Original Article

Integrative and Collaborative Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Assessment of Military Support to Civil Institutions in Uganda

David Okumu Munyua[1] & Dr. Adegbite Waliu Mulero, PhD[1]*

[1] Unicaf University Zambia, P. O. Box 35868, Lusaka, Zambia.
* Author's ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0009-0009-2087-9386; Email: munyuado@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Uganda, a nation amidst socio-economic transformation, faces significant challenges concerning human security that demand unified and proactive efforts at the national level. In the wake of a notable decline in insurgent activities across the country, the Ugandan government boldly solicited military support to bolster civilian institutions grappling with effectiveness and efficiency issues. This study centres on the critical collaboration between the Ugandan Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF) and two pivotal institutions: the Uganda Police Force (UPF) and the former National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS). Utilising an exploratory sequential mixed-methods approach, the research begins with in-depth qualitative interviews followed by quantitative surveys. This methodology illuminated the substantial adjustments and socialisation processes that army personnel underwent as they adapted to their new roles in these civilian contexts. The findings revealed a growing appreciation from the host institutions for the military's support, particularly as their interactions matured over time. The military's engagement with both the police and NAADS was characterised by integrative and collaborative civil-military relations, which served as foundational models for their cooperation. However, the study suggests that a multi-model approach is more advantageous in dynamic working environments, allowing flexibility and responsiveness to evolving challenges. Moreover, introducing a national service training program aimed at equipping Uganda's future workforce, with a strong emphasis on civil-military relations as a core component of its curriculum, could foster a more seamless and effective coordination and cooperation between the military and other government institutions. This initiative enhances mutual understanding and cooperation, ultimately contributing to the nation's development and stability.

INTRODUCTION

The primary purpose of establishing a military force, or an army for that matter, has always been to defend a state's territorial integrity and sovereignty. This objective was particularly significant during the Westphalia Conference in the 1640s, which focused on forming modern states. It was essential to ensure that a strong military protected each state to guard against aggression from other nations (Gross, 1948; Straumann, 2008).

In the traditional African context, kingdoms and chiefdoms were often defended by energetic individuals, both men and women, who were guardians of their territories. For example, the Zulu Kingdom in South Africa boasted a formidable army that posed significant challenges to invading colonial forces (Deflem, 2022; Gluckman, 1974). Similarly, the Bunyoro Kingdom in Uganda, led by King Kabalega, engaged in conflicts that compelled the imperial British army to seek reinforcements from Nubians and the neighbouring Buganda Kingdom in order to achieve victory (Kiwanuka, 1968; Uzoigwe, 2013). Military service was not considered a specialised profession in many traditional African societies. Soldiers often participated in various communal activities to support the kingdom and its administrative functions. Consequently, it was not always easy to distinguish between soldiers, police officers, and civil servants because the roles were assigned to non-disabled individuals in the community. No specific training was designed for training soldiers, police officers and civil servants (Lunyiigo, 2015; Rutanga, 2011).

However, during the colonial regime, the idea of an army dedicated to the protection and defence of the state was introduced. The military had no other role than securing the state and its citizenry. They also introduced the police and other paramilitary agencies to facilitate the running of the colonial states. Africans, Ugandans included, adopted this mode of running a state and continued it after independence. The British relegated the kingdoms to a ceremonial role without executive state power (Taylor, 2018). For instance, in Uganda, the Kabaka (King) Edward Mutesa of Buganda, the most extensive Kingdom in Uganda, was left as a ceremonial president. Dr Milton Obote, a Party Leader, was an elected Executive Prime Minister with all the powers over the military and other state agencies. Uganda adopted the United Kingdom's (UK) parliamentary democracy model, which Dr Obote abrogated later in 1966 to make himself an executive president and declare Uganda a Republic. A move that has never been reversed to date. The colonial army, the King's African Rifle (KAR), was responsible for securing and sustaining Uganda's territorial integrity and sovereignty. KAR had no other roles besides protecting and defending the country (Karugire, 2010; Omara-Otunnu, 1987; Sejjaaka, 2004).

During the presidency of General Idi Amin, the Uganda Army's role expanded. Army officers played a traditional role in the domain of civilians. For instance, there were army officers holding governorship positions, the battalion commanders in the districts also supported civil administrative structures, and others held ministerial positions. The impact was civilian victimisation. The army personnel felt they had authority over civilians. Civilians used to fear military officers because of this special treatment of soldiers over and above the civil population. This hurt the country's civil-military relations. Even after the overthrow of the Idi Amin regime by the exiled Ugandans with the support of the Tanzanian military, there was little change from what prevailed during the Amin era (Nayenga, 1979; Peterson, 2021; Peterson & Taylor, 2013).

The National Resistance Army (NRA) had a different approach to civil-military relations while still a rebel outfit. Under the leadership of the current President of Uganda, General (Retired) Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, the NRA believed in working closely with the civilian population as a cardinal requirement for winning the liberation struggle. This was based on Chairman Mao's philosophy of a people's army—the people to the army is as water is to fish—a sacrosanct bond. The latter cannot survive without the former. During the protracted liberation war (1981-1986), the NRA had a cordial working relationship with the civilians (commonly called *the Wanainchi* in the Swahili language). Indeed, the *Wanainchi* supported the NRA rebels with medical and food supplies. The liberated areas established civilian administrative structures based on the National Resistance Movement (NRM) structures called Resistance Councils (RCs). The military leadership worked closely with the RCs to address community challenges (Amaza, 1999; Bell, 2012; Kategaya, 2006; Katirima, 2020; Kutesa, 2006; Museveni, 2016).

After capturing state power on 26 January 1986, the NRA/M did not discard their concept of civil-military relations founded during the liberation war. The RC system was expanded across the country, and the local district leadership was occupied by NRA/M cadres, some of whom were army officers. Uganda witnessed the return of army officers to civil service. However, this time, it was different in that the army officers respected and valued the civilian population and their contributions to national service. The NRA soldiers were disciplined, unlike the Uganda Army of Idi Amin and the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), which was left in charge by the Tanzanian military after overthrowing Idi Amin. The NRA attributed its success in defeating the UNLA to the cordial relationship it had with the *Wanainchi* (Amaza, 1999; Bell, 2012; Museveni, 2016).

In 1995, a new national constitution changed the NRA's name to the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) and the RC to the Local Council (LC) systems. The UPDF retained most of the founding principles of the NRA, more so the doctrine of respect for civilian authority. However, important to note that most officers, except the retired, were withdrawn from civilian roles as the new constitution came into force. Besides, the UPDF was busy fighting insurgent groups in Uganda's northern and western territories, meaning there was little or no need to deploy soldiers in civilian roles. The UPDF officers, in rare cases, only supported civilians during emergencies such as landslides and floods (Behrend, 2000; Dolan, 2005; Namutebi, 2015). This is provided for in the Ugandan Constitution under Articles 208 and 209. However, by 2001, most insurgent groups had been defeated, and others had fled to neighbouring countries. The government resumed engaging the army officers in supporting civilian roles. In 2001, General Katumba Wamala was appointed Inspector General of Police (IGP) after the Sebutinde Commission of Inquiry into the inefficiencies of the UPF recommended overhauling the institution, which was exacerbated by armed gangs' increased

activities in metropolitan Kampala City. UPF appeared to have been overwhelmed by the rising criminality, warranting the deployment of a military mind. The deployment of General Katumba reduced the crime rate, which must have encouraged the state to deploy more military officers to the UPF in the following years (Candia, 2005; LLC, 2010; The Independent Editor, 2019; Uganda Police Force, 2008).

Similarly, in 2014, the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), established by an Act of Parliament to promote agricultural production and modernisation in Uganda, was under intense public criticism over rampant corruption and inefficiency in implementing the designated policy programme. The government responded by creating a parallel organisation, Operation Wealth Creation (OWC), operated by mostly army officers, to take over some of the key roles of NAADS and some success was registered (ACCU, 2013; Benin et al., 2011; Kalyesubula, 2019). As we write this article, we note that the UPDF now supports many more government civilian institutions, and most have great success stories, with a few reporting negative results.

