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Marketization of Humanitarian Work in the 21st Century: Balancing the Survival and Moral Imperatives for NGOs: A Case of Uganda Red Cross Society

Joseph Akol¹* & Dr. Denis Musinguzi, PhD¹

¹ Uganda Martyrs University, P. O. Box 5498, Nkozi, Uganda.

* Author's Email: totoamongin@gmail.com

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Today's NGO is a large corporate undertaking in systems and structure in comparison to the early days of a small, humble, locally connected one with a clear vision and mission focus (Gibson, 2019). It is a big service provider dependent on funding from institutional donors rather than individuals or the public. It has elaborate structures for operations, procurement and supply chain management, public relations and communications, fund-raising and business development services (BDS), internal audit and accounting, human resources (HR), monitoring and evaluation, community engagement and feedback receipt, and implementation (Cooley and Ron, 2002; Gibson, 2019). It is staffed with thematic specialists who implement short-term niche complex programmes and projects with tight deliverables, budgets, and timelines. Its staff, while dedicated, suffer from dilemmas of balancing moral motivations and efficient implementation of discrete projects that they are assigned to implement, and the processes needed to operate large-scale undertakings (Gibson, 2019). This is, rather, rational behaviour in response to their existential pressures created by today's market conditions. This has created cracks in the heart of the NGO sector. Identity, mission, and public trust are being threatened by the resultant pressure as increased corporatization, enterprise culture, and principal-agent (P-A) relationships gain momentum in NGO operations (Salamon, 2003). NGOs need to preserve their values as they navigate the distinctiveness and survival imperatives. This article attempts to delve into how NGOs have attempted to balance these imperatives, drawing from an empirical review of the existing body of literature in the subject area and analysis of the set-up and operations of one large Relief Service NGO in Uganda - the Uganda Red Cross Society (URCS).

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INTRODUCTION

Traditional donors – governments, foundations, and private funders are all increasing funding to humanitarian actors that include the United Nations, the Red Cross Movement, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Despite this effort, the gap between humanitarian needs and funding continues to widen. As Willitts-King, Bryant and Adamczyk, (2019) have indicated, in 2018, for example, only 58.5% of the required funding was met. Making humanitarian funding access faster, more consistent, and cost-effective has been identified as a solution to this long-standing challenge. This need has changed the aid terrain and the way NGOs work in several ways. Private sector methods and tools have found their way into their work, making them market-oriented and to operate in business-like ways (Salamon, 2003). Emphasis on approaches previously prevalent in mostly the private sector have found their way into NGOs' operations. This includes strategic planning, the value of the mission, quick service delivery to clients rather than long-term mission social change engagement, and increased focus on recruiting professional staff and managing their behaviour and performance (Eagleton-Pierce, 2020). Such methods have been fused with traditional non-profit methods to produce a blend of market-led methods in use today. This has not come without challenges, but has been accompanied by responses and consequences that

have altered NGOs' values' bases. This article addresses this subject.

Challenges Faced by NGOs in Increasingly Marketized Conditions

Despite the general societal appreciation of the role of NGOs as service providers, advocates for the voiceless, the social capital builders, and community service and moral value guardians, they have always been confronted with several challenges since their entry into the scene in the late 19th century. While opportunities have kept presenting themselves along the way, the challenges have become more intense in the 21st century (Salamon, 2003). The main challenges are financial, competition, effectiveness, technology, legitimacy, and human resources.

Financially, NGOs have always faced a fiscal squeeze to support their work, but the marketization of their work has made the challenge more intense. Large-scale humanitarian, political, and economic changes, such as post-war reconstruction, filling the decolonization spaces created by independence pressures, and delivery of social services where international and national neo-liberal pressures caused state departure, too, opened space for NGO activities (Gibson, 2019). NGOs, therefore, entered the millennium peak in power with funding from government institutional donors and the UN system, becoming influential and successful in campaigns such as "drop the debt" and the "land mines"

(Gibson, 2019). This power and resources made NGOs grow in number, size, and scale of their operations. The introduction of the Thatcher-Clinton policies of rolling back the state of the 1980s (Basu, 1994) made NGOs even more necessary and relevant in filling the gap created by the state's departure from social service delivery.

