bases in Djibouti and how they relate to the country's economic security. It is against this backdrop that the following research questions were formulated for further inquiry;

- Are the geostrategic locations of military bases in Djibouti driven by the economic interests of foreign countries?
- To what extent does the rent on the bases have any significant increase in the economic development of Djibouti?

Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study have been categorised into broad and specific objectives. The broad objective is to investigate how foreign military bases affect the economic security of African countries, with special reference to Djibouti. Specifically, the objectives are to:

- Determine whether the geostrategic locations of military bases in Djibouti are driven by the economic interests of foreign countries.
- Ascertain whether the rent on the bases has any significant increase in the economic development of Djibouti.

Figure 1: Summary of FMBs in Djibouti and their economic rent

Source: (Mail & Guardian: Djibouti's threat may come from within; Simon Allison 2018)

Clarification of the Concept of Economic Security

Economic security is not a new concept for governments for it is associated with the socioeconomic activities of man, states, and their economic policies (ILO, 2004). Apart from the traditional concept of economic security to defence economics and other perspectives, there is a need to explore why economic security is essential to economic development (Annette, 1999). In lieu of the above, Grigoreva and Garifova (2015) observed that economic security is related to the access to resources, finance, and markets that are needed to support acceptable wealth and power levels in the state. Furthermore, Ianioglo and Polajeva (2017) with a similar approach, pointed out that the concept of economic security refers to the long-term security of access to economic opportunities in markets and resources such as people (human capital), capital, energy, water, technology, and education. Therefore, economic security is defined as access to basic needs pertaining to health, education, and social protection.

Inferring from the above, the setting of five military bases in a small country of that nature though

creates employment indirectly and also generates revenue for the country through rent. However, testing of new weapons, flying of drones, nearness of such bases to the nation's port and gaining control over the transshipments of goods and services along the Gulf Aden and Suez Canal Trade route are among its impact on economic security (Al-Yadoomi, 1991). Considering the aforementioned concerns and other relevant issues surrounding the establishment of military bases, it is necessary to assess their impact on the economic development of Djibouti.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In explaining what a theory is, Ifesinachi (2014) sees a theory as a set of logically interrelated assumptions that are used to describe, interpret, explain, and predict social reality. He went further to conclude that theories are, therefore, scientific explanations that relate ideas we have with the observations we make.

Consequently, this study adopts the realist theory of international relations. Realism as a theoretical framework in this study is used to explain the basis for the establishment of foreign military bases on

foreign soil, other related issues surrounding such establishments like the expansionist motives, national/economic interests of the foreign countries, military power which is being used to advance economic interest and the issues of grants, aids and trades.

However, the realist school of thought is an excerpt from the power theory, which is commonly used in international relations as propounded by Hans Morgenthau (1967). For him, power possesses a relational sense of describing the relationship between one country and another in a specific situation, while on the other hand, power is relational to time and situation. The issue of power in international politics makes it possible for nations to advance their economic/national interest across boundaries, especially when such is premeditated by military power.

Neo realists like Kenneth Waltz and Henry Kissinger have critically observed the issues of power in world politics and infer that military security often dominates the low politics of economic and social affairs (Keohane and Nye, 1977). In addition, Jean-Germain and Hung-Gay (2019) have observed that states employ a variety of tactics, including persuasion, manipulation, and economic incentives such as rewards, grants, and other forms of assistance, in order to promote their interests and exert dominance within the international political system. Therefore, power in international relations is considered relative to the goals for which it is used. It includes tangible factors such as military capabilities and intangible ones such as political will (Samatar, 2007).

Application of the Theory

In the application of this theory to this study, realist theory is used to examine the establishment of the five military bases in Djibouti and what prompts or drives the location of these bases in the geostrategic Horn of Africa. On another note, this theory is useful in the explanation of the economic security of the host country inferring from the surrounding

issues of power, grants, trade, and aid. It is evident that the primary impetus behind Djibouti's economic expansion stems from the political and economic security concerns of powerful external actors, notably the USA, China, and Japan. For example, Japan invested \$30 million in Djibouti's base facilities, in addition to other forms of aid. Similarly, China has provided ongoing support to Djibouti since 1979. (PRC F, 2015; Press TV, 2015). The aforementioned facts highlight the increasing economic and political rivalry among influential nations vying for their respective security and economic objectives in Djibouti. For instance, in 2012, the China-Africa Development Fund offered a \$6.4 million soft loan to Djibouti. Furthermore, Djibouti is undertaking a \$240 million geothermal energy project near Lake Assal, with partial funding from China, and has piqued the interest of the US for support as well (Shinn, 2009; Schmitt, 2014; Yewondwossen, 2014).