The UPDF's support to the Police adopted an integrative approach. This is where the army officers deployed to support the police are seconded to the institution. The officers are appointed to specific positions, wear the corresponding uniforms, and hold ranks in the police administrative system. This is where the military officers became part and parcel of the employees of the police department, where they were deployed. Contrary to the integrative approach, the collaborative approach was used by the UPDF to support the NAADS. In this case, the supporting and the supported institutions operate in parallel to each other through a system of liaisons. The UPDF, under the Operation Wealth Creation (OWC) framework, supports NAADS by deploying officers to interface with the civilian NAADS officials at the point of service delivery to the beneficiaries of the agricultural services. A few Army Officers were deployed at NAADS Headquarters as Liaison Officers (LOs) to coordinate the activities of NAADS with those of OWC.

Evaluating the integrative and collaborative approaches to civil-military relations is essential to recommend the appropriate approach for harnessing the army's capabilities for civil authority support and effective service delivery to the citizenry. There is no doubt that each approach has intrinsic strengths and weaknesses. The phenomenon of the army supporting civilian institutions appears to have gained traction in Uganda and some neighbouring states like Rwanda, South Sudan, and Tanzania, where the military is considered to be a people's army. The army's support for the civilian institutions is provided for in the constitutions of these states, meaning the phenomenon is likely to continue in the future, hence the justification for further research in this area.

This paper analyses the two modes—integrative and collaborative—of civil-military relations in Uganda by reviewing the literature on civil-military relations, the materials and methods used to conduct the research study, the results and findings, and the discussions. The paper then concludes and makes recommendations for applying the findings.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The Understanding of Civil-Military Relations vis-a-vis Militarisation

Civil-Military Relations (CMR) is complex and multifaceted; some authors risk confusing it with militarisation. The concepts are related but distinct, and it is important not to confuse them to avoid the wrong evaluation of the events and activities carried out by the army to support civilian authorities and society genuinely. Militarisation is how military values and institutions increasingly dominate a society. It transforms society into a confrontational machine intended to achieve the ends of war or violence (Marcuse & Kellner, 1991; Mills & Wolfe, 2000). Definitions by the Oxford Advanced

Learners' Dictionary, development and economic institutions like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and critical feminist scholars all focus on the generation of violence to denote the concept of militarisation (Butler, 2006; Enloe, 2000; Oxford University, n.d.; UNDP, 2023). Contrary to militarisation, Civil-military relations encompass the complex web of relationships between the military, the government, and society, including issues of authority, power, and accountability. Civil-military relations emphasise cordial interaction between the military and civilians at all levels for economic, social and political development (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Schiff, 2008). The critical and constructivist perspectives exhibit significant similarities; civil-military relations encompass a complex web of interactions among the military, the government, and society, which includes considerations of authority, power, and influence accountability (Barkawi, 2011; Enloe, 2000). It is, therefore, essential to understand that militarisation centres on increasing military expenditure and involvement in politics, resulting in a more "militarised" society. In contrast, civil-military relations pertain to the interactions between the military, government, and civilians within a country, encompassing how defence policy is formulated, budgets are allocated, and oversight is conducted.

Research on CMR primarily focuses on how civilian authorities can effectively control the military. The emphasis is on containing the army to ensure that it follows the directives of political leaders without posing a risk to civilian control. Maintaining this crucial balance has been central to the study of CMR. However, much of this research is rooted in the principles of Western liberal democracy (Brooks et al., 2021; Brooks & Erickson, 2022). The distinction between military and civilian authority is often unclear in developing countries. Research into CMR primarily examines the mechanisms through which civilian authorities can assert control over the military. This field of study highlights the importance of establishing boundaries that prevent the army from overstepping its role, ensuring that it adheres to the mandates set forth by political leaders. The overarching aim is to maintain a delicate equilibrium where civilian governance remains intact and is not threatened by military intervention (takeover).

In most African states, it is not uncommon to find the state elements leaning heavily on the army for support to deliver services to the population effectively. This could be because state institutions are still developing core values of independence in their operations. The implication is that the army gains more power and assumes the national guardian status. The literature suggests the army may meddle in the country's politics when over-empowered. This may be true in some instances where the army took over political leadership in developing nations because of having immense power or out of frustration with the civilian authority (Harig & Ruffa, 2022). For example, the Coup d'état in Ghana in 1966, Uganda in 1971, and again in 1985. In each case, the army claimed to be responding to the ordinary people's frustration about the country's poor administration by the political leaders (Decalo, 1973; Nayenga, 1979; Owusu, 1989). The army's leadership in a country is usually characterised by higher performance output at the expense of civilian victimisation by the military or overdependence on the military by the civil authority and society.

The army is intended and trained for warfighting to defend national interests, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Some militaries also have a curriculum on Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA), a humanitarian intervention to help civilians in distress situations. However, many countries no longer have imminent threats related to state sovereignty and emergencies (Cook & Yogendran, 2021; Kelley, 1996). In these cases, the army is left to do routine training and prepare for changing security situations, which are costly activities with no immediate benefits. As a result, some countries have decided to deploy their armies to conduct

peacekeeping operations and/or engage in industrial production. For instance, in Uganda, the UPDF operates a group of industrial companies under the National Enterprise Corporation (NEC). It is also involved in peacekeeping operations in Somalia (African Union Commission, 2017; Freear & De Coning, 2013; Musinguzi, 2024). All these are aimed at making the military contribute to national economic development.

It is essential to know that getting the army to perform roles they were not initially trained for requires a process of role conception. The army personnel receive the new role assigned by the civil authority, and they have to perform the role as per the expectations of the role senders and the society. Since the officers work with civilians in the institutions they have been assigned to support, they have to undergo orientation and socialisation to understand and perform the roles correctly (Ashforth & Saks, 1996; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). Mixing civilians with soldiers in the same workplace affects the civil-military equilibrium in the host institutions and the surrounding environment. It has two extremes in a continuum—civilian victimisation (usurping civilian role and authority) on one end and overdependence on the military on the other. Both of these are undesirable to civilian authorities and the army leadership. Therefore, the desired state would be optimal and can be adjusted per the prevailing work environment and the targeted production level of the supported institution(s). The leaders (civilian and army) are responsible for managing the civil-military equilibrium at the desired level of balance.

Globally, most countries call on the army to address pertinent national problems only when other efforts by the police, paramilitary and civilians have failed. Indeed, many national constitutions, including that of Uganda, have provided for this arrangement. For instance, in the United States, declaring a state of emergency (Martial law) by the governor of a state or the President of the U.S. automatically calls on the military to join the efforts to address the crisis (FEMA, 2015b, 2015a; US Commission, 2024). In Indonesia, during the reign of President Suharto, the national army was deployed to promote agricultural production by working side by side with farmers across the country to address the recurrent problem of food insecurity (Djuyandi et al., 2018, 2019). During the COVID-19 pandemic, many governments deployed the army to enforce the lockdown regulations in support of law enforcement agencies, administer vaccines and participate in research to curb the pandemic's impact. For example, in Israel, the army was instrumental in medical research efforts to work on an effective way of treating and managing the COVID-19 pandemic (Harig et al., 2022; Harig & Ruffa, 2022).

In Articles 208 and 209, the Ugandan Constitution is quite authoritative. The UPDF shall cooperate with civil authorities in emergencies and promote harmonious co-existence between the army and civilians (Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995). Since the National Resistance Movement (NRM), the ruling party in Uganda came to power in 1986, the Ugandan military embraced civil-military cooperation in most aspects of governance—socio-economic transformation, administrative roles, and support to law enforcement. For instance, the UPDF supports the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) through an agency called Operation Wealth Creation (OWC) that assists farmers in improving agricultural productivity through improved seeds and mechanisation of farming methods. The directive to support NAADS came after a public outcry about corruption and inefficiency in the organisation (ACCU, 2014; Editorial Newvision, 2010; Kalyesubula, 2019). The working arrangement OWC (UPDF) and NAADS adopted is one of collaboration, where they interface through liaisons while jointly working on a project for service delivery to the farmers. The UPDF also extended law enforcement support to the Uganda Police Force (UPF) in 2001, when General Katumba Wamala was appointed the Inspector General of

Police (IGP). This deployment of a military General to the police came after increasing crime rates in the Kampala metropolitan area. The Sebutinde Commission of Inquiry into the operations of the Police report also suggested that there are inefficiencies and corruption cases in the Police, warranting formidable government action to address the problem. In the subsequent years, more General and Senior UPDF officers were posted to the police in different capacities to improve performance and efficiency (Candia, 2005; LLC, 2010; The Independent Editor, 2019). This article is based on the findings of a study on the implications of expanding the role of the UPDF to include supporting NAADS, a socio-economic transformation role (collaborative), and the Police, a law enforcement role (integrative) as case studies.