The financial pressures experienced by governments, climaxing with the global economic crash of 2008, however, created negative financial consequences for NGOs in the early 21st century. The need to operate as efficient entities became a necessity. This was also a period when private sector contracting for the delivery of social and other humanitarian services was embraced, with the use of private sector methods, such as the use of vouchers, adopted. The same period is when leading donors adopted the short-term project competitive tendering and renewable performance-based contracting to promote efficiency and effectiveness (Cooley and Ron, 2002). The entry of the private sector into humanitarian work, previously a preserve of NGOs and other humanitarian agencies, the increase in the number of NGOs, and the introduction of market-based funding modalities intensified competition and led to the loss of their market share.

The slow rates of growth, structural changes, and political pressures back home from donors are further causing a reduction of funding to NGOs and making donors stricter on NGO spending (Agyemang, Brendan O'Dwyer and Jeffrey Unerman, n.d.). The localization agenda pursued by donors today has also changed focus from "aid to NGOs" to "aid through NGOs." (Agyemang, Brendan O'Dwyer and Jeffrey Unerman, n.d., p. 2360), and increasingly, NGOs are being asked to adopt private sector self-sufficiency models, clearly new methods and ways of working for NGOs.

In a marketized environment, where performance, discipline, and capacity are revered rather than mission and values, demonstrating effectiveness has become another challenge NGOs have had to

grapple with. In a turf where trust is needed, and information asymmetry is a synonym; NGOs have had it rough demonstrating the efficiency and effectiveness of their methods and services. Criticism from the politicians, the public, and the media is high. This has resulted in a rather accountancy and not accountability environment (Crack, 2013a). Moreover, NGOs have been called upon to demonstrate results to multiple stakeholders, thus creating a multiple accountabilities disorder, where more accountability is supplied to some and less to other stakeholders depending on their importance to the survival of an NGO and sanctioning abilities (Kaba, 2021). Measures responsive to the market pressures instead of those responsive to beneficiary needs have, therefore, been adopted, such as quantitative routine reporting and audits, and superficial M&E assessments (Ebrahim, 2003).

Cracks have also emerged on the very foundation of public trust that NGOs sit on. Unmet public expectations, negative campaigns from the politicians and the media that NGOs are just another interest group cahooted with government bureaucrats to defraud the unsuspecting public of resources to fulfill their interests (Crack, 2018) have reduced the public trust in NGOs. The criticism has gained currency from the lack of dedication to voluntary action, high costs of operations, too much professionalization of work, and thus a loss of touch with beneficiaries (Gibson, 2019). Humanitarian work is now generally seen as inefficient in the generation of the requested results (Stoddard et al., 2017) and local NGOs are affected more. This has resulted in donors preferring large international NGOs that can meet the complexities of implementing large projects, numerical data collection and reporting, and managing sub-contracting to field-level partners. According to Willitts-King, Bryant, and Adamczyk, (2019), a study of 28 EU-funded projects found that only 38% of the total €302 million funding released for the projects reached beneficiaries directly, the rest being expended on logistics and other support costs,

something donors are at pain with and always looking for ways of reducing. Surveys indicate that NGO trust ratings are as low as 33% (Salamon, 2003).

There are also challenges with technology, where the demand to use it for community mobilization and reporting, without adequate preparation in training, maintenance, and replacement, is seen. In the human resources side, NGOs, for long considered purposeful and fulfilling employers, are no longer in a strong position to attract and retain talented staff due to insufficient resources and job insecurities, limited advancement opportunities due to flat structures, and adoption by the private and public sectors of NGO-like structures (Salamon, 2003). The financial squeeze, stiff competition, accountability demands of multiple stakeholders, trust decline, human resources, and technological pressures have all combined to increase NGOs' survival pressure. The section below discusses how NGOs have responded to this pressure.

