The Effect of Overlapped Roles of Ownership, Leadership and Management in Post-Civil War Somali Universities

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the overlap that exists in the governance systems of higher education institutions (HEIs) in Somalia. Then, it tries to contribute to the appropriate remedies for effective higher education leadership. With the exception of four universities, all of the investigated universities and their boards exist nominally. Only eight university boards of trustees/directors are structured in ways where the delegation of responsibilities is achieved in a way that gives other bodies a sense of who answers to whom. For the publicly-owned Somali National University (SNU), it is the incumbent President of the Federal Republic of Somalia is the rector and patron. There is a great deal of confusion and overlap in the respective roles of its council and Senate. As a result, the immediately felt knock-on effect has been the quality of education delivered, which in turn impacted the employability of graduates. To achieve better, a good corporate governance system, which is cascaded down into middle and lower-tier management that guarantees a balance of power between different investors and management, is sine qua non. Finally, the FGS and FMEs need to set up proper external quality control mechanism bylaws for the universities to form an internal quality assurance (IQA) apparatus.

APA CITATION

CHICAGO CITATION
INTRODUCTION

In view of Africa’s historical progress of higher education institutions (HEIs), models and petition for delivering educational programs and services have been making headways at all levels since the 1980s, a period of fiscal and social uncertainty (Varghese, 2013). Lending credence to this position, a high degree of association has been established between the educational status of an individual and measures of development (Ozturk, 2008; Fajonyomi, 2008). Countries such as Somalia, which is recuperating from a protracted civil war, find it inconceivable to imagine institutional recovery that sets the nation on a trajectory of desired sustainable development without substantial investment in human capital. Moreover, the employment generation potential is clearly dependent on the availability of the required skilled and trained personnel. The acquisition of sustainable advanced higher education has become a critical aspiration in rebuilding and reconstituting the country’s emerging institutions and industry. In addition to capacity building, higher education plays a crucial role in the advancement and strengthening of human rights, durable democracy, and peace in the framework of justice in a setting as fragile as that of Somalia (Fajonyomi, 2008). Nevertheless, Somali HEIs are faced with difficult challenges in governance and management roles, which subsequently decelerate the graduation of cadres that play a crucial role in economic, political, and social recovery.

The theories of organisational leadership and management are two distinct yet intimately entwined features of the whole operative functioning of higher education institutions (HEI). Leadership is a procedure for inducing decisions and directing people, while management entails the employment and execution of institutional decisions and policies (Taylor & Machado, 2006; Bergquist, 1992). Governance is used to denote scope, structures, procedures, and the act of decision-making that entails the creation of new configurations in either existing or newly constituted organisations. The structure mainly concerns offices, positions, and formal roles within an organisation. Management, on the other hand, refers to the execution of decisions involving necessitated standards for the allotment of resources to individual activities, the apportionment of tasks to various groups, and the appraisal of performance. (Varghese, 2013; Vymental, 2007). For some considerable time, higher education in Africa, governed, managed, and controlled by the state, with dwindling public resources, has been gradually transferring part of its authority and responsibility to market-friendly autonomous institutions in their operations. This trend fits well with the Somali context, which is overwhelmingly privately-run higher education in the post-conflict period (Farah, 2020, Eno et al., 2015, The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2013).

Rational academic dialogue does not always serve to promote and develop institutional effectiveness. Consequently, various areas of study in HEI suffer from the imbalance between empirical inquiry and real-world applications. Therefore, there are profound gaps in formulating effective and lasting stratagems to understand leadership and management concepts in post-conflict Somali HEIs. For the simple reasons of making them more effective to produce leadership influencing decisions that guide people, driven by performance and institutional strength and policies (Peterson, 1995; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Abbas & Asghar, 2010). There is a consensus that institutions function effectively as long as all involved parties possess the skills and tools necessary to implement their respective contributing roles as leaders and
managers in the multi-layered supervisory, policy advancement, and administrative responsibilities essential to function effectively (Dembowski, 2006; Abbas & Asghar, 2010). But, as several recent studies have revealed, the overall state of Somali higher education is contextually multifaceted and lacks effective internal quality assurance (IQA) and regulatory bodies that provide external quality assurance (EQA) due to the absence of funding and other necessary support from the government, private entities, and international organisations. Hence, privately owned and funded tertiary education is outside the recently reconstituted sole government-owned SNU devices (Abdi, 1998; Farah, 2020, The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2013; Eno et al., 2015). Despite the situation, there is limited, informed debate on progress in establishing and improving leadership quality evolution and management for the HEIs and their academic programs.