The Integrative Civil-Military Relations

The integrative approach to civil-military relations involves the military, as an institution, offering support to a civilian institution by seconding personnel who join the ranks of the supported agency. For instance, when the UPDF sent personnel to the UPF, the officers were appointed to specific positions and accorded the corresponding police ranks and entitlements. The army officers discard their military uniforms and wear police attire throughout the secondment period. The military appointees to the police included the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIGP), the Chief of Joint Staff (CoJS), and the Directors of Human Resource, Crime Intelligence and Criminal Investigations (The Independent Editor, 2019). The meaning of this is that the UPDF officers support the institution by contributing to policy development and implementation at the strategic level of the Police. However, in May 2024, the UPDF officers were withdrawn after their tenure, probably because the government thought the police had gained the required competence and capability to address their institutional challenges (Aine, 2024). This further confirms that this was a pure civil-military engagement offering support to a

civilian institution, not militarisation, as suggested by some critics (Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts, 2019; Khisa & Rwengabo, 2024).

The Collaborative Civil-Military Relations

The collaborative approach to civil-military relations is a working arrangement in which the military and the supported civilian institution interact using liaisons and joint activities, especially when delivering services to the public. Unlike the integrative approach, the collaborative approach does not involve military officers joining the ranks of the supported institutions. The relationship between NAADS and the UPDF, using Operation Wealth Creation (OWC), is a typical example of collaborative civil-military relations. NAADS was created by an Act of Parliament in 2001 (NAADS, 2023), and a Presidential Executive Order created OWC under the Office of the President (OWC, 2022). It consists of UPDF and Civilian personnel tasked with promoting the government policy of wealth creation among the citizens, with a special focus on the peasant population in the rural areas. Following Public dissatisfaction with the activities of NAADS, the government decided that OWC should support NAADS in delivering the much-needed service of distributing planting materials and equipment to the beneficiary farmers (ACCU, 2014; Editorial Newvision, 2010; Kalyesubula, 2019). NAADS and OWC personnel interact in joint meetings, workshops, and when delivering materials to farmers. They also exchange liaison officers to ensure constant communication and coordination between the two institutions. Recently, the government created other programmes, such as the Parish Development Model (PDM), to take on the responsibilities of OWC and NAADS at the grassroots level. As of January 2025, NAADS was dissolved, and its functions were relocated under the Ministry of Agriculture instead of being an independent agency. However, OWC continued supporting PDM and other related frameworks

within the Ministry of Agriculture (ChimpReports, 2025; ISER, 2022)

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The study for this phenomenon was exploratory, aiming at a deeper understanding of the implications of expanding the military's role in civil-military relations in Uganda. It focused on the relations between the UPDF, NAADS, and the UPF (Police). NAADS implemented socio-economic development policies, while UPF was a law enforcement role—the former employed collaborative interaction, while the latter employed integrative frameworks.

The study used the Exploratory Sequential Mixed Methods. This is a study design where qualitative precedes the quantitative approach. The former explores the underlying concepts described by the participants interviewed, and the latter, using survey questionnaires, expounds the qualitative interview variables on the greater population using a larger sample size. Then, during data analysis, the data from the two processes are incorporated through triangulation to draw trustworthy, valid and reliable findings (Creswell & Clark, 2017; Creswell & Creswell, 2018).

The qualitative strand used interview guides that had a demographic and five significant sections aligned with the research questions. The themes of focus were the motivation of the government to deploy the UPDF to support the civilian institutions, and how the UPDF conceptualised and formalised the supportive roles. It also asked the respondents (UPDF and Civilian—NAADS and UPF) to describe their experiences and suggest potential approaches for harmonious civil-military engagements if the UPDF continues to support other government institutions. Forty (40) individuals were interviewed: fourteen (14) UPDF officers, fourteen (14) UPF Officers and twelve (12) Civilians from NAADS/OWC. The interviews targeted top-level, mid-level, and lower-level managers/officials at the headquarters of the three

institutions (UPDF, UPF, and NAADS) that were directly concerned with civil-military working relations. The five major themes in the qualitative approach are also used to frame the quantitative survey questionnaires. The design of the survey questionnaires was intended to generate statistical data that could enhance the validity and reliability of the interview data. Using the Krejcie and Morgan table for sample size determination (Krejcie & Morgan, 1970) and confirmed by an online sample size calculation application (Calculator.net, 2023), the minimum sample size for a population of 319 is 249. We gave out 300 survey questionnaires and received 268 valid questionnaires. This was an added advantage for statistical analysis (Sullivan, 2018; Uakarn et al., 2021).

The interview data were compiled and analysed using the computer-based software NVivo and augmented with manual coding. The quantitative survey questionnaire data were analysed using Microsoft Excel, supplemented by R, DataTab, and SPSS to produce statistical results. The researchers also made observations and collected unpublished official documents such as standing operating procedures, memoranda of understanding, workshop reports, seminar notes, and presentations as part of the comprehensive database. During the presentation of the results, the findings from all approaches (qualitative and quantitative) were used to generate comprehensive insights and understandings.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND FINDINGS

Table 1 shows the demographic summary. Other variables like marital status, years of service, and salary scale have not been included here. The figures in the table include participants in the interviews (40) and survey questionnaires (268). Most of the participants were males, which is a near-exact reflection of the demographics in the three institutions (BMAU Briefing Paper, 2019; Ssali et al., 2019). The predominant generations are Y and X (born between 1964 and 1995); the Baby Boomers are ageing out while Generation Z is

ageing in. Most respondents had first degrees, and the top managers had second and third degrees.

Civilians from NAADS and OWC combined to dominate the number of participants in the research.

Table 1: Socio-demographics of the Study Participants

Variable	Category	Interview (Qualitative)		Survey Questionnaire (Quantitative)	
		n	%	n	%
Gender	Females	11	27.50	89	33.21
	Males	29	72.50	179	66.79
Generation	Baby Boom	3	7.50	6	2.24
	X	19	47.50	81	30.22
	Y or Millennial	15	37.50	156	58.21
	Z or i	3	7.50	25	9.33
Organisation	Military/UPDF	14	35.00	73	27.24
	Police/UPF	14	35.00	94	35.07
	Civilian/NAADS/OWC	12	30.00	101	37.69
Appointment	Top-Management	23	57.50	174	64.93
	Mid-Management	6	15.00	80	29.85
	Lower-Management	11	27.50	14	5.22
Academic Standard	Post PLE			4	1.49
	UCE	2	5.00	14	5.22
	Post UCE		0.00	19	7.09
	UACE	4	10.00	31	11.57
	Post UACE			15	5.60
	Diploma	6	15.00	74	27.61
	Bachelor	9	22.50	80	29.85
	Master	16	40.00	27	10.07
	Doctorate	3	7.50	3	1.12
	Post Doctorate			1	0.37

Source: *The Authors' Field Data.*

On the theme of the government's motivation to expand the role of the UPDF to include supporting the Police and NAADS, the literature and the documents collected by the researcher point to inefficiencies in delivering the services constitutionally assigned to the supported institutions. Additionally, the participants from UPF mentioned capacity enhancement. In contrast, others said it was routine for them to work jointly with the UPDF as provided in the UPDF and Police Acts. For instance, one police officer (PF5) discussed the UN standard for police-to-population ratio of 1:250. In Uganda, it is 1:1000, and UPDF has unique capabilities that the police can borrow to address the law enforcement challenges. The NAADS respondents talked about the government's interest in cost reduction, creating employment for the UPDF veterans, and exploiting a joint workforce to address societal challenges. Besides, social challenges are now considered security challenges, which could be why the government assigned the army to support the efforts to alleviate poverty and increase agricultural productivity (economic insecurity). For example, NAADS officials ND3 and ND1 talked of the outstanding performance of a veteran association in the greater Luwero in

agricultural productivity that must have convinced the government that the army could do better working with NAADS. They also mentioned the nexus between human security and development indices, thus warranting the army's contribution to development activities. Some respondents opposed the idea of harnessing UPDF's support; they argued that given time, the supported institutions could have addressed those challenges. Some of the responses from the participants are depicted in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Quoted Responses from the Participants