The Response – the Moral and Survival Imperatives

NGOs have adapted in very resilient ways to the marketization challenges of the 21st century, contrary to the normative belief that they lack flexibility in deploying and redeploying resources in the face of contextual changes (Kanter and Summers, 1987) owing to their lack of self-interest of owners, competition, and the bottom-line measure of profit and loss of the private sector (Herzlinger, 1996). Whereas their response is generally considered strong and resilient, questions, however, abound on whether the response is in the right direction or has competition pushed them to mission and values-irrelevant directions. Below, we examine the NGO response, citing examples from the Uganda Red Cross Society. Data to enrich this was collected from a review of URCS operational documents and qualitative interviews with a limited number of her staff and beneficiaries. Findings summarized under increased corporatization,

enterprise culture, and principal-agent (P-A) relationships are presented below.

Increased Corporatization in the Structure

The behaviour and interests of organizations are in several ways shaped, sometimes unintentionally and rationally, by material incentives when their survival depends on choices they make, especially in crowded, fiercely competitive, and uncertain market conditions (Cooley and Ron, 2002). Like most NGOs, today's URCS is very corporate compared to the early days of a small, humble, locally connected humanitarian organization with a clear vision and mission focus. It is a big service provider dependent on donors - institutional ones, rather than individuals or the public. The proportion of donor funding, mainly home governments of member societies, is over 99%, with less than 1% of its funding coming from membership enrollment and annual subscription fees or venture income.

A Large Organogram

URCS has elaborate structures like those in private sector corporate organizations for its operations. Headed by a Secretary General who reports to the governing board that accounts to the national council, it has 8 directorates, each headed by a director that includes Logistics and Supply Chain Management; Operations; Disaster Risk Management; Health and Social Services; Communications, Resource Mobilization and Partnerships; Human Resources and Administration; Finance, Branch and Membership Development. Under these directorates there are other functions such as monitoring and evaluation, community engagement and accountability; and program implementation. It is staffed with thematic specialists and implements niche complex programmes and projects with tight deliverables, budgets, and timelines in two categories - *Core Services* that are routinely provided by the Society through its branch structures and *humanitarian emergency response and development services* that are provided based on the need and often delivered

on program/project basis. This functional differentiation and segregation is a feature of private enterprises that has been adopted by NGOs to manage the large-scale operations that they manage today.

A Wide Program Scope


As indicated above, URCS' technical program scope which is divided into two categories - *Core Services* and *humanitarian emergency response and development services*, is wide. Core services include first aid, blood donor mobilization, membership and youth enrolment, volunteer enrolment and empowerment, and dissemination of Red Cross principles. The First Aid services largely deal with injury prevention, including awareness creation, road safety awareness, and ambulance services. Under blood donor mobilization, URCS actively participates in the recruitment, counselling, and retention of non-remunerated blood donors with the overall intention of ensuring an adequate and steady supply of safe blood in the country. URCS, being a membership organization, relies heavily on members and volunteers. Therefore, membership and volunteer recruitment, initiation, orientation, and empowerment are key activities and inadvertently a key service that the society renders to the community. Dissemination of Red Cross and Red Crescent principles is a key ingredient in the recruitment and induction of members and volunteers.

Humanitarian response and development services are currently mainly in the areas of health and disaster risk management. The key services include community-based disease/epidemic surveillance, public health promotion services, operations and maintenance of facilities, humanitarian response to refugee crises, conflict management and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), post-disaster recovery

services, and community resilience, among others. The services are delivered through the 51 branches spread throughout the country and are delivered in partnership with the local government structures, such as district disaster management committees and district health committees. This wide program scope requires a wide geographical and technical presence, and indeed URCS employs over 500,000 staff and volunteers country-wide. This is highly challenging to manage given the short-term nature of some projects and related staff and volunteer contracts, yet it is the only way to survive in a highly competitive funding and existential space.