As the direct administration of universities by either the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) or Federal Member States (FMSs) is no longer functioning effectively, the authority of HEIs appears to be facing some strenuous challenges, including the strengthening of the governance of the universities and redefining capacity and roles for their leaders. The issues here include how much freedom institutions hold or should hold to run their own affairs and, at the same time, rely on government funding or draw on other sources, and finally, ways in which the HEI system can be subjected to quality assurance and control in the future. Also, and perhaps crucial in the short run, how to formulate a method that minimises overlap that hinders the good ascendency of almost all HEIs in the land: ownership from institutional governance (Garwe & Tirivanhu-Gwatidzo, 2016; Li & Yang, 2014).

CURRENT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES

Customary collegial models in which all member of academic community or at least faculty participate in university governance have been under reconsideration for a while, and in the process, some countries have introduced legislation addressing the matter (Baldridge, 1971). For example, in Austria, a law was introduced that gave the university council the authority to assign the rector and prepare institutional plans (Eurydice, 2020). As part of restructuring in 2004, Japan established a three-tier system with an administrative council, an academic council, and an executive board. In 1989, UK legislation stated that overall authority should rest with a board of governors, which would have authority over an academic board. Thus, the dominant pattern that is emerging is a governance structure in which there are three main players: the board of trustees, or council-cum-academic board or Senate, and the executive (Fielden, 2010). In Somalia, the Higher Education Act is being developed in draft form and is waiting to be enacted by the FGS parliament, while the Puntland and Somaliland ones have already been ratified by their respective parliaments. It is common for the roles of the council and the Senate to be defined broadly in the legislation, and this also usually outlines the relationship between the council and the vice-chancellor/rector (Fielden, 2010). The Higher Education Act developed in the Federal State of Puntland (FSP) states that the university council is the governing body of a university (Puntland higher education bill, 2016). Therefore, a purposeful question this study tries to answer is ‘does the aforementioned three-tier system exist, and the extent of its effectiveness in all HEIs of the land (FMS, Somaliland, and Mogadishu that come under the FGS).

Debates on the tertiary education systems in sub-Saharan Africa in general and Somalia in particular focus on whether the key principle that guides recent governance and management reform of the sector is to reconcile autonomy with accountability (OECD, 2003). When assessing autonomy, it is imperative to take into account the outside controls, a role for the FGS and FMSs that cannot at the same time compromise the independence of HEIs. Similarly, constraints on autonomy can also be applied by other sources such as powerful academic staff unions, strong student organisations, or strong dependence on a particular source of international financial assistance. Nevertheless, from the outset, as far as Somali HE is concerned, the greatest threat to better institutional management and academic as well as research development is posed by the incremental blurring of the contours of ownership and leadership roles.

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After the demise of Somalia’s central government in 1991, the tertiary education sector, comprising vastly of university types with one or two teacher training and polytechnic institutes, has proliferated into hundreds or so for-profit HEIs. The first ones were established almost ten years into the civil war, and after 15 years into the existence of permanent SFG and FMSs featured in, and all of a sudden, it became sensible for the federal government and respective FMS ministries of education to establish higher education quality assurance bodies, as aforesaid, to oversee these increasingly convoluted systems (Farah, 2020). Comparatively, at the international and sub-Saharan African levels, the trend in post-conflict Somalia toward privately owned university domination is attributed to the absence of effective institutional control functions by the state. Even though higher education policies and acts have been developed in some parts of FMSs such as Puntland and the self-declared state of Somaliland, the authorities have rudimentary oversight of the routine activities of HEIs. That creates a very difficult situation for the government, including a lack of supervision of the leadership and governance standards and also the absence of financial support. On the upside, that gives institutions greater flexibility and encourages them to develop new ideas and programmatic possibilities (Odhiambo, 2011).