Based on the preceding analysis, it is clear that influential nations such as the USA and China are expanding their involvement in Djibouti to safeguard their economic and security interests. However, this heightened engagement could potentially undermine Djibouti's autonomy in pursuing its regional integration and cooperation strategies in the Horn of Africa, particularly with Ethiopia..

RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design here refers to all the overall strategies that a researcher chooses to integrate the different components of his study in a coherent and logical way, thereby ensuring that he will effectively address the research problem. In this study, we adopted the “*time series research design*.” The Time-Series Design involves successive observations throughout a programmed intervention and assesses the characteristics of the change process (Gottman et al., 1969). The descriptive function of the time series is particularly important when the intervention extends over a considerable time period. Thus, the symbols X, -X₁,

-X₂ indicate such changes over time (Asika, 1990). From this study, the change process that has occurred over time in the establishments of foreign military bases in Djibouti from one to five bases and viewing it as a continuous phenomenon with the advent of the Chinese naval base necessitated the use of time series research design.

In application of the *time series* research design to the investigation of our research problem, it provided a veritable tool for validating our hypotheses:

- The geostrategic location of the foreign military bases in Djibouti was implicated in the economic/national interests of the countries that own such bases.
- The premiums/rents on these bases have not significantly increased socioeconomic development in Djibouti.

Again, as a secondary observer, this design tool helps to examine a change process overtime on the establishment of these FMBs from its historical point of view

Method of Data Collection and Data Analysis

For the purpose of this study, we adopted the observation method, precisely the indirect type. The indirect observation involves archives, electronically or mechanically recorded activities, or photography as can be seen in the map of Djibouti and the presence of these bases. Other ways through which data were gathered for this study include textbooks, journals, periodicals, AFDB reports, news agencies like Aljazeera and BBC, UN documents on security, etc. The data were analysed using the *qualitative descriptive method of data analysis*. This type of data analysis involves the explanation and description of the secondary sources of data that were used in this study and how it relates to the dependent variable. In doing this, we sieved and analysed the mass of relevant data found in official documents, fact-finding reports, books and journals used in this study.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Geostrategic Locations of FMBs in Djibouti and Economic Interests

In Djibouti, America's military Camp Lemonnier is assumed to be the hub and medium for the US to expand and extend its Global War on Terrorism campaign, especially in the Horn of Africa region. Some studies have revealed that such campaigns as counterterrorism missions in Somalia, Yemen and other troubled neighbouring countries have been confirmed to be launched from Djibouti including American drone strikes against militants in Yemen (Wohlsetter, 1951; Woodward, 2006; Campbell, 2017). However, over the last twenty years, it has been observed that beyond the Counterterrorism (COT) objective, the primary reasons for the US military's presence in Djibouti have been motivated and driven by its geostrategic position and subsequent geopolitical interests of America. According to Kimani (1993), these interests include guaranteeing and monitoring logistical aid for Gulf wars and safeguarding the Bab al-Mandab Strait which is a crucial shipping route in the region and one of the world's busiest waterways. In addition to these, Sun & Zoubir (2016) buttressed that promoting stability in the Horn of Africa, providing humanitarian assistance, and implementing anti-piracy measures are among the activities of America's camp lemonier in Djibouti. However, knowing that national interests serve as a central focus in global politics, the motivations behind the United States' establishment of a military base in Djibouti are also driven by vested interests, evident in the strategic location of the base and its role in facilitating maritime and other logistical operations. Be that as it may, some scholars like (Nicoll, 2007; Shin, 2008; Jamieson, 2009), had pointed out that the decision to host US military deployment by the Djiboutian government is a result of various reasons beyond the nation's geopolitical concerns. Additional factors contributing to the situation include geo-economic considerations and apprehensions surrounding radical Islamism or

violent extremism, which are inconsistent with the majority of Djiboutians' adherence to conventional Islam practices, followed by 95% of the population.