An Elite Governing Board

URCS has a 14-member governing board consisting of the chairperson, the vice chairperson, the treasurer, the legal advisor, two youth representatives, and 7 members. Analysis of the composition of the board reveals that it is a highly elitist board, more corporate and less community-based. The governing board is composed of highly eminent persons in academia, business, law, and politics. The board also appoints an integrity committee to guide and counsel it on matters of right and wrong and to be the goodwill ambassador for the organization. This committee is equally composed of persons of stature in the country. One standout member of the committee is a retired Archbishop of the Anglican Church of Uganda. This suggests that interest is more in business-like management, integrity, and image-building advice instead of community-basedness. Having a legal advisor on the board means that the organization is doing all it can to shield itself from legal liabilities related to large-scale operations, contracting, and employment contracting. Youth representation is appealing to the demographic youth bulge opportunity in the country as a pool to recruit and train from.

Figure 1: The Uganda Red Cross Society Operational Structure

The kind of structure seen above is not of the typical small, humble, locally connected NGO with a clear vision and mission focus of the past. It is the one needed to operate the large operation that the URCS is today. It is not an ideal structure for community mobilization, social diagnosis, and community organization, as Salamon, (2003) recognized. This is in line with the arguments of scholars such as (Cooley and Ron, 2002 and Gibson, 2019) that today's NGO is very corporate in comparison to the early days of a small, humble, locally connected one, a big service provider-dependent on donors, institutional ones, rather than individuals or the public.

URCS projects are mostly short-term focused and service-oriented, with a limited long-term change orientation to address social conditions that are the root causes of people's needs in line with the writings of Gibson (2019). While staff are, in most cases, professional, motivated, and dedicated, they suffer from dilemmas of balancing moral motivation and efficient implementation necessary for discrete projects that they are assigned to implement and the processes they must follow to operate large-scale undertakings, as Gibson (2019) wrote.

There are, however, still attempts to maintain community presence via volunteers' use and membership recruitment but the URCS strategic plan 2021-25 recognises that volunteer management has become challenging as people now volunteer less and for shorter periods, preferring to join paid employment as quickly as possible. This means that the turnover is high and much effort is invested in their recruitment and training and membership is not growing as fast as required.

Adoption of the Enterprise Culture and Language

Today, similar to corporations and governments, many NGOs embrace strategic planning, performance monitoring, stakeholder participation, and marketing and communications, frameworks synonymous with the accounting relevant in competitive marketized settings, more than accountability (Eagleton-Pierce, 2020). A review of the documents and operations of URCS confirms this, as discussed below.

Strategic Planning

URCS employs a 5-year strategic planning cycle. The current SP runs from 2021-2025 with the theme of "sustainability". Underlying this theme is the quest to build on the foundation set during the

previous recovery period, aimed at improving the poor public image that had been eroded by bad leadership and management scandals that bedevilled the society and led to the imprisonment of the then Secretary General. It aims to attain institutional, financial, and programmatic excellence/sustainability. It gears towards consolidating the achievements attained during the recovery phase and addressing the gaps that were identified therein. The URCS defines the ‘sustainability’ stage of its organization’s performance and excellence in four blocks: namely, *program sustainability, financial stewardship (sustainability of partnership and resource mobilization), sustaining membership and volunteer recruitment, and institutional sustainability (operational efficiency)*. This is in text, by and large, a market language aimed at mobilizing and better management of resources for organizational survival purposes.

Marketing Her Work

Marketing her work and fundraising, strategies predominantly in use in the private sector are fully embraced by URCS, as evidenced in the creation of a full directorate for Communications, Resource Mobilization, and Partnerships. The fundraising and marketing unit is fully staffed with career professionals doing all types of promotional and branding activities and events. Community members are no longer treated simply as beneficiaries but rather as clients or consumers of her services. The organization has identified its niche, segmented its market as described above, and has generally adopted a market language and management style in the wake of the market conditions now prevailing. Results-based management and outcome measurement as key parts of the market orientation are emphasized in the organization's strategic plan, and indeed, the M&E guidelines are in place.