Over time, and with the gradual phasing in of the SFG & FMS, in return for HEIs maintaining autonomy, other stakeholders such as business people and primary customers (students and parents) asked for notable accountability in their performance, such as representation in decision-making bodies, external assessment by neutral authorities, and publicly available reports on activities and accomplishments to qualify for financial support. These instruments, if successfully implemented, will constitute feedback loops that enable decision-makers to enact appropriate adjustments in shifting circumstances. Thus, international institutional responsiveness is dependent on accountability apparatus rooted in university governance, such as the removal of the state from institutional control and management, as well as the establishment of buffer agencies to monitor educational quality and outcomes (Saint et al., 2009). In an innovative legal context for tertiary education in Sub-Saharan Africa, it replicates these global tendencies in which a leader of the state is the titular chancellor/president and appoints the chief officer, namely the vice-chancellor or President, is being phased out.

**Research Aims**

This paper examines how the governance system of the existing management and leadership of predominantly private higher education structures in Somalia is designed, managed, and administered in post-conflict Somalia. In particular, it aims to review the balance of power and associations between leadership modalities adopted by respective universities in providing strategic direction and its subsequent impact on service efficiency. Also, it highlights, at the organisational level, based on the findings of the study, the mismanagement of these institutions through the distribution of power and authority and their detrimental effects on the universities. Finally, it tries to contribute to and recommend the appropriate remedies for effective higher education leadership.

**METHODOLOGY**

**Target Population and Sample Selection**

The target population consists of all the hundred registered privately-owned universities and one public university. Due to the similarity of governance systems in private and public universities, 40 met the selection criteria of being chartered, licensed, or accredited by the appropriate Somali higher-education agencies, offering at least four-year undergraduate degrees (bachelor degrees) or postgraduate degrees (master). Also, delivering courses predominantly in a traditional, face-to-face, non-distance education format was important for being selected for the study (UniRank, 2021; Ranking Web of Universities, 2021; Reddit, 2021).

The selected universities’ governance structures, function and power arrangements and the subsequent impact on efficiency and service delivery have been observed. Therefore, the individual HEIs in the five FMSs, the capital city of FGS, and the self-declared Somaliland government were examined regarding their particular governing body structure, type, and sizes, such as the board of trustees/ general assembly, the university council,
the Senate, and the student governance in place. Finally, whether it is complete or otherwise and consistent across separate bodies, selection modalities, periodic convening schedule (how often the individual bodies convene/year), their term and that of the president/chancellor/rector, responsibilities, and its effectiveness. In order to achieve the above undertakings, data was collected from those universities’ websites, and 320 cross-section questionnaires were distributed. The main reference here is to those bodies, such as governing figures and management, academic staff, administrative non-teaching staff, and members of the student body, who were interviewed anonymously in person and/or over the phone. Finally, the results were presented and discussed. In addition, recommendations were provided for rectifying any flaws in their existing governance structures and also in conformity with the internationally accepted ones.

RESULTS

Contrasting the pre-civil war Somalia tertiary education framework, where the head of state served as the president/chancellor of the only public Somali national university (SNU) at the time (Abdi, 1998; Farah, 2020; Eno et al., 2015), the institutional governance is either community-based, quasi-religious non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) or corporately and commercially owned ones reputed with a founding father or shareholder members (The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2013). In that regard, the organisational structure of the universities examined governing body types is, barring the reconstituted sole public one in which the President is the titular rector and a cascaded down the hierarchy in which the board of trustees/directors/executives are at the pinnacle of the decision-making process, followed by the university council/board of management, the Senate and student governance.

Of the 40 private universities examined, 18 (45%) mentioned on their websites that they have a board of trustees/directors/general assembly, 15 (38%) have a university council/board of management, 11 (28%) with the Senate, and 6 (15%) student governance. But, only 4 universities detailed the roles of each governance level on their websites. Only one university provided detailed information about the governance structure, including the number of members, their names, respective responsibilities, tenure, and the number of meetings held each year.