What motivated the government to deploy the UPDF to support UPF/NAADS?	
Participant	**Direct Quote**
Document (LLC, 2010)	The army's role in policing begins with the appointment of military personnel to high-ranking police positions. Major General Katumba Wamala became Inspector General of the Police in April 2001. As the head of the army, the President directly oversees it. Wamala's appointment came after the Sebutinde Commission's sharp criticism of the police and its leadership. Given the circumstances surrounding this appointment, it faced little opposition. After a military reshuffle, Wamala was succeeded by another army officer, Major General Kaihura, in October 2005. Beyond the worries regarding the ongoing militarisation of the police, the notion that only an outsider can address the police's issues raises significant concerns for the force's morale and its ability to operate independently.
PF5	Nevertheless, since OWC is organised from the national to the grassroots levels, NAADS could leverage OWC's structural capabilities to emphasise its goals. The police faced challenges in maintaining law and order nationally, stemming from their limited capacity and skills.
ND1	It was a more affordable arrangement for the government because these officers did not need to rent houses and offices to provide services to the local population.
ND1	The original idea was to create jobs and utilise the UPDF Veterans.
DF10	NAADS encountered numerous corruption issues, prompting the government to enlist the UPDF for assistance. The police, facing capacity limitations, also required support from the UPDF, which possesses the necessary resources. As government institutions, we collaborate to achieve shared objectives.
PF5	The UN recommends a police-to-population ratio of 1:250; however, in Uganda, the ratio stands at 1:1000, indicating a shortage of police officers for maintaining law and order. This results in a considerable operational and administrative deficit. To fill this void, the military often intervenes when police cannot handle certain situations, like civil unrest or disobedience.
DF9	The solution to this issue is rooted in the constitution, emphasising interagency collaboration, shared priorities such as peace, security, law and order, and managing emergencies and crises. Additionally, we have Standard Operating Procedures (sops) created collaboratively by all security forces. This unifies our efforts to tackle a common challenge. Typically, we achieve our goals smoothly because our roles are clearly defined.
DF10	The connection between development and security is irreversible. Development takes place only in secure environments. Thus, human security implies that the UPDF must broaden its role to encompass non-traditional security aspects, including the socio-economic transformation of the community.
DF4	There was no need to expand the military's role.

DF11	The concept originates from the UPDF's history as a people's army. The constitution mandates the UPDF to assist civilians when needed. Whenever civilians face overwhelming challenges, the UPDF steps in to provide support.
ND3	I'm not certain, but it seems the issues stem from executing plans at the lower levels. The UPDF veterans performed successfully in the greater Luwero Triangle, prompting the president to assign the distribution task to the army.
PF1	For instance, we possess a unified anti-terrorism team, a collaborative intelligence committee, a joint command centre, and more. This illustrates how security agencies operate in Uganda. Indeed, I believe it is lawful. I contend that it was about utilising national resources to tackle national issues.
ND1	The connection between security and development is crucial. The deployment into OWC stems from its strong service delivery and clear and efficient command and administration structure, which set it apart from other institutions. Additionally, the veterans were more connected to the community, which made them ideal for helping to provide services to their fellow villagers.

The Authors' Field Data, 2024. Note: DF denotes a Military (UPDF) respondent, PF (UPF) denotes a Police respondent, and ND (NAADS/OWC) denotes a Civilian respondent.

The statistical analysis of the survey responses supports the narrative of the interview participants in the above table. The results are shown in Table 3. Only the variable of patriotism for the UPDF officers is not statistically significant. The rest of the variables could apply to the study population.

Table 3: Statistical Analysis of the Responses on Government's Motivation to Involve the UPDF in UPF/NAADS Roles

Sample Variable	Category	NAADS	UPF	UPDF	N (%)	Mean	SD	Chi-Square (χ^2)	p-value
UPDF Officers are less corrupt	Strongly Disagree	3	3	6	12(4.5)	3.16	1.218	29.067	<0.001
	Disagree	18	12	15	45(16.8)				
	Undecided	37	49	13	99(36.9)				
	Agree	25	25	29	79(29.5)				
	Strongly Agree	18	5	10	33(12.3)				
UPDF Officers have technical expertise	Strongly Disagree	3	2	3	8(3.0)	3.20	1.229	25.078	0.002
	Disagree	12	19	17	48(17.9)				
	Undecided	25	40	17	82(30.6)				
	Agree	49	30	23	102(38.1)				
	Strongly Agree	12	3	13	28(10.4)				
UPDF Officers are more patriotic	Strongly Disagree	5	1	3	9(3.4)	3.44	1.260	14.084	0.080
	Disagree	11	16	13	40(14.9)				
	Undecided	22	30	10	62(23.1)				
	Agree	42	35	30	107(39.9)				
	Strongly Agree	21	12	17	50(18.7)				
UPDF officers are	Strongly Disagree	6	1	7	14(5.2)	3.64	1.135	26.558	<0.001

Sample Variable	Category	NAADS	UPF	UPDF	N (%)	Mean	SD	Chi-Square (χ2)	p-value
hard-working	Disagree	9	8	6	23(8.6)				
	Undecided	12	28	18	58(21.6)				
	Agree	47	46	22	115(42.9)				
	Strongly Agree	27	11	20	58(21.6)				

Authors' *Field Data, 2024.*

UPDF had to undergo role adjustment to adapt to the new roles assigned to it at the institutional and individual levels. The role conception and socialisation process are challenging for the officers and their hosts in the supported institutions. The Police and NAADS participants pointed out that some UPDF personnel underwent orientation, pre-deployment training and briefing to adjust to the new roles. However, some officers were qualified lawyers and agriculturists, so they quickly fitted into the new roles. Some learned from their colleagues and host-workmates on the job to adapt to the new roles. UPDF respondents credited their military values of endurance, flexibility, creativity, regular consultation and communication, and initiatives for contributing immensely to helping them fit into the new role expectations. Table 4 shows some of the participants' responses to the question on preparing the officers for the new roles.

Table 4: Participants' Response to How UPDF Officers Were Prepared for the New Roles

How was the UPDF prepared before joining this organisation?	
Participant	**Direct Quote**
PF11	Our actions are directed by an Operation Order that specifies roles and responsibilities at any moment.
ND3	A procedure standing order, endorsed by the President, directs our engagement with the UPDF.
PF6	We will go through orientation and the various laws and acts that guide policing, such as the Police Act, the Penal Code Act, police standing orders, etc.
DF11	I understand that in areas requiring technical support, some qualified personnel are assigned.
DF14	Diligently choose officers, particularly those with experience in logistics, command, and control at senior levels or technical agricultural matters.
ND2	The UPDF officers were not required to undergo extensive training, as their responsibilities focused on input distribution, which does not demand high skill levels.
DF11	The military prepares individuals to adapt. Thus, officers who are adaptable can seamlessly integrate into organisations.
DF5	We organised capacity-building programmes, retreats, and national meetings to address outstanding or emerging issues.
PF1	We conduct joint planning meetings where each agency contributes its capabilities to ensure success in the operation.
DF9	The UPDF was prepared in terms of capacity but was uncertain about its civilian role.
DF10	Assuming roles that enhance the work of civilian teams, including securing areas, delivering logistical support, and applying military resources for conservation initiatives.
DF5	Most UPDF officers lack technical skills and collaborate with the district headquarters technocrats to ensure the correct procedures are followed.

ND1	The OWC officers received clear terms of reference but struggled to internalise them. The OWC functions as an oversight entity for NAADS and other MDAs.
ND7	I have learned that their responsibilities now include supervising various agencies related to wealth creation.
DF5	Now with PDM, funds are sent straight to the farmers, and our role is limited to oversight, ensuring beneficiaries access and utilise the money properly.

The Authors' Field Data, 2024. Note: DF denotes a Military (UPDF) respondent, PF (UPF) denotes a Police respondent, and ND (NAADS/OWC) denotes a Civilian respondent.

Table 5 presents the statistical analysis for the multiple-response corresponding research question in the quantitative survey. The results indicate that 36.17% and 30.85% of the participants agree that the army officers were oriented and/or qualified for the professional role. This finding is statistically significant, suggesting it could apply to the study population.