Community Engagement and Accountability

Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA) is another area that is receiving greater emphasis in URCS. Guided by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFCRC) *Community Engagement and Accountability Strategy 2021-25* that places local communities at the center of change so that actions are effective, inclusive, and sustainable, URCS has developed its local version, code-named the “Essential Themes Strategy”. It emphasizes Community Engagement & Accountability (CEA), Protection and Gender Inclusion (PGI), and Safer Access Framework (SAF) as pillars in community participation and partnership. With it, URCS aims to inform, involve, collaborate, and empower communities, ensuring that these communities are given a voice. A standout component of this strategy is receiving and addressing feedback from communities in programming to improve and deliver quality and sustainable humanitarian assistance. This is akin to client surveys in the private sector, a purely market-driven approach to speaking to clients. As Ackerman (2004) observed, marketization empowers consumers to let their opinions be heard through exit options but does not enable their active participation as it leaves them speaking to avoid. In the case of NGOs like URCS beneficiaries, they may even self-censor in providing feedback for fear of losing project benefits (Crack, 2013b) and cannot exercise exit options due to their vulnerability (Ebrahim, 2003). To emphasize this point, a key informant observed the following in line with the disempowerment of beneficiaries to complain or provide feedback to or about NGO staff or services:

Historically, beneficiaries are used to receiving supplies from NGOs. They see NGOs and NGO staff as their saviours or donors, just like the way we NGO staff see our donors, and may censor things that go to them. It is, therefore, next to impossible to expect beneficiaries to complain or provide critical feedback about NGO staff or to have the power to reject NGO

assistance. They naturally tend to fear appearing like they are reporting the staff they relate with on a routine basis, and this is so, remembering especially that they are in most cases already in need and vulnerable. (KI, 17/01/2025).

Principal-agent Relationships and Problems between NGOs and Their Donors

Often, NGOs seem preoccupied with the implementation of donor projects, most often institutional ones, with strategic, political, and economic interests (Carothers and Gramont, 2013), and delivery of services that the state ought to have delivered but are, for several reasons, unable to. In this situation, relations between donors, NGOs, and beneficiaries of these project activities are a double set of P-A problems (Cooley and Ron, 2002). The donor is the principal of the NGO, and at the lower half of the charity chain, the NGO becomes the principal to the beneficiaries, contrary to the liberal normative thought (Keating and Thrandardottir, 2017, p.136). When Assad and Goddard (2010) subjected the P-A theory to NGO accountability, they found donors to be the most salient stakeholders. URCS is no exception to these market-occasioned challenges, which play out in several ways.

Time-consuming Reporting

URCS implements several projects funded by different donors, and reporting is one major way to account for them. Staff are always preparing, reviewing, revising, submitting, and resubmitting reports to them. These reports are, in most cases, tools for accountancy in as far as they provide donors' data, they need on NGO performance, and limited information on community participation and the quality of work overall, in line with the views of Ebrahim (2003). Reports pay limited attention to beneficiaries' information needs, the reason Park and Kramarz (2019) observe that the relationship between donors and NGOs ignores beneficiaries, even when they are an important stakeholder

category affected by the donor-NGO contract relationships. Crack (2013) further adds emphasis to this point by pointing out that the tendency for NGOs to make beneficiary accountability efforts non-obligatory but undertake it only when demanded by donors and sometimes host governments invites the accountancy rather than accountability culture. The overall long-term aim of NGOs' accountability does not seem to be self-reflection on mission achievement performance (Ebrahim, 2003) but rather short-term target meetings and efficient project implementation and reporting to donors.

The Use of a Quantitative-focused Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) Model and Tools is Dominant

Analysis of project proposals for some projects that the researcher came across reveals that the dominant M&E framework tool in use, URCS, is mostly the quantitative-friendly "logical framework analysis" (LFA) model. The LFA tool defines hierarchically at the design phase the results of the project, indicators to measure progress on them, the means of verification, and key contextual assumptions that may affect results achievement. Whereas it's a good tool to structure the project results to support proper project planning, management, and M & E by providing clarity on key project objectives, clarifying assumptions based on logic, it mostly favours quantitative targets and methods. It also assumes that social change is linear, thus ignoring its complexity. It, in the process, often ends up addressing the needs and interests of NGO donors and staff by collecting, for reporting purposes, quantitative data on results achieved.