There is no definitive sacrosanct modality as far as the university governance structure is concerned (Communities of University Chairs, 2020; De Coster et al., 2008; Magalhães et al., 2013; Pruvot & Estermann, 2018). In that regard, the surveyed private universities use the terms “board of trustees” and “board of directors” interchangeably for the same purpose of being a group of individuals, including the founders or a corporate assemblage of investors (quasi-religious or private business), as there are no provisions such as acts of parliament by the FGS parliament, that regulates for a particular structure of university management structures. Based on the Interviews conducted both through telephone and one on one with members of governing bodies, administrative and academic staff of a particular university, only in 8 HEIs are the university board of trustees/directors structured in a way where the delegation of responsibilities is accomplished and give space to other bodies such as the council, Senate, and student governance to answers to whom, and whom to address should a problem arise. The case is different from the publicly owned SNU, whereby the incumbent President of the federal republic is the rector and patron, and it is a vice-rector and a board appointed by him that runs the executive affairs of the university. The tenure for the vice-rector is 4 years and only once has the incumbent been replaced since the SNU reconstitution in post-civil war Somalia. This is true in most East African countries in which the public HEIs more or less follow the scheme of chancellor, vice-chancellors, and university council, while overwhelmingly, Private HEIs adopted the aforesaid cascaded pattern that is not by Somali public HEIs. Even so, after 2003, universities, with the exception of a few had their own board established by government proclamation. Consequently, turning them into self-governing from the direct interference of the respective governmental education agencies: federal member states and federal government of Somalia (Varghese, 2013). Again, based on the survey, there is a great deal of confusion between the council and the Senate with 15 universities having adopted the council and four calling it the
board of management. The same goes for the Senate, whereby three universities named it an academic committee, an academic council, and an executive committee, respectively.

The answers from private universities were predicated on the questions supplied and those from interviewed individuals regarding their governance structures. The board of trustees/the general assembly/the board of executive directors is the highest governing body of the university (ostensibly not be paid for their services and shall, in effect, perform voluntarily). The board issues focused on the overall policy directives and guidelines along which the university is steered, the appointment of the President, the chancellor, or rector. They also review the annual report and budget of the university. Their composition ranges between 5 to 9 individuals, mainly consisting of founders and stakeholders. Again, with the exception of four universities, they exist nominally and it is self-appointed, never vacated the post since the university was established when owners/shareholders became the board themselves, and if they could not fill the quorum, they bring either close family members or trusted individuals. Or else, the founding father, who is also the President, is the ultimate decision-maker on who does what and gets which job. In other words, HE, as female figures never feature in the role throughout Somalia, is the titular leader of the university. Noteworthy is the renewal of the tenure of the President or members of the board, which was not predicated upon performance appraisal, but on whether or not the concerned person is obedient in view of the assigning establishment. Very often, that is the biggest shareholder or the owner who indicates whom they vote in or out.

The university council is appointed by the board of trustees for a period of 4 years to deliberate on matters affecting the institutions. They are the executive body that runs the day-to-day affairs of the university and ensures the due implementation of the objectives and functions of the university, such as the administrative structure, financial and academic matters. The council appoints senior officials of the university, excluding the president/chancellor and vice president/chancellor. However, from the overall picture, the interviews conducted and assessments made a point to the President, who, as aforementioned, as also head of the board of trustees, other than few universities, has never been either re-elected or replaced since the establishment inauguration unless death takes him or he voluntarily vacates office. Some respondents also purported that the selection of council members in private universities was based on favouritism, clan, or religious affiliations. Since the board and the President, contrary to the university statutory laws, are virtually sacred, most council members assembled are recycled within the system. Thus, their term can be extended numerous times. Normally, the length of tenure for council members is 4 years. However, membership can be renewed for as long as the members are still favoured by the appointing authorities.

The university senate is made up of the academic staff, the President as chairperson, the vice-president(s), the students’ union, and the deans of schools and faculties. The Senate meets at least once a semester. Their role is to discuss the academic affairs of the university (the implementation of academic policy, advise the university council, regulate the programs and admissions, promote coordination, control and general direction of research and publication of the university), and finally submit recommendations to the university council for consideration. Only one university specified the required quorum for these activities. However, based on the survey findings, there is a great deal of confusion and overlap in relation to the respective roles of the council and that of the Senate. Sometimes, the board encroaches upon the aforesaid role of the council and Senate. Mainly, it has to do with the capacity of the institution or long-standing culture based on the owner/stakeholder rules as the *modus operandi*.

