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Assessing the Effectiveness of the Institutional Frameworks Established by the Government to Enhance Accountability in Local Governments in Uganda: Voices from the Greater Kigezi District Local Governments

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*Effectiveness,
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This study investigates the levels of stakeholder participation in management decision-making for the effective management of Kabale and Mbarara Central Markets in Uganda. Management decision-making is crucial for effective governance. Involving stakeholders ensures reliable, inclusive decisions. Structured decision management is essential for urban markets, vital for socio-economic development in towns, especially in developing countries like Uganda. Despite the benefits of participatory management, clear and transparent guidelines between vendors and market authorities are often lacking. Authorities frequently made unilateral decisions on market sales, redevelopment, and operations without involving key stakeholders. Using a descriptive case study design, data were collected through interviews and questionnaires. Results indicated that while stakeholder participation was more consolidated in implementation activities, problem rationalization and ensuring fair representation in boundary condition settings still had wide gaps. Although some collaborative initiatives were seen, the decision-making process was primarily top-down and resulted in frustration and resistance from stakeholders where inappropriate. This exclusionary strategy diminishes confidence between market authorities and vendors, hence compromising the efficacy of governance frameworks. Transitioning to a more participatory decision-making paradigm is essential for enhancing transparency, mitigating disputes, and ensuring that policies address the requirements of all market stakeholders. These findings highlight an urgent call for stakeholder inclusion in market governance to foster transparency, equity, and sustainable innovation. Tackling these challenges is key to the successful integration of vendors in management and requires structured vendor representation in decision-making forums and participatory policy frameworks to improve market governance effectiveness and boost stakeholder satisfaction. The study enhances participatory urban governance literature and provides insights for policymakers and planners to improve stakeholder engagement in urban market management.

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INTRODUCTION

Accountability is an ethical concept concerning proper behavior and it deals with the responsibilities of individuals and organizations for their actions towards other people and agencies. The concept is used in practical settings, notably in describing arrangements for governance and management in public services and private organizations. The term is often used synonymously with concepts of transparency, liability, answerability and other ideas associated with the expectations of account-giving. As an aspect of governance, it has been central to discussions related to problems in the public sector, nonprofit and private (corporate) worlds (Reyes, 2006).

The problem of holding politicians and administration accountable for their actions in the new governance environment has been widely acknowledged. As the interest in 'accountability' has increased, the definition of the term itself seems to have become more ambiguous. Scholars have argued that the concept is all but well-defined and that the definition of the term has moved and expanded (Mulgan, 2000; Sinclair, 1995; Dubnick, 2005).

Dubnick (2005) traces the origins of the concept of accountability to the emergence of royal legal traditions in England, well before the rise of the modern bureaucratic state. Mulgan (2003) and Bovens (2005) also acknowledge the history of the term but argue that for a long time, it was little used outside the sphere of financial accounting and that it first spread to a wider use with the New Public Management (NPM) reforms that started in the 1980s. According to Mulgan, the concept of accountability has gained ground on the term responsibility (Mulgan 2000: 557-558). In Mulgan's view, accountability was first conceptually included in the idea of responsibility, but later gained ground as an individual concept, even to the extent of overweighting responsibility in both importance and scope.

Accountability being a moral issue requires the exercise of one's ethical virtue. However, the study of ethics has been at the heart of intellectual thought since ancient times. Its ongoing contribution to the advancement of knowledge and science makes it a vital aspect of management theory regarded as a set of moral principles (Carrol & Buchholtz, 2008). Ethics itself is a discipline that deals with what is

good and bad and with moral duty and obligation). The need for high ethical standards and moral conduct has had many advocates throughout history. Confucius talked about the ethical path that one should follow here on earth, which he called 'the way' (Hansen, 2007:2). When asked if there was any single work that could guide a person's entire life, he replied that perhaps it was 'shu'; a word that means compassion and open-heartedness (Freedman, 2002). Thus, the conduct of public business requires persons who are committed to doing the right things at the right time (normative ethics).

Uganda has a number of institutional frameworks established by the government through the constitution and presidential arrangement to enhance accountability so as to tackle the problem of corruption that has eaten up the heart of the economy and in the process bred negative consequences given the losses incurred by the country in the hands of the merciless and ruthless public servants that mismanage the tax payer's monies-having a direct impact on the state of service delivery to the common publics. These institutions include the Inspectorate of Government (IGG), CID-Police, Director of Public Prosecution (DPP), Office of Auditor General (OAG), Anti-Corruption Court, and State House Anti-Corruption Unit, among others.