Table 5: Setting the Army for the New Roles

Category	NAADS	UPF	UPDF	N (%)	Mean	SD	Chi-Square($\chi2$)	p-value
UPDF officers were oriented	30	27	11	68(36.17)	0.44	0.497	27.131	<0.001
Deployed qualified UPDF officers	11	28	19	58(30.85)	0.46	0.499		
UPDF officers were briefed and did OJT	13	2	8	23(12.23)	0.34	0.474		
UPDF officers got a briefing only	14	15	6	35(18.62)	0.10	0.302		
No idea	3	1	0	4(2.13)	0.11	0.311		

Authors' *Field Data, 2024.*

Initially, the UPDF and their workmates in the supported institutions reported challenging and frustrating work experiences. The police and civilians were suspicious of the government's motives in deploying the military to support their institutions, and the employees of the supported agencies feared for their job security. However, as time passed, the employees of the supported institutions realised their jobs were secure and learned to work harmoniously with the UPDF officers. The supported institutions reported that the character of the UPDF officers, including hard work, cooperation, consultation and mutual respect, helped them to develop confidence and trust in the joint working arrangement. Police officer PF13 and NAADS official ND2 said the presence of the UPDF in those institutions injected fresh energy into their employees and improved efficiency and productivity. The literature suggests that new organisational culture and climate are created when new employees join an organisation, enabling the old and new employees to improve productivity (Denison & Mishra, 1995). Some of the directly quoted participants' responses are shown in Table 6.

Table 6: Experience of the UPF/NAADS Personnel working with UPDF Officers

As a civilian employee of this organisation, describe your experience working with the UPDF officers.	
Participant	**Direct Quote**
DF94	We manage the secondment and attachment process with police and civilian organisations. While some organisations operate efficiently with well-structured MoUs, others require navigating significant bureaucracy to assign officers.
ND12	Our system is highly bureaucratic, requiring a great deal of patience to navigate the processes and systems.
ND3	Conflicts often arise from budgeting and procurement regulations. As per the PPDA law, participation in the procurement process mandates that individuals be full-time employees of an institution. This posed a challenge for the UPDF, as its members were not full-time employees of NAADS.
ND1	Nevertheless, their relationship is troubled by conflict. It is important to understand the two organisations' roles better. Strategically, NAADS has stuck to its initial mission and responsibilities, while at the district level, it has delegated the task to OWC.
PF7	Coping with their work style was challenging. Nevertheless, my adaptability allowed me to collaborate effectively with them (UPDF). My coworkers refer to them as workaholics.
ND12	The individuals I collaborated with are courteous and considerate, while others differ significantly.
ND2	It was challenging at first to socialise the officers into our system.
ND3	I'm unsure about the current situation as we function independently. They manage their own budget, which is financed by the Office of the President, while our funding comes from the Ministry of Agriculture.
ND7	We coordinated with them while they fulfilled their responsibilities and we managed ours.
ND1	At first, NAADS officials viewed the military officers with suspicion. Trust was absent between the officers and the civilians.
DF93	There was suspicion; they believed we had come to investigate them or jeopardise their jobs. While the police were initially wary, they eventually trusted us, recognising that we were allies and that our intention was to support, not to replace them.
PF11	They quickly respond to orders and excel at delivering results swiftly, despite this weakness.
ND7	I appreciate their work ethos. Once the planning phase concludes, they are enthusiastic about initiating implementation, unlike some individuals who need motivation to advance.
ND12	Having them in the field with us drives us to act decisively and clearly.
PF1	Our collaborative efforts in most operations have enabled us to understand the workflows of each agency's personnel. UPDF officers generally complete their tasks promptly before moving to another location.
ND5	Each officer strives to tidy their desk before heading home.
ND2	I truly appreciated the officers' involvement with us. They brought new energy to the organisation and motivated everyone to be efficient and effective in achieving results.
PF13	I believe they achieved this through their work ethic. They fostered a culture of diligence without external pressure.
PF12	Their presence inspires us to work harder.
PF10	They urged me to show greater dedication to my work.

The Authors' Field Data, 2024. Note: DF denotes a Military (UPDF) respondent, PF (UPF) denotes a Police respondent, and ND (NAADS/OWC) denotes a Civilian respondent.

The Police and NAADS personnel (hosts) were queried about the influence of army officers on their work. As indicated in Table 7, both the Police and NAADS staff appreciated the officer's work ethic, feeling that their presence motivated them to commit more to their responsibilities. The results from multiple responses are statistically significant and thus relevant to the study population.

Table 7: Influence of UPDF on the UPF/NAADS Personnel

Category	UPF	NAADS	N (%)	Mean	SD	Chi-Square(χ2)	p-value
UPDF did not influence me (hosts)	6	5	11(8.8)	3.69	1.298	10.040	0.04
The presence of UPDF made me lose interest in my work	9	7	16(12.8)				
I did not get along with UPDF	9	7	16(12.8)				
I like UPDF's work attitude	29	11	40(32.0)				
UPDF encouraged me to be more committed to my work	16	26	42(33.6)				

Authors' *Field Data, 2024.*

The respondents were divided on suggesting models for future civil-military engagement in Uganda if the UPDF is to continue supporting other government institutions. During the interview, the debate was between integrative and collaborative military support to other institutions. However, when this issue was subjected to the survey questionnaire, the results are shown in Table 2, summarising the participants' responses on a Likert scale.

Table 8: Respondents' Preferences for the Models to employ in Future Civil-military Engagements

Serial	Model	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
1	Legalistic (Stick to the legal provisions)	38	22	22	7	11
2	Ad hoc (Engage UPDF when needed)	36	3	36	20	6
3	Mimetic (Copy the UPDF doctrine/culture)	15	5	31	32	17
4	Collaborative (Parallel cooperation)	41	8	24	22	6
5	Integrative (cooperation)	21	6	18	47	8
6	Multi-approach (Combination mode)	14	3	25	49	10

Source*: The Authors' Field Data.*

The Likert variables were transformed into a single variable and regressed against a similar variable for factors motivating the government to consider involving the army in civilian roles. Table 9 shows the results of the linear regression analysis. The findings are strongly statistically significant, indicating that the rest of the study population could have shared similar views.

Table 9: The Relationship between Government's Motivation and Participants' View on the Future of Civil-Military Relations in Uganda

	The Motivation to Involve UPDF in Civilian Role		
Variable	Model (β)	Confidence Interval (CI)	
		Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Participants' views on the future of CMR	0.18***	0.70	0.27
Model Fit Statistics			
F-value	30.45		
R²	0.26		
ΔR²	0.03		

Note*: *** P=< .001. The Author's Field Data, 2024.*

The respondents' suggestions were more than ten models or approaches; however, the researcher summarised them into six categories through coding and theming, as shown in Table 8. The first model, proposed by participants, is the legalistic approach, which suggests that the UPDF should stay in barracks unless there is an emergency as provided for in the Constitution under Articles 208 and 209. There should be no MoUs or Presidential Directives to cause joint operations between the UPDF and other government institutions. In the qualitative interviews, those who support this model based their arguments on the constitution's framers, who stated that the UPDF should be the nation's defender against internal and external military threats only.

The second model suggests deploying the UPDF only when needed (Ad hoc), probably using Executive Orders or MoUs for transactional purposes. This is similar to the current situation, where challenges in the supported institutions motivated the state to call on the UPDF to extend its supportive capabilities. A good example is the deployment of the UPDF to support the Fisheries department in enforcing the technically recommended fishing methods (Edema, 2024).

The third approach suggested by the respondents is that the supported institutions should copy UPDF's approaches to work. This implies that all citizens, potential government employees, should undergo basic military training, as it is done in countries that have national service programmes for citizens. This will ensure the supported institutions can work independently and efficiently with any attached UPDF officers because they would have understood UPDF's doctrine and culture.

The collaborative model suggests that the UPDF may support other government institutions through liaisons or when engaged in joint operations to deliver public service—for instance, the relationship between NAADS and OWC. The integrative model is the opposite of the collaborative, where the UPDF officers discard their military attire to join the ranks of the supported institutions, for example, the relationship between UPDF and Police. The last model, which most respondents (49%) agreed with, is that of combining any two or more of the above five models as and when the situation demands. The multimodal mode of interaction assumes no one-size-fits-all.