Student governance/union exists pretty much in almost all universities, though only 15% of examined universities stated this on their websites. They elect their own student government leaders and secretaries for the same term. On average, the student government also has a 15-member strong senate, which serves as the legislative arm of the student government, and a nine-member judiciary that, among other things, keeps the peace between the legislature and the executive branches of the student government. Normally, their tenure is between 2 to 4 years.
DISCUSSION

It is a commonplace that the university as an organisation is in perpetual change, and it starts with leadership, whereby existing responsibility is held and answerable to the linking elements of the management structure and its subsequent roles (German Rectors’ Conference, 2017, De Boer & Goedegebuure, 2009). Post-civil war Somali universities initially started with a low base and gradually made stable and praiseworthy progress, mainly due to putting in place the basics of a learning environment for the first ten years of the last two decades. Nevertheless, the delivery of higher education services flattened and started to decline or get stagnant due to the compromised and blurred quality of the leadership and, consequently, the management. The sluggish progress is chiefly transpired by misperception and overlap persisting in their corporate governance and the absence of quality control mechanisms (external and internal). Despite the fact that the board of trustees is affiliated with the shareholders and is sometimes obscured by the founding father figure, representation of diverse occupations, genders, religions, and cultures is lacking in their selection. This is due to the absence of a code of practice on corporate governance together with universities’ ascendency tools such as statutes, ordinances, financial regulations & procedures, and standing orders of the council (Communities of University Chairs, 2020).

This overlap of ownership and governance made the institutional residence a highly personalised one where the tenure of other important stockholders, particularly the academic, administrative, students, and their parents, was heavily compromised and beset with secretive dealings. Most of the board members are therefore, given the privilege with minimal input, resulting in a facade of the board of trustees. Their selection is not based on experience and knowledge of the available pool for the organisation. It is beyond coincidental and a great deal of clan/religious NGO’s allegiances that almost all private universities throughout the country are, in one way or the other, run by entities with similar interests. Consequently, the aforesaid modality has a knock-on effect on the quality of the services delivered.

Also, the existing governance ascendency bodies recycled within the system restricted the extent to which new ideas could permeate the university structure. That is mainly due to the deficiency of funding and other necessary support from the government, private, and international organisations; the absence of operational statutory regulatory tools such as minimum standards for management and academic programmes; and effective IQA regimes that provide EQA (Farah, 2020, Eno et al., 2015, The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2013). As a result, this has rendered almost all institutions stationary in which mere activities rather than achievement are the norm for year-to-year output. That lack of effective statutory regulatory bodies that can periodically assess management and leadership appointments gave rise to the institutional accountability and efficiency of the governing board, the council and the Senate being practically non-existent. As far as the sole public university is concerned, the major Achilles heel is that, as aforesaid, the council is appointed by the President, and members do not have to attend meetings and subsequently contribute that much to the council meetings as the vice-chancellor has the prerogative of the decision-making process (Farah, 2020, Eno et al., 2015, The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2013).

Higher education providers throughout the world are now in the process of reinvention to become more enterprising with institutional renovations evolving to improve their cooperation with businesses and put in place sound executive-level controls. In such a context, the current leadership and management of Somali universities could set themselves free from the powerful owner/s’ grip, and the clan/religious NGO’s culture mellowed during the long and protracted civil strife and embrace policies with the vision of a future that inspires people and dynamically generates progressive strategies for the future. Based on the universities studied, the activities of one institution are mirror images of the other, setting the timetable for the semester, assigning every unit to a lecturer, and collecting the fees. Therefore, the formal powers of Somali private universities’ top leadership and management have been one with an increasingly tight grip on all levels of the organisation at the expense of more reciprocal or participative modes of governance based on the
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As changes in higher education is appropriately and non-transformationally gradual, universities in Somalia require acceptable and articulated strategic thinking and plans aimed at SFG and FMSs to establish priorities and clear direction regarding what and how to incrementally achieve desired results. Therefore, to realise the anticipated outcome, the knowledge and skills of leaders and managers are far more important in planning desired models that are strategic and incrementally cascaded through the whole institution. Thus, for almost all privately-owned universities, adaptable planning processes implemented through the complementary roles of leaders/owners and managers deliver the most fruitful HEI environment evolution (Taylor & Machado, 2006). To achieve the above, a good corporate governance system that guarantees a balance of power between different investors and management is sine qua non (Milosevic et al., 2015; Bradford et al., 2017).

In order to come up with a policy that will address the deficiencies that exist and ensure effective institutional practices that improve governance (leadership and management), instructional and research leadership further, the HEI stakeholders will need to consider and quickly attend to setting up functional corporate structures that are responsive to expectations delineated through the overall structure as implicated through the work of stakeholders, university council, the Senate and student governance (Fielden, 2010). For that to happen, there should be an informed debate on establishing and improving the leadership quality evolution and management of the HEIs and their academic programs to make up for the period lost during the civil war to beef up the delivery of quality university education (Farah, 2020, The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2013).