In December 2019, the Government of Uganda launched the Zero Tolerance to Corruption Policy (ZTCP) and the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) 2019/20-2023/24 to tackle the growing corruption problem. The NACS provides a framework for implementing the ZTCP, which aims to establish anti-corruption institutions, prevent corruption, encourage public participation, foster integrity, and promote individual commitment. The NACS guides stakeholders in responding to corruption according to the ZTCP objectives. However, after four to five years of implementation, the situation does not seem to get any better as cases

of corruption have not only increased but taken different directions.

Problem Statement

Despite Uganda's strong legal framework against corruption, the continuing prevalence of corruption raises questions about the root causes. Corruption appears to be deeply embedded in systemic, cultural, and political dynamics, challenging the efficacy of legal measures alone. According to the Inspectorate of Government (IGG), the cost of corruption is significant in Uganda, with an estimated total cost of UGX 9.144 trillion per year. This amount equals 44% of the total government revenue in the year 2019. The highest total cost of corruption was estimated in the environmental protection sector, with approximately UGX 2.8 trillion per year. Corruption related to taxation is estimated at UGX 136 billion per year, while corruption related to public utilities (water and electricity) results in a loss of almost UGX 478 billion per year. The estimated cost of corruption in natural resource contracts and royalties is UGX 868 billion annually. Absenteeism in the healthcare and education sectors causes an annual loss of approximately UGX 2.3 trillion, with corruption in healthcare amounting to nearly UGX 191 billion per year and corruption in the education sector estimated at UGX 278 billion per year. The estimated cost of bribery in the security sector is UGX 91 billion per year. The cost of bribery for citizens to receive permits and other regulatory services is estimated at UGX 244 billion annually. Finally, about UGX 614 billion is lost to corruption in procurement sectors. Such a state of affairs takes place in an environment where the government has put in place numerous institutional frameworks to combat the vice. Hence this study set out to assess the effectiveness of the various government institutional frameworks put in place to enhance accountability so as to combat corruption that adversely affects service delivery.

Research Question

- The main research question addressed by this study is: How effective are the institutional frameworks put in place by the government to enhance accountability in the public sector?

LITERATURE REVIEW

Accountability is always related to good governance that implies public organizations which conduct public matters, manage public funds and guarantee the realization of human rights in a way fundamentally free from abuse and corruption, as well as obeying the rule of law (Bhuiyan & Amagoh, 2011; Morrell, 2009; United Nation Human Rights, 2012). In this day, accountability and governance appear to be coexisting with each other. Collier (2008) stated that accountability entails governance and a stakeholder accountability perspective is the only available option for organizations like the ones in the public sector. This notion is also shared by O'Dwyer & Unerman (2007) who states that in the quasi-public sector accountability mechanisms have tended to focus on upward accountability to funders rather than downward to the recipients of services.

Therefore, accountability in the public sector can be defined as the answerability of public officials to the public, the law, and other governing bodies for their actions, decisions, and policies. It encompasses various dimensions, including political, financial, administrative, and legal accountability. Political accountability refers to the responsibility of elected officials to the citizens who elected them, while financial accountability focuses on the proper management and allocation of public resources. Administrative accountability ensures public officials adhere to established rules and regulations, while legal accountability holds individuals liable for law violations (Oketch & Tumukunde, 2013).

If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. Therefore in framing a government

which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in enabling the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control of the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions so as to guard against wrongdoing by those entrusted to govern (Madison, 1788).

Since accountability is a relational term, a person or organization has to be accountable to someone else. It is therefore essential, in thinking about accountability in a given situation, to distinguish between power wielders and the accountability holders to which they are held accountable. Accountability is a matter of degree. For a relationship to be one of accountability, there must be some provision for interrogation and provision of information, and some means by which the accountability-holder can impose costly sanctions on the power-wielder (Katusiimeh, Oketch, & Mucunguzi, 2024). However, there is no presumption that the accountability holder knows what information to ask for, that all information desired by the accountability-holder will be provided by the power-wielder, or that the accountability-holder's sanctions will be effective in changing the power-wielder's behaviour. In addition, imposing sanctions is often costly to the accountability-holder as well, tending to limit the extent to which they are employed (Keohane, 2003)