DISCUSSION

The first subsection of discussion will focus on the last three models, collaborative, integrative, and multi-model approaches to civil-military relations, which have been proposed by the participants and are relevant to the topic under consideration in this paper. Nevertheless, this discussion will first wrap up the silent issues in the other findings before embarking on the core aspects of this paper. The second subsection of the paper then attempts to conceptualise all the models proposed by the

participants against the overdependence on, vis-à-vis civilian victimisation by, the army.

Generally, the demographic findings reflect the true nature of the institutions selected for this study. It may be slightly different from the national characteristics of Uganda. For instance, according to the recent population census, women are the majority in Uganda by 50.42% (UBOS, 2024); however, in this study and most government institutions, particularly the security forces, the number of females is relatively low. Other demographic variables, such as the dominant generation manning the workforce and education standards, correspond to the national workforce's characteristics (UBOS, 2024).

The participants generally agreed that the state's motivation to deploy the army to support the Police and NAADS was driven by the challenges these institutions faced. They also acknowledged that the UPDF did some good work (66%). Some individuals opposed the idea of UPDF supporting other government institutions to the extent of labelling it militarisation. However, this paper disagrees with that assertion based on the definition of militarisation vis-a-vis civil-military relations discussed early in this article under literature review. The former focuses on military domination while the latter focuses on cooperative military support to civilian institutions to overcome prevailing challenges, and it is usually a temporary arrangement. For instance, OWC has a strategic operation plan with an exit phase at the end of this mission. This is contained in their master reference document (Unpublished manuscript, 2014).

The experiences of the Police and NAADS officials working with the UPDF officers are similar, with slight differences because of the mode of civil-military relations employed. Initially, there was intense suspicion about the army officers taking over their jobs, so the hosting institutions were less cooperative. This led to a challenging and frustrating work environment for the UPDF and their hosts. Nevertheless, the situation changed when they learned to work together. This was driven by the soldiers' cooperative, mutually respecting and disciplined character that gained their hosts' trust and confidence. Civil-military relations shifted from distant to cordial, and the army and its hosts enjoyed working together more efficiently. A recently commissioned study in Uganda also acknowledged that engaging the military's support is generally productive and promotes efficiency (Namwase et al., 2023).

Uganda's integrative and collaborative approaches to civil-military relations have individual merits and demerits. The most formidable approach to evaluating them is to assess them against the risk spectrum of causing civilian victimisation by the army on one extreme and overdependence on the army by the civilians on the other end. The integrative model promotes a joint working environment where the army officers discard their uniforms and work side-by-side with their hosts. This study took the example of the UPF as a case study of this approach. The UPDF officers deployed to support the police wore police uniforms and held office positions commensurate to the police ranks given to them. This meant that the senior police officers gave army officers orders, and the soldiers gave instructions to police officers who were subordinate to them. Working closely with the Police officers means the UPDF officers could apply their knowledge and capabilities to the maximum. It would also be easy to pick the phone and call for additional support from the army on behalf of the police when the need arises. However, the risk of over depending on these army officers is high because of their efficiency and vast relational capital. The Police officers (PF8, PF11 & PF13) attested to this when they said the presence of the UPDF officers increased their operational efficiency and reach and would wish to continue the integrated working arrangement. The positive side of the integrative model is that police officers do not feel so much victimised by the presence of UPDF officers. Recently, the government decided to withdraw some of the UPDF officers from the

police, I hope they continue to perform well without the integrated military support (Aine, 2024).

The relationship between the UPDF's OWC and NAADS illustrated the collaborative approach. NAADS remained a separate entity supported by another military entity, the OWC. The only direct exchange between the NAADS and OWC was the Liaison Officers; OWC attaching officers to NAADS, and vice versa. However, the two institutions conduct joint planning workshops, educational seminars, and field activities, such as meeting farmers and distributing planting materials and farm equipment. Because OWC personnel are closer to the farmers at the county level, NAADS had to depend on them for mobilisation and regular engagement with farmers. This structural disadvantage to NAADS arose from the collaborative working arrangement contained in the Executive Order and the SOP establishing the OWC. The NAADS officials, therefore, may have felt some victimisation/alienation. The collaborative model thus sustains a moderation of overdependence on the UPDF and civilian victimisation by this working arrangement. However, NAADS maintained its independence as an institution as provided for in the Parliamentary Act that established it (National Agricultural Advisory Services Act, 2001). That is why the risks of overdependence and civilian victimisation remained moderate.

The Police and NAADS appeared contented with their civil-military engagement approaches with the UPDF. This could be because of the differences in the institutional objectives and roles. The Police enforce laws and order in the country. This requires using proportional force to achieve the desired mission and the UPDF, as a force, ably delivered the required services as per the design of the Police. NAADS, on the other hand, was established to promote agricultural modernisation to alleviate poverty amidst Uganda's predominantly subsistence farmers. This mission is both technical and non-technical; it involves technical planning and planting materials' production, but it also involves non-technical tasks of implementing the plans and distributing the seeds. OWC was able to do the latter tasks while collaborating with NAADS effectively. Therefore, one can conclude that each civil-military mode applied fits the nature and purpose of the military support model.

Nevertheless, if UPDF had deployed qualified agricultural officers to support NAADS, they could have used the integrated model and achieved the desired ends. One may also argue that the Police have used the collaborative approach whenever there have been joint operations, such as when the country hosted global conferences in Kampala that required a considerable security workforce. Besides, in the Joint Anti-Terrorism (JAT) operations, all security forces contribute their unique capabilities to achieve a common mission, collaboratively. It is, therefore, important to use the multimodal civil-military relations, choosing the appropriate model as and when the situation or the nature of the mission may determine.

The Conceptual Framework

The respondents suggested six approaches describing the relationship between the army and civilians. The selection of a particular approach is contingent upon the nature of the support expected from the army to the civilian institution. In the following paragraphs, we delve deeper into these approaches, exploring their implications and potential effectiveness in promoting cooperation and understanding between the army and the supported institutions. Figure 1 shows the models plotted against the overdependence and victimisation risk-spectrum.

Figure 1: Models of Civil-Military Relations and the Spectrum of Overdependence and Victimisation. Source: Authors' Conception.

Mimetic Approach

The mimetic approach involves applying army doctrines and codes of conduct to a supported institution, effectively transforming it into an army-like organisation. A notable example occurred during Suharto's reign in Indonesia (1966-1998) through the Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI Masuk Desa) programme. This initiative saw the army engaging in civil activities to promote national stability, security, and development. While the outcome was largely positive, the programme faced criticism for its heavy militarisation, obscuring the civilian roles in these activities (Djuyandi et al., 2018, 2019). Similarly, during Idi Amin's regime in Uganda, the army significantly usurped civil authority by taking on roles traditionally held by civilian leaders, such as governorship and district commissioners (Karugire, 2010; Sejjaaka, 2004). Military leaders applied army doctrine to manage the civilian institutions, resulting in a high level of civilian dependence on the army and widespread civilian victimisation by army personnel—a typical case of militarisation.

Ad hoc Approach

The ad hoc approach, as the name implies, involves the army being directed by the deploying authority to intervene in a supportive role during situations that are getting out of control. For example, the army is called to assist civilian authorities responsible for emergency response in a disaster. In Uganda, the army is frequently summoned to support civilian efforts during disasters such as landslides, floods, locust invasions, and other emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic (Khisa & Rwengabo, 2024; Namutebi, 2015). Typically, there is no prior preparation for this civil-military engagement. Due to their well-organised structure, the army usually takes charge once they arrive at the emergency site. However, these engagements often result in high levels of civilian victimisation by the military, as they tend to marginalise civilians from the core activities of the emergency response. Consequently, civilians experience low dependence on army support because of their limited participation or outright absence.

Legalistic Approach

The legalistic approach emphasises that each institution adheres strictly to the established legal provisions. When the army is called upon to support civilian institutions, it does so in full accordance

with the law. This arrangement does not require executive orders from the political leaders to validate the legal provisions. In most developed countries, such as the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, the army typically refrains from taking on roles intended for other government agencies. Even when invited to provide support, the military operates according to legal specifications; reluctantly responding to directives that they consider fall outside their mandate (Huntington, 1957; Kier, 1995; Schiff, 2008). Because of the stringent adherence to legal guidelines, civilian reliance on the army and instances of civilian victimisation by the military are significantly minimal.