Another factor that contributed to compromised governance and the subsequent knock-on effect on quality, particularly as experiences gained in neighbouring countries such as Kenya indicate, is the rapid unintended expansion of universities. Since 1990, the growth of the number of universities in Somalia has been astronomical, given the poor state of the country’s political, socio-economic and infrastructure, which deemed these undertakings necessary. The sweeping effect of this impulsive expansion of university education without a proportionate increase in the level of funding will inevitably lead to a precipitous decline in the quality of education and compromised decision-making within university governance (Sifuna, 1998). Therefore, Somali HE leadership needs to improve the quality of the services they deliver to meet global standard benchmarks for excellence in the context of harmonisation and competition from within cross-border institutions. This will bring the mushrooming of universities into order, and those that fall through the challenge will be naturally eliminated. Inevitably, a process that will continue until the number of tertiary education providers and their customers gets into equilibrium is urgently needed.

In terms of remedying the situation, the governance challenges within institutions should be required to put in place effective systems of accountability, performance procedures for the boards and other stakeholders. It is a commonplace for the board members to take a partisan view and undermine the role of either the council or the Senate. Also, academic consequences are accorded low priority compared to financial gains. To resolve this, effective governance strategies and rapid and extensive changes in governance structures where the trustees/owners take the role of advisory and superficial roles are necessary. In addition, the
quality of leadership and management ranks should be substantially improved by choosing the presidency/chancellery from highly qualified personalities to make institutional governance more effective. Also, ultimately find an appropriate trajectory for effective leadership to the vision and mission of the institution, quality improvement, academic urgencies and financial robustness, competence and equity concerns, local significance, global standards, and rankings.

The transformation at the top ought to cascade downward, reaching the middle and lower tiers of management. As Ramsden (2002, p. 24) opens in his salvo on “The leadership challenge in the context of higher education”, “Outstanding leaders base their hopes for the future on what they have learned through assessing their past experiences”. There is some relentless and deep-seated academic culture developed in a very short space of time in which the top echelons should give their blessings in undertaking any major transformation prior to its implementation. This makes, as Bruner (2017) put it in his “The 3 Qualities That Make a Good Dean”, “tenure-promotion ladder from scholarship to administration either missing or very slow”. Due to the above, the organisational alteration in human resource policy, treatment and achievement management systems, staff training, and development must be dealt with and rectified (Ramsden, 2002). The separation of the institution’s ownership from its governance is a pressing matter in the Somali HE world, followed by the recruitment of qualified members for the role if a particular university wants first to survive in the myriads of similar institutions providing almost copycat services, and secondly make headways in promoting their institutions for the market. This crucial step will trigger some management ball rolling. Because winning scholarships, research grants and educational facilities will remain nonexistent unless universities recruit, for example, staff members with PhDs gain a lot of exposure to how things are accomplished from similar institutions for the role of presidents and vice-presidents of the council, the senate and university management ranks.

Another equally important issue is that those leaders, once they are headhunted and recruited, ought to empower the middle management cadres and give them the opportunity to improve their leadership capabilities in academic, research, and development. These will give them confidence and hope for future career advancement. This incentive and sanctioning of deans, heads of departments, and administrative staff is a prerequisite for the universities of Somalia to get out of the vicious cycle of patronage and accommodate change for the better (Bolden et al., 2008).

Ultimately, the SFG and FMEs ought to set up proper external quality control mechanisms bylaws that enforce the universities to set up IQA apparatus that will definitely nudge the management, leadership structures and roles in the Somali University situation in the right direction. Finally, lessons from such entities as the Association of African Universities (AAU), Senior University Management (SUMA), leadership management (LEDEV) and management development (MADEV), the Pan-African Institute of University Governance (IPAGU) in Cameroon, and the African Leadership Centre in Kenya (Varghese, 2013) should be embraced by the corporate governance of private and public universities in Somalia in order to bolster their leadership and managerial capacities. Thus, ensuring effective governance of higher education in the country and being part of a harmonised system of delivery and monitoring of higher education in Africa.

Disclaimer: There are no competing interests to declare.

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Puntland higher education bill (2016) not available online. Contact: info@parliament.pl.so. http://en.puntlandparliament.net/act/