Table 1: Summary of FMBs in Djibouti and their activities

FMBs in Djibouti	Future Prospective Military Base Operators in Djibouti	Military Bases in Djibouti, Hosting Other Nations	Types of Missions Executed by Militaries Based in Djibouti
USA, France, Italy, Japan, China	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Saudi Arabia (agreement to build a base in Djibouti) • India (looking to secure base in the future) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • France hosts German & Spanish military personnel • United States hosts British military personnel • Japan has entered a cooperative agreement to share base(s) with India 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anti-piracy in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea • Air Force ops • Special forces-ops • Anti-terror ops- to combat terrorist threats in Yemen and the Horn of Africa • Intelligence • Surveillance • Humanitarian aid missions • Peacekeeping missions • Tactical & strategic military operations • Navel ops • Drone activities

Source: Adapted from. Intelligence Research Observatory. Small Wars Journal. <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/open-source-background-djibouti-foreign-military-bases-horn-africa-who-there-what-are> 2019. Retrieved 20/5/2022

However, beyond these altruistic reasons of ensuring stable security lies the economic interest. First, the US military deployment in Djibouti falls under US national interest in the region which is Multifarious (Geopolitical, geo-economic, and security). One of the US strategic interests is ensuring US energy security by protecting access to oil and gas reserves. Thus, due to its proximity to the source of Middle Eastern oil in the Gulf and even African oil-endowed regions, the Horn becomes cost-effective for the US in protecting oil sources by military facilities and bases in the region (Alem, 2007; Bloice, 2011). In addition to the reason why Djibouti hosts these bases is a result of inadequate economic power. Djibouti's GDP indicates a lack of significant economic strength, leading the country to rely on economic aid as its

primary incentive for allowing the deployment of US (and other foreign) troops for peacekeeping and humanitarian purposes. In the same way, its geostrategic location and establishment could also serve as a rent economy for the country with regard to the terms of the lease.

The other Western country which has a military presence and uncompromised interest in the Horn is France. France's interest in the Horn can be traced back to 1939 and even after the independence of Djibouti in 1977 (Liebl, 2008; Styan, 2013). France has economic and security interests in the region. Liebl (2008, p. 3) describes the significance of French military bases as follows:

“... French presence not only ensures that France has a secure military platform to

maintain its position in East Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean but more importantly enables France to monitor the safety and security of maritime traffic (both military and commercial) through the Babel Mandeb into the Red Sea” (p. 3).

Moreso, French businesses have longstanding operations in Africa. The continent accounts for 5 percent of France’s exports. Though France has diversified its sources of raw materials, Africa remains an important supplier of oil and metals. André Dulait, a French parliamentarian, declared during a debate on Africa that “The African continent is our neighbor, and when it is rocked by conflict, we are also affected.” Nevertheless, not all individuals are persuaded that African affairs should be the primary concern of French foreign policy. (Andrew, 2008). Therefore, France’s Military base in Djibouti serves as a platform to import and export goods and services as well as other French interests in Africa and in the Horn in particular.

With regard to China, the much-debated notion of the ‘String of Pearls’ and ‘Energy Future of Asia’ is related to the Sino- African relations of China in Africa (Manhas, 2020). It reflects the projection of Chinese military power from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean to Africa and the Middle East. Despite the contrary view that the Chinese facility in Djibouti is intended to help in counterterrorism, anti-piracy, intelligence collection, peacekeeping missions, and non-combat evacuation operations (Downs et al., 2017), there is an economic interest in such establishments. China’s military base in Djibouti represents both a culmination of years of expanding economic and maritime security interests and a prelude to deeper levels of strategic engagement in Africa and the Indian Ocean region as part of Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road. To better understand the purpose and uses of the Djibouti base, it is helpful to examine three features of China’s broader foreign policy: migration of Chinese citizens to Africa and Beijing’s growing diplomatic engagement on the continent; a growing emphasis on maritime military power and

safeguarding citizens abroad, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Igbinoba, 2016). Increased Chinese economic engagement in Africa has been accompanied by enhanced diplomatic efforts consisting of foreign aid and peacekeeping objectives (Davis & Woetzel, 2010). The Djibouti base reflects a growing emphasis on maritime military interests and national interests abroad (Chuka, 2011). In Africa and Djibouti, China has invested exceedingly. An example is the railway linking Ethiopia with Djibouti, which has plans to construct a natural gas pipeline between the two countries as well (Tanchum, 2021). China's investments in African nations have resulted in economic benefits not only for the African countries but also for China itself (Pant, 2017).