Collaborative Approach

The collaborative approach refers to the working relationship between civil and military entities where a supported civilian institution exchanges liaison officers with a supporting military agency. They operate in parallel but come together to address problems that require joint efforts—for example, the relationship between NAADS and the supporting army organisation, OWC. OWC supports NAADS; however, both have their own office locations, budgets, and operational doctrines. They typically interact when meeting farmers in villages or during educational workshops (NAADS, 2023; OWC, 2022). This arrangement allows each party to focus on its roles, fostering mutual respect and understanding. As a result, there is moderate civilian reliance on the army and reduced civilian victimisation by the army. Maintaining this balance in civil-military relations is a significant responsibility for the leaders of both agencies, underscoring the importance of their role in sustaining this delicate civil-military equilibrium.

Integrative Approach

The integrative approach involves merging supported and supporting institutions into a single entity. A notable example in Uganda was the relationship between the Uganda police and the

military. In this partnership, when UPDF personnel support the UPF, they remove their army uniforms and ranks, adopting the police dress code and doctrine. Officers from the army and police work together, performing police duties under a single supervisor, who may be either a police or army officer (The Independent Editor, 2019). This approach tends to create a high civilian reliance on the army; however, civilian victimisation is lower because the civilians willingly accept the army personnel as co-workers. In essence, the supported institution often relinquishes many of its responsibilities to the supporting institution. Consequently, the military typically continues to carry out its assigned tasks as the appointing authority directs, even when they face an increased workload due to the supported personnel's complacency.

Multimodal Approach

The final approach combines two or more of the above-described models. Leaders of both civilian and military agencies play a crucial role in deciding the nature and content of this combination. The choice will also depend on the current situation that necessitates army support. The military is generally adaptable and can respond flexibly to changing circumstances to accomplish the assigned mission.

CONCLUSIONS

This article traced the concept of civil-military relations in Uganda from the pre- to post-colonial era. Uganda experienced both militarisation and civil-military relations throughout its existence. However, it is important to differentiate between the two to avoid giving wrong impressions. The former turns civilians and civilian institutions into military entities for achieving violent ends. On the contrary, the latter is a cordial social, political, and economic development-oriented interaction between civilians and army officers for socio-economic transformation/development.

The gist of this article was to evaluate the integrative and collaborative approaches to civil-

military relations in Uganda to propose the most suitable model for future civil-military engagement. This study explored the implications of involving the military in civilian roles and identified four other models that drew their philosophical departure from the integrative and collaborative models.

This paper recommends the multimodal approach as opposed to the one-size-fits-all concept, in which the army's leaders and the supported institutions could choose the appropriate model based on the prevailing conditions and the nature of the mission undertaken. Both parties should be flexible enough to adopt the appropriate model when the working environment changes. The UPDF and the supported civilian institutions may wish to revise their training curriculum to include lessons on civil-military relations to avert the complicated working relations at the initial stages of civil-military engagements. Introducing national service training for all high school leavers with civil-military relations as one of the core modules will contribute significantly to shaping the future working relationship between civilians and army officers.

Similar studies may be conducted in other developing countries, especially countries neighbouring Uganda to get a regional perspective on this phenomenon. Future studies may also consider exploring the experiences of civilians working in military establishments in what we may call military-civil relations in the UPDF. Regularly engaging the military in civil-military activities may have doctrinal and cultural modifications in the army—a study could be commissioned to explore this further.

Acknowledgements

REFERENCES

ACCU. (2013, March 25). Government to scrap failed NAADS programme. *Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda*. https://accu.or.ug/government-to-scrap-failed-naads-programme/

ACCU. (2014, January 31). NAADS officials sweat over Shs 7.1bn. *Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda*. https://accu.or.ug/naads-officials-sweat-over-shs-7-1bn/

African Union Commission. (2017). *Report on the Ten-Year AMISOM Lessons Learned Conference*. 22.

Aine, K. (2024, May 18). *Museveni Removes Army Officers From Police Top Command* [Company]. ChimpReports. https://chimpreports.com/museveni-kicks-out-army-officers-from-polices-top-command/

Amaza, O. O. (1999). Museveni's Long March from Guerrilla to Statesman. In *African Studies Review* (Vol. 42, Issue 3). Fountain Publishers. https://doi.org/10.2307/525289

Ashforth, B. K., & Saks, A. M. (1996). Socialization tactics: Longitudinal effects on newcomer adjustment. *Academy of Management Journal*, *39*(1),149–178. https://doi.org/10.5465/256634

Barkawi, T. (2011). From War to Security: Security Studies, the Wider Agenda and the Fate of the Study of War. *Millennium*, *39*(3), 701–716. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829811400656

Behrend, H. (2000). *Alice Lakwena & the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda 1986-97* (1 edition). Ohio University Press.

Bell, A. M. (2012, September 30). The Role of Military Culture in Civilian Victimization during Counterinsurgency: Examining the Ugandan Civil Wars. *Annual Conference*. American Political Science Association Conference, Duke University.

Benin, S., Nkonya, E., Okecho, G., Randriamamonjy, J., Kato, E., Lubade, G., & Kyotalimye, M. (2011). Returns to Spending on Agricultural Extension: The Case of the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) Program of Uganda. *Agricultural Economics*, *42*, 249–267.

BMAU Briefing Paper. (2019, October). *Gender and equity responsiveness in the Ministry of Public Service: What were the interventions for FY 2018/2019?* UN Women.

Butler, J. (2006). *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*. Verso.

Calculator.net. (2023). *Sample Size Calculator* [Private Network]. Calculator.Net. https://www.calculator.net/sample-size-calculator.html?type=1&cl=95&ci=5&pp=50&ps=581&x=38&y=22

Candia, S. (2005, October 31). *Police will miss Katumba Wamala* [Newspaper]. New Vision. https://www.newvision.co.ug/articledetails/1114008

Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts. (2019, August 22). *Militarisation, sustainable growth and peace in Uganda* [Organization]. Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts; University of Copenhagen. https://cric.ku.dk/research/militarisation-sustainable-growth-and-peace-in-uganda/

ChimpReports. (2025, January 3). *UCDA, NAADS, DDA & CDO Officially Return to Agriculture Ministry*. ChimpReports. https://chimpreports.com/ucda-naads-dda-cdo-officially-return-to-agriculture-ministry/

Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, Pub. L. No. 1, 6 1995 (1995).

Cook, A. D. B., & Yogendran, S. (2021). Conceptualising humanitarian civil-military partnerships in the Asia-Pacific: (Re-)ordering cooperation. In *East Asia, Peacekeeping Operations, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief* (pp. 35–53). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003179160-3

Creswell, J. W., & Clark, P. V. L. (2017). *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research* (3rd ed.). SAGE Publications Inc. https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/designing-and-conducting-mixed-methods-research/book241842

Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2018). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. SAGE Publications.

Decalo, S. (1973). Military Coups and Military Regimes in Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *11*(1), 105–127. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00008107

Deflem, M. (2022). Warfare, Political Leadership, and State Formation: The Case of the Zulu Kingdom, 1808-1879. *Anadolu Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, *8*(2), Article 2. https://doi.org/10.54699/andhd.1050300

Denison, D. R., & Mishra, A. K. (1995). Toward a Theory of Organizational Culture and Effectiveness. *Organization Science*, *6*(2), 204–223. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.6.2.204

Djuyandi, Y., Bainus, A., & Sumadinata, W. S. (2018). Synergy between the regional command unit of the Indonesian National Army (TNI AD) and the local government in encouraging the spirit of state defence. *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, *12*(4), 127–143.

Djuyandi, Y., Casnoto, H., & Hidayat, W. (2019). Military operations other than war (MOOTW): Synergy of Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) in disaster management. *Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews*, *7*(4), 111– 121. https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2019.7416

Dolan, C. G. (2005). *Understanding War and its Continuation: The Case of Northern Uganda* [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of London.