METHODOLOGY

The study applied a descriptive research design in the collection and analysis of data from the five local governments (Kabale, Rukiga, Rubanda, Kanungu & Kisoro) that formed the unit of analysis for the investigation. Three categories of respondents took part in the study comprising 251 technical staff, 98 councilors and 263 community respondents. The technical staff and councillors were selected using a simple random sampling technique whereas the community respondents were purposively selected by virtue of their experience in

local government operations and therefore provided key information relevant to the study. Data collection across the three categories of respondents was through the aid of a self-administered questionnaire which was Likert-scaled so as to give the respondents the option of choosing the best answer that better suits their opinion or view. Throughout the research process, the researchers ensured utmost confidentiality so as to protect the privacy of respondent opinions and views. In addition, respondents who took part in the study signed an informed consent form to express their voluntary will to participate in the study.

The study set out to assess the effectiveness of the institutional frameworks established by the government to enhance accountability in local governments. Three categories of respondents (the community, technical and political staff) were requested to give their opinion based on Likert's five-point scale by showing the extent to which they agree or disagree with the statements in the questionnaire by indicating the number that best describes their respective answers. On a continuum of 1-5, the following abbreviations were adopted: Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Not Sure (NS), Disagree (D), and Strongly Disagree (SD). Their responses are presented in Table 1 below:

FINDINGS

Table 1: Showing Descriptive Statistics on Community Responses on the Effectiveness of Institutional Frameworks Established by Government to Enhance Accountability in Local Governments (n=263)

Institutional frameworks established by the government to enhance accountability in local governments.	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		
Statements	SA	A	N	DK	SD	Mean	Std Dev.
The IGG's Office is effective in managing corruption in local governments	31.2	30.4	17.1	13.3	8	2.36	1.26
The Auditor General's Office is instrumental in promoting accountability	25.5	42.2	22.1	6.5	3.8	2.20	1.01
The Office of CID Police is effective in fighting corruption	11.8	29.7	23.6	19	16	2.97	1.26
The Office of Accountant General is effective in promoting accountability	20.2	38.8	26.2	11.8	3	2.38	1.03
The Anti-Corruption Court is doing a good job in fighting corruption	27	30.4	22.8	12.2	7.6	2.42	1.22
The Local Government Public Accounts Committee is effective in promoting accountability in local governments	18.3	33.1	24.7	18.3	5.7	2.60	1.14
The Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee is effective in promoting accountability in the public sector	18.3	35.7	21.3	16.3	8.4	2.60	1.19
State House Anti-Corruption Unit is effective in fighting corruption in the public sector	30.8	31.9	14.4	16	6.8	2.36	1.25
The media is doing a good job in fighting corruption in the public sector	44.9	31.6	11.8	8.4	3.4	1.93	1.10
Social media has been influential in the fight against corruption	42.2	34.2	13.3	6.1	4.2	1.95	1.08
Religious institutions are doing a good job of promoting good ethical morals in society	35	43.3	14.1	5.7	1.9	1.96	.944
Civil society institutions are doing a good job of fighting corruption in local governments	27.8	41.4	20.2	8.7	1.9	2.15	.989

Institutional frameworks established by the government to enhance accountability in local governments.	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		
Statements	SA	A	N	DK	SD	Mean	Std Dev.
In order to fight corruption effectively, the government need to reduce the many offices put in place to promote accountability	48.3	28.9	11.8	6.1	4.9	1.90	1.13

Source: Primary Data, 2023

Table 1 presents findings on community responses on the effectiveness of institutional frameworks established by the government to enhance accountability in local governments. Findings indicate that respondents unanimously agreed that the IGGs office (Mean 2.36), Auditor General's Office (Mean = 2.20), Accountant General's office (Mean = 2.38), Anti-Corruption Court (Mean = 2.42), Local Government Public Accounts Committee (Mean = 2.60), parliamentary public accounts committee (Mean = 2.60) State House Anti-Corruption unit (Mean = 2.36), the media (Mean = 1.93), social media (Mean = 1.95), religious institutions (Mean 1.96) and civil society organizations (Mean = 2.15) are effective in managing accountability in local governments. These findings indicate that the government's effort towards promoting accountability so as to reduce corruption is on the right track. However, they also noted that there is a need to reduce the many offices

put in place to promote accountability (Mean 1.90) implying that the duplication of roles ends up frustrating efforts to reduce corruption in the public sector. Interestingly to note is that respondents indicated that they are not sure about the effectiveness of the office of CID Police in fighting corruption (Mean = 2.97) implying that the police (CID) unit is not doing enough with regard to fighting corruption to the expectation of the public.