From the foregoing, military bases in Djibouti are established to cash in on the geostrategic location of the country, which will grant access to the foreign military bases to protect and promote their national/economic interests in the region such as transshipment of goods and services, which are beyond the counterterrorism motive.

Premium/Rent on the Foreign Military Bases and Socioeconomic Development in Djibouti

In this subtheme, this study reviews the concepts of premium and rent as regards the establishment of foreign military bases in Djibouti. For this study, premiums and rents were used interchangeably to indicate money paid for the establishment of Foreign Military Bases in Djibouti. However, premium in the economic sense of it has to do with the money paid by the insured to the insurer for covering or bearing the risks involved in insurance. However, in this context, premium refers to the money paid by the foreign countries for the establishment of their military base in Djibouti which is the host country that bears the risk. These premiums are paid annually to the government of Djibouti and in tandem with the bilateral agreement covering the establishment of such a base (Allison, 2018). No doubt, the economy of Djibouti is heavily reliant on the benefits of its geostrategic location in

the Horn of Africa, at the entrance to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden on the Indian Ocean coast. This location presents opportunities and challenges for economic growth and development. The vast coastline must be secured and the maritime route protected. Its ports are indispensable to its existence and a key feature of its trading activities (UNECA,

2016). According to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC, 2012), the country receives \$63 million and \$100 million from the United States and China, respectively, for the military bases (cited in Oladipo, 2015). The table below displays the rent/premium of some of the established foreign military bases in Djibouti.

Table 2: Rent/premium of some of the established foreign military bases in Djibouti

Foreign military bases	Rent /premium
Us camp lemonier	\$63 m
China	\$20 m
France	\$36 m
Italy	\$2.6 m

Source: Adapted from (Oladipo, 2015; Allison, 2018) and compiled by the author 2018

Considering the socioeconomic perspective, Djibouti has demonstrated its aspiration to become the primary gateway for commerce for member states of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) since it hosted the COMESA summit in 2006 (Ferras, 2015). As a result, the economy's primary pillars are transit businesses, logistics services, and telecommunications, with economic sectors such as fisheries, tourism, and mineral resources yet to be fully exploited for optimal potential (Beng, 2016; Braude & Jiang, 2016). As a consequence, Djibouti earns revenue due to its advantageous geographic location and the resulting growth of its infrastructure. The nation has gained advantages as a gateway to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, as well as a trade path for Ethiopia, which is a landlocked country. The majority of the government's revenue, approximately 86%, is generated through its International Port, which serves Ethiopian trade. Furthermore, Djibouti earns annual revenues of US\$30-36 million from the US and French military bases (Brass, 2012).

Foreign Military Bases in Djibouti and Horn of African Region

The Horn of Africa and Djibouti in particular is the only region in the world in which the US, French, Italy, Japan, and recently the Chinese military

forces are stationed simultaneously (Sun & Zoubir, 2016). In the words of Nigusu (2021),

"...Djibouti hosts military bases belonging to Germany, Spain, Italy, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and Saudi Arabia at a very little distance from one another. Russia and India too have strong interests in setting up military bases there" (p. 1).

No doubt, this is largely due to the region's strategic location. First, the Red Sea is the main transit of oil ships both in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Second, the intractable Arab-Israel conflict increases the geo-military significance of the region (Al-Yadoomi, 1991; Woodward, 2006). More so, the region's geo-strategy for maritime security and anti-piracy increased the significance of the region.

In an attempt to explain some of the motivations that underlie the establishment of foreign military bases, Khalid (2012) linked it to the issues and lines of communication. He observed that there are routes that connect military and commercial units with their supply base, being important to connect markets and being the main issue regarding military logistics abroad (Khalid, 2012, p. 13). More to this is that the coast of Djibouti is along the sea lines of the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf Aden.

However, this study does not focus solely on US foreign military bases in Africa but on other countries that have such bases in Africa in relation to the economic implication of the host African State beyond the notion of countering terrorism and countering violent extremism. China's recent efforts to establish a naval base in Djibouti and provide financial support to African armed forces, among other forms of diplomacy and security cooperation, may hold greater significance for China than for the African nations involved (Peterson, 2009; Jeffrey, 2016). This implies moving towards an ever more expansive definition of its global interests as its business in Africa pushes it to create new mechanisms for securing those interests, including its own growing military footprint abroad (Pant, 2017).