Edema, D. (2024, November 20). *Mixed fortunes as UPDF marks seven years on fishing waters* [Company]. Monitor. https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/mixed-fortunes-as-updf-marks-seven-years-on-fishing-waters-4830046

Editorial Newvision. (2010, March 3). Uganda: Jail Corrupt NAADS Officials. *New Vision.* https://allafrica.com/stories/201003030135.html

Enloe, C. (2000). *Manoeuvres: The International Politics of Militarising Women's Lives* (1st ed.). University of California Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt14qrzb1

FEMA. (2015a). Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In *Encyclopaedia of Trauma Care* (pp. 607– 607). FEMA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29613-0_100622

FEMA. (2015b). *Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Training Manual: Independent Study Programs and Courses.* FEMA.

Freear, M., & De Coning, C. (2013). Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali. *Stability: Internal Journal of Security & Development*, *2*(2), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.bj

Gioia, D. A., & Chittipeddi, K. (1991). Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change initiation. *Strategic Management Journal*, *12*(6), 433– 448. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250120604

Gluckman, M. (1974). The Kingdom of the Zulu of South Africa. In *Man in Adaptation*. Routledge.

Gross, L. (1948). The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948. *American Journal of International Law*, *42*(1), 20–41. https://doi.org/10.2307/2193560

Harig, C., Jenne, N., & Ruffa, C. (2022). Operational experiences, military role conceptions, and their influence on civil-military relations. *European Journal of International Security*, *7*, 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2021.29

Harig, C., & Ruffa, C. (2022). Knocking on the barracks' door: How role conceptions shape the military's reactions to political demands. *European Journal of International Security*, *7*(1), 84–103. https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2021.30

Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations*. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

ISER. (2022). *Parish Development Model (PDM): 5 things the government must immediately address* (pp. 1–14). Initiative for Social and Economic Rights.

Janowitz, M. (1960). The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, *47*(2), 365. https://doi.org/10.2307/1891771

Kalyesubula, B. (2019). *Assessing the Impact of Operation Wealth Creation (OWC) on Rural Livelihoods: A Case Study of Mityana District* [Bachelor's Thesis]. Makerere University.

Karugire, S. R. (2010). *A political history of Uganda*. https://www.africabib.org/rec.php?RID=384013767

Kategaya, E. T. (2006). *Impassioned for Freedom*. Wavah Books.

Katirima, M. P. (2020). *Compelled to action: Struggle for self-determination*. Author Pad.

Kelley, C. (1996). Limitations to the Use of Military Resources for Foreign Disaster Assistance. *Disaster Prevention and Management*, *5*(1), 22–29.

Khisa, M., & Rwengabo, S. (2024). Militarism and the Politics of Covid-19 Response in Uganda. *Armed Forces & Society*, *50*(4), 1118–1149. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X231162848

Kier, E. (1995). Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars. *International Security*, *19*(4), 65. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539120

Kiwanuka, M. S. M. (1968). Bunyoro and the British: A Reappraisal of the Causes for the Decline and Fall of an African Kingdom. *The Journal of African History*, *9*(4), 603–619. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853700009063

Krejcie, R. V., & Morgan, D. W. (1970). Determining Sample Size for Research Activities—Robert V. Krejcie, Daryle W. Morgan, 1970. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, *30*(2). https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/001316447003000308

Kutesa, P. (2006). *Uganda's Revolution 1979-1986: How I Saw It*. Fountain Publishers.

LLC, B. (Ed.). (2010). *Law Enforcement in Uganda: Katumba Wamala, Violent Crime Crack Unit of Uganda, Kale Kayihura, Uganda Police Force*. Books LLC.

Lunyiigo, S. L. (2015). *Mwanga II: Resistance to Imposition of British Colonial Rule in Buganda 1884-1899*. Wava Books Ltd.

Maitlis, S., & Christianson, M. (2014). Sensemaking in Organizations: Taking Stock and Moving Forward. *Academy of Management Annals*, *8*(1), 57–125. https://doi.org/10.1080/19416520.2014.873177

Marcuse, H., & Kellner, D. (1991). *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, 2nd Edition* (2nd ed.). Beacon Press.

Mills, C. W., & Wolfe, A. (2000). *The Power Elite*. Oxford University Press.

Museveni, Y. K. (2016). Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda. In *Foreign Policy* (Issue 111). Moran Publishers Limited. https://doi.org/10.2307/1149386

Musinguzi, B. (2024). *Uganda: Defence industries come of age…at what cost?* [Company]. The Africa Report.Com. https://www.theafricareport.com/362193/uganda-defence-industries-come-of-ageat-what-cost/

NAADS. (2023). *About Us – National Agricultural Advisory Services* [Government Organisation]. National Agricultural Advisory Services. https://naads.or.ug/about-us/

Namutebi, J. (2015, December 10). 500 UPDF Officers Trained in Disaster Management. *The New Vision*.

Namwase, S., Naluwairo, R., Nampewo, Z., & Waever, O. (2023). *Militarising more to develop faster? Uganda's difficult choices on governance, human rights and the economy*. The African Studies Bookstore.

National Agricultural Advisory Services Act, 2001 NAADS Act 2001.

Nayenga, P. F. B. (1979). Myths and Realities of Idi Amin Dada's Uganda. *African Studies Review*, *22*(2), 127– 138. https://doi.org/10.2307/523817

Omara-Otunnu, A. (1987). *Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985*. St. Martin's Press.

OWC. (2022). *Operation Wealth Creation—O W C* [Organization]. Operation Wealth Creation. https://owc.go.ug/index.php

Owusu, M. (1989). Rebellion, Revolution, and Tradition: Reinterpreting Coups in Ghana. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, *31*(2), 372–397. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417500015875

Oxford University. (n.d.). *Oxford Learner's Dictionary of Academic English*.

Peterson, D. R. (2021). Government work in Idi Amin's Uganda. *Africa*, *91*(4), 620–640. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0001972021000462

Peterson, D. R., & Taylor, E. C. (2013). Rethinking the state in Idi Amin's Uganda: The politics of exhortation. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2012.755314

Rutanga, M. (2011). *Politics, Religion and Power in the Great Lakes Region*. Fountain Pub Ltd.

Schiff, R. L. (2008). The military and domestic politics: A concordance theory of civil-military relations. In *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203892305

Sejjaaka, S. (2004). A Political and Economic History of Uganda, 1962–2002. In F. Bird & S. W. Herman (Eds.), *International Businesses and the Challenges of Poverty in the Developing World: Case Studies on Global Responsibilities and Practices* (pp. 98–110). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230522503_6

Ssali, S., Kabaasa, B. B., & Kiranda, Y. (2019). *A matrix and analysis of gender equality laws and policies in Uganda* [Research Paper].

Straumann, B. (2008). The Peace of Westphalia (1648) was a secular constitution. *SSRN Electronic Journal*, *15*(2), 1–27.

Sullivan, G. M. (2018). Sampling. *Journal of Graduate Medical Education*, *10*(3), 353–355. https://doi.org/10.4300/jgme-d-18-00044.1

Taylor, I. (2018). *African politics: A very short introduction* (Online). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198806578.001.0001

The Independent Editor. (2019, July). Museveni Names Four New Police AIGPs from UPDF. *The Independent*. Https://www.independent.co.ug

Uakarn, C., Chaokromthong, K., & Sintao, N. (2021). Sample Size Estimation using Yamane, Cochran, Krejcie, Morgan, and Green Formulas and Cohen's Statistical Power Analysis by G*Power and Comparisons. *APHEIT International Journal*, *10*(2), Article 2.

UBOS. (2024). *National Population and Housing Census 2024: Final Report* (Census Final Report 1; Volume 1(Main), p. 434). Uganda Bureau of Statistics.

Uganda Police Force. (2008). *Annual crime and road traffic crime report—2008*. Uganda Police Force.

UNDP. (2023). *Soldiers and Citizens: UNDP report highlights call for democratic renewal across Africa* [Organisation]. UNDP. https://www.undp.org/press-releases/soldiers-and-citizens-undp-report-highlights-call-democratic-renewal-across-africa

US Federal Communications Commission. (2024). *The Emergency Alert System (EAS)*. https://www.fcc.gov/emergency-alert-system

Uzoigwe, G. (2013). Bunyoro-Kitara Revisited: A Re-evaluation of the Decline and Diminishment of an African Kingdom. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, *48*(1), 16–34. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909611432094