This finding tallies with what Ebrahim (2003) and Edwards and Hulme (1996a) wrote, that the LFA tool that is in use by most NGOs works best with quantification, is less suitable to measure complexity, and is more an accountancy than an accountability tool. Further analysis of some project proposals that the researcher came across reveals that there are usually no beneficiary accountability

indicators in project LFAs, even when the humanitarian community seems to have developed some general indicators to measure community participation and accountability.

Monitoring and Evaluation Activities Favour Rewards Over Critical Reflection

It should be noted that reports of performance assessments and evaluation findings are usually used by donors to decide whether to extend or renew project funding, as Cooley and Ron (2002) argued. Donors generally tend to rate projects that achieve or even exceed their targets in time and within budgets as more successful and commonly reward this kind of success by renewing or extending their funding cycles. Given the over-reliance of NGOs on donor funding, they will often report more successes and fewer failures or challenges. Moreover, given the less NGO power in social relations, when donor priorities or obligations change, dissolving funding agreements with NGOs is easier in comparison with the governments, where bilateral agreements' requirements are more binding (AbouAssi, 2013; Edwards and Hulme, 1996). This makes NGOs embrace tangible and discrete project activities compared with riskier, longer-term engagement endeavours like accountability. NGO staff also tend to view project evaluations as their performance assessments. For these reasons, as Murtaza, (2012) and Ebrahim, (2003) have written, NGOs tend to overstate successes and under-report failures and challenges. This limits the value of evaluations as tools for learning, organizational change, and accountability to beneficiaries and promotes their accounting value instead. A key informant, a staff member of URC, confirmed this by saying that:

Just like beneficiaries may censor feedback they provide to us, NGO staff, we also censor what to include in our reports to donors for fear of sanctions from them, knowing that we depend on them for funding. Our organization and our jobs depend on the quality of the project implementation we do, and the reports, which are the main tools to inform donors about our

work, must be good. So, we are careful with what to include in these reports and the several reviews these reports go through, further sieve out things even if the originator of a report intended to be critical.

These finding implies that NGO progress and M & E reports are less useful as learning and accountability programming tools. Murtaza, (2012) has argued that even when evaluations are done by consultants, the fact that NGOs recruit and manage them means they can influence the contents of these reports, an argument that is supported by the quotation above. About this, Assad and Goddard, (2010) argued a case of a Tanzanian NGO that paid five times the cost of a normal audit to hire an international firm for the purpose of making the report reputable, even when it was not prepared to implement recommendations.

The findings above also imply that because NGOs have control over project information and resources, they, in several ways, guide projects to promote their interests, not necessarily in tandem with the beneficiaries. The temptation amongst NGOs to report only positive results and hide challenges if they are potentially harmful to NGO interests and to overstate achievements becomes real in this situation. Because donors, in most cases, subject project renewal to positive outcomes of evaluations, NGOs have fewer incentives to report failures for fear of missing out on project renewal (Cooley and Ron, 2002; Murtaza, 2012). Due to their weak agency problems and information asymmetry, beneficiaries tend to be opportunistic and welcoming of everything from NGOs, not critical enough about their activities, and self-censoring in many respects, even when consulted and allowed to engage with NGO staff. The P-A nature of the accountability relationship between NGOs and donors has been described by scholars in different ways; upward (Ebrahim 2003a), supervisory (Grant and Keohane 2005), or managerial (Howell, Fisher, and Shang 2019) accountability. The power of the principal to impose sanctions is what differentiates

directional accountability and the P-A model from others (Fox 2007). The P-A model then becomes less useful for relationships not bound by contracts, such as the one between NGOs and their beneficiaries. This exposes the fact that contracts signed between NGOs and donors exclude important stakeholders, the beneficiaries (Kramarz and Park 2019, p.21).

DISCUSSION

Competition and Unproductive Outcomes.