From the above, this study sustains that the establishment of foreign military bases in Djibouti has gone beyond the global war on terrorism and piracy which is often viewed as the reason for such establishments. Consequently, major findings as it relates to the first research question and hypothesis respectively affirm that military bases in Djibouti are seen as a means of expanding the economic interests of the countries that own such as a result of the strategic location of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa region.

Positive Impacts of Foreign Military Bases in Djibouti

Inferring from the explanations and definitions so far, economic development is all-encompassing and consists of all other stages of development including human development and standard of living. Over the last 20 years, the United States has provided Djibouti with the second-largest amount of aid, following only France, which is the primary source of revenue for Djibouti's government. After the 9/11 incident which prompted the idea of the "tyranny of distance" and the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the amount of financial aid provided by the US to Djibouti has significantly increased over time. In 2003, the US offered a total of USD 26.37 million

in economic and military aid, which rose to USD 37.37 million in 2004 (InsideGov, 2016). A new agreement regarding the use of the military base and associated services was signed between Djibouti and the US in 2012. This agreement grants the United States the will to use its base for a period of 99 years. This ensures that Djibouti will receive a consistent rental income throughout the current century. Prior to 2014, it was also gathered that the annual rental cost for the use of the base, which includes Ouaramous Island, was approximately USD 38 million (The Washington Post, 2013; Lostumbo et al., 2013, p. 156).

Aligned with the affirmative consequences of these foreign military bases, the French military base located outside the city produces an annual income of EUR 30 million. Therefore, the revenue earned from rental costs indicates that the amounts paid by the United States and France rank second only to the USD 700 million in transit fees paid by landlocked Ethiopia to export its products through the Djibouti seaport (Reuters, 2012). Apart from the lease, such installations provide employment for Djiboutians. As an illustration, the base employs around 1,200 local and foreign workers, contributing significantly to the employment sector. Despite this, the unemployment rate in Djibouti has remained consistently high, ranging from 50 to 60 per cent since 2007 (CIA, 2016). Although the GDP growth rate in Djibouti was initially negative, it gradually turned positive from 2001, reaching 5.8 per cent in 2008 and remaining at 5.5 per cent in 2014 (Trading Economics, 2016). Thus, the income generated by the US military base, in combination with its beneficial economic outcomes, along with the rents received from other foreign powers, has played a crucial role in promoting the economic growth of Djibouti.

Djibouti has typically maintained a hospitable atmosphere and shown acceptance towards foreign military presence as a means of drawing in revenue. Moreso, Djibouti's practical approach to diplomacy has fostered amicable relationships with nearly all

major global powers, regardless of their ideological stances. As a city-state, Djibouti accommodates military troops from a range of nations, including the US, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Japan. Additionally, it has entered into military cooperation agreements with China, which purchased a significant share of the Port of Djibouti for USD 185 million and aims to invest USD 420 million to upgrade the port facilities (Lee, 2015). By doing so, Djibouti has received USD 38 million annually from the US, as well as additional support for financial and developmental purposes. Furthermore, Djibouti's critical importance to global political and economic security has attracted further foreign investments from countries such as Spain, Japan, Dubai, and China. The rise in Djibouti's revenue and rapid economic growth is a consequence of its strategic location and consequent infrastructure development. Therefore, Djibouti has maintained an average GDP growth of 5% over the last five years and is anticipated to retain this growth rate in the years to come (Yewondwossen, 2014).

Negative impacts of FMBs in Djibouti.

With the hope that these FMBs could bring socio-economic and political benefits to the weak state, there is a serious concern by the Djiboutian authorities' that during an interview in 2012, Ilyas Moussa Dawaleh, Djibouti's Minister of Economy, Finance, and Planning, expressed concerns that the US presence might lead to terrorist attacks or cause dissatisfaction among the population, which could result in the growth of jihadist Islam. He further claimed that although local radical groups in Somalia and Al-Qaeda affiliates might not be able to attack the US military facilities, they could still damage the fragile Djiboutian infrastructure (Reuters, 2012). In addition, Djibouti, a resource-poor nation of 900,000 people in the Horn of Africa region, rarely makes international headlines. Due to its strategic location and proximity to the Mandab Strait and the Suez-Aden Canal, which accounts for ten percent of the world's oil exports passing through its maritime corridor, as well as its relative

stability, Djibouti holds significant geopolitical importance. Djibouti is caught in-between opportunities and challenges (Beng, 2016). Opportunities that have economic benefits from rental economy and tourism to the challenges of economic security and vulnerability to the enemies of the countries that own such bases.

Although the US and French militaries maintain bases in Djibouti, jihadist militants have still managed to launch attacks against Westerners. One such example is the bombing of La Chaumière café on May 24, 2014, which was a popular destination for foreign military personnel and tourists and resulted in several fatalities. This attack resulted in the deaths of French army chiefs. The Somali group Al-Shabaab was responsible for this attack (Goldman, 2014). Additionally, the authorities in Djibouti aim to persuade the public that the US base is not meant to be used as a starting point for assaulting Muslims which takes a whole lot of conviction. The potential economic benefits for Djibouti have consistently been deemed more valuable than the risk of terrorism. However, the government has not been successful in garnering support from the majority of the population or improving their living conditions. (Brooks 2012). Furthermore, there is a likelihood of an eruption of resentment associated with the drones and the considerable military presence, as well as discontent with the absence of tangible economic advantages for the populace and the deficiency of genuine political reforms. Since 2010, the US has deployed sixteen Predator drones in Djibouti. However, in 2013, five of these drones crashed, raising concerns about the possibility of unmanned aircraft colliding with passenger planes. This incident sparked resentment among the Djiboutian population. (Whitlock & Miller, 2013; Washington Post, 2013). To avoid the risk of collision with civilian aircraft, the Pentagon had to move a considerable number of drones from a heavily populated area to a remote desert location several miles away in 2013 (Ramirez, 2013).

Summary of Findings

From the findings, we observed that the Horn of Africa is one of the world's single-most important geostrategic regions. Its geostrategic significance is related to the Red Sea, oil, Nile factor, Indian Ocean, Gulf Aden, Suez Canal Trade route, and transshipment of goods and services, amongst others. Historically, the region had been an athletic field of foreign powers between Ottoman Turkey and Egypt, during the colonial period between France, Britain, and Italy, during the cold war between the US and the Soviet Union, and now between different competing Arab countries, western and the emerging China. Now, Djibouti has become the world's largest military base of foreign powers in terms of established foreign military bases. It can be argued that the region has become a military garrison: the US, France, Japan, Italy, and China have already established their military base at Djibouti. This militarisation is both an opportunity as well as a risk for Djibouti. It is an opportunity in areas of military, regional stability, an accelerated factor of coasts, Gulf Aden, Suez Canal trade route, amongst others. However, these opportunities are largely determined by Djibouti's diplomatic efforts both with foreign countries, her neighbours in East Africa like Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia and African countries as a whole. Therefore, Djibouti needs a rational and responsive domestic and foreign policy to utilise the opportunities and at times minimise the security risk.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

Having examined foreign military bases in Djibouti, it is upon the strength of our findings that we put forth the following recommendations:

With regards to Djibouti's geostrategic location, the country should focus on other socioeconomic activities like tourism which has aesthetic nature in the coastal region and equally attracts tourists and expatriates. Consequently, this will help bring a drift from the rent economy of hosting military bases on its soil. Again, she should be on top of her

diplomacy and relations with neighbouring states of Africa in other not to be used as a guinea pig when an uproar or disagreement arises as a result of the bases and also used to pay the price in terms of conflict situation like a military base in Eurasia.

Djibouti as a country should look beyond the revenues and premiums realised from these bases as a result of its geostrategic location to how it can indigenously enhance such opportunities to bring about economic development and a good standard of living among its citizens. Based on the findings of this study and the questions it sets to address, the premiums and rents on these military bases have not had any significant increase in the socioeconomic development of Djibouti (UNECA, 2016-Djibouti's country profile).

In a regional sense, AU will need to increase its capacity (a challenge in a general sense) to have a stronger focus on preventing foreign exploitation and interstate. The joint multinational task force amongst Lake Chad basin states and the G5 Sahel (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Chad) are welcome steps in ensuring neighbourhood solutions to cross-border militancy, although these still need to be coupled with more focus on inclusivity. Consequently, if AU would adopt such a mechanism to fight terrorism in the Horn of Africa region, it would help reduce the influx of military bases in Djibouti.

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