To liberal scholars and Western donors, the increasing number of NGOs and the growing marketization of their funding activities are critical inputs to the robustness of civil society because competition boosts efficiency when corruption and waste are minimized (Cooley and Ron, 2002). The competition also has the added advantage of keeping the humanitarian terrain open to free entry and exit. In the arguments of Cooley and Ron (1992), this is too optimistic or even questionable in some respects. It ignores the fact that sometimes less is more, or more is not necessarily better. Opening the NGO sector to competition through liberalization may have been pushed or necessitated by increased criticism of NGOs and donor-funded projects by sister sectors with an axe to grind with them in the words of Murtaza, (2012), demands for greater accountability by host governments, and broader neo-liberal tendencies of letting the market rule (Basu, 1994). Consequently, Western donors are increasingly issuing short-term, renewable, and performance-based project contracts.

Donors are also increasingly reluctant to fund overheads to push NGOs to rationalize procedures, demonstrate efficiency, reduce waste, improve professionalism, and enhance project implementation (Agyemang, Brendan O'Dwyer and Jeffrey Unerman, n.d.). It may also improve support for donor projects by the host governments (Carothers and De Gramont, 2013). Competition can create principal-agent incentives and unproductive outcomes; makes coordination

difficult in a crowded space as individual agencies concerned with their own survival and autonomy resist coordination with other organizations or even with government; and beneficiaries in need of aid have to navigate individual NGO systems with own eligibility criteria and forms of aid; and disincentives to protect aid diversion and empower beneficiaries, many times suspicious, disinterested, uncooperative, and opportunistic, are created. There's also such a thing as the failure of the market to serve human needs, and it's partly what has triggered an interest in NGOs to find a solution for this failure, as Salamon (2003) argues.

Marketization as a New Programming Approach

Marketization has resulted in new approaches for NGOs and for-profit firms developing, a departure from earlier emphasis and divide between community-based programming to hybrid type public service delivery systems and methods. With an increasing shift towards hybridity by nonprofit organizations reflected in the sector's approach to structure, organizational mission, and delivery methods (Minkoff, 2002) it has been recognized that non-profits will cope with the stiff market competition for resources (Smith, 2010). Yet this has not come without challenges or risks for NGOs and their time-tested community-based programming. Hybridization may have distanced NGOs from their people-centred development approach that was preached by the likes of Chambers (2014), who prioritized local participation and decision-making in a state-supported environment, Korten (1987). Evolution in methods and relationships between NGOs and the private sector signals a shift to cooperation from competition. The new approaches are characterized by co-creation and co-implementation as strategies and operations previously of suspicion are now considered mutually reinforcing. The private sector's fiscal shrewdness and tools may be the new resort alternatives to traditional humanitarian funding mechanisms now under financial squeeze (Willits-King, Bryant, and Adamczyk, 2019).

CONCLUSION

The movement to the market has created deep cracks in the middle of the heart of the NGO sector, which for long has been its identity, mission, and public trust. It's a known fact that the opportunity to support or save the life of someone somewhere, to contribute to or do something socially changing, and to make a social difference is what attracts people to support, work for, or volunteer with NGOs. The move to adjust to market pressures is creating real threats to this, as increased corporatization, enterprise culture, and principal-agent (P-A) relationships gain space in NGO operations (Salamon, 2003). This requires NGOs and society to redefine charitable values. The distinct identities of NGOs and other sectors need to be rethought. Charitable purposes and community benefits need redefining. They need to strike a reasonable balance between their distinctiveness and survival imperatives – that is, things which make them unique, special, and different as opposed to things that make them survive (Ackerman, 2004). Currently, there are tensions between these imperatives, and there's reason to be scared that the survival imperative is getting the better of the distinctiveness one (Salamon, 2003). As Ackerman, (2004) and (Salamon, 2003) suggest, a healthy balance can be struck between survival and the moral imperatives of NGOs, but work needs to be done on it intentionally.

NGOs should engage with their donors and define the meaning of efficiency and results in humanitarian work for them instead of leaving it to be defined by donors. They should avoid entering ambitious results commitments and adopt a progressive implementation of results measurement without emphasis on numerical targets. They should report reality including contextually informed failures or challenges. NGOs should communicate more to the public and other stakeholders, especially their beneficiaries, about their missions and values, activities implemented, and community entitlements to solidify accountability.

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