Technical Staff Responses on the Effectiveness of Institutional Frameworks Established by the Government to Enhance Accountability in Local Governments

This section presents findings on technical staff responses on the effectiveness of institutional frameworks established by the government to enhance accountability in local governments as presented in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Showing Descriptive Statistics on Technical Staff Responses on the Effectiveness of Institutional Frameworks Established by Government to Enhance Accountability in Local Governments (n=251)

Institutional frameworks established by the government to enhance accountability.	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		
Statements	SA	A	N	DK	SD	Mean	Std Dev.
The IGG's Office is effective in managing corruption in the public sector	23.5	28.3	23.9	10.4	13.9	2.62	1.32
The Auditor General's Office is instrumental in promoting accountability	32.7	44.2	10.8	7.2	5.2	2.07	1.08
The Office of CID Police is effective in fighting corruption	13.5	20.3	25.5	19.9	20.7	3.13	1.32
The Office of Accountant General is effective in promoting accountability	24.7	48.2	17.1	6.4	3.6	2.15	.987

Institutional frameworks established by the government to enhance accountability.	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		
Statements	SA	A	N	DK	SD	Mean	Std Dev.
The Anti-Corruption Court is doing a good job in fighting corruption	24.3	41.4	18.3	10	6	2.31	1.12
The Local Government Public Accounts Committee is effective in promoting accountability	35.9	39.8	16.3	5.2	2.8	1.99	.99
The Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee is effective in promoting accountability in the public sector	29.5	43.4	16.3	7.2	3.6	2.11	1.02
State House Anti-Corruption Unit is effective in fighting corruption in the public sector	22.3	46.2	16.7	6.8	8	2.31	1.13
The media is doing a good job in fighting corruption in the public sector	28.7	36.7	20.3	10	4.4	2.24	1.10
Social media has been influential in the fight against corruption	27.5	31.1	19.5	12.4	9.6	2.45	1.27
Religious institutions are doing a good job of promoting good ethical morals in society	31.5	42.6	17.1	6.4	2.4	2.05	.978
Civil society institutions are doing a good job of fighting corruption in the public sector	25.1	41.8	23.1	6.8	3.2	2.21	.999
In order to fight corruption effectively, the government need to reduce the so many accountability offices	38.2	22.7	14.3	12	12.7	2.38	1.418

Source: *Primary Data, 2023*

Table 2 presents the findings of technical staff on the effectiveness of the institutional frameworks established by the government to enhance accountability in the public sector. Findings reveal that respondents were sceptical about the role of IGG (Mean = 2.62) and CID police (Mean = 3.13) in fighting corruption in the public sector. This indicates that they do not have trust and faith in the role of the two offices in holding leaders accountable for their actions and inactions. Furthermore, they rated the following offices as being effective in the fight against corruption: Auditor General's Office (Mean = 2.07), Accountant General (Mean = 2.15), Anti-Corruption Court (Mean = 2.31), Local Government Public Accounts Committee (Mean = 1.99), Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (Mean = 2.11), State House Anti-Corruption Unit (Mean = 2.31), media (Mean = 2.24), social media (Mean = 2.45), religious institutions Mean = 2.05) and civil

society (Mean = 2.21). These findings indicate that a number of government institutional frameworks established to enhance accountability are instrumental and effective with the exception of the IGGs office and CID police. Table 2 further indicates that technical staff respondents agreed that in order to fight corruption in the public sector, there is a need to reduce the many offices established by the government to enforce accountability measures (Mean = 2.38).

Councillor's Responses on the Effectiveness of Institutional Frameworks Established by Government to Enhance Accountability in Local Governments

This section presents findings on the councillor's responses on the effectiveness of institutional frameworks established by the government to enhance accountability in local governments as presented in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics Showing Councillor's Responses on the Effectiveness of Institutional Frameworks Established by Government to Enhance Accountability in Local Governments (98)

Institutional frameworks established by the government to enhance accountability.	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		
Statements	SA	A	N	DK	SD	Mean	Std Dev.
The IGG's Office is effective in managing corruption in the public sector	30.8	23.1	16.9	12.3	16.9	2.61	1.46
The Auditor General's Office is instrumental in promoting accountability	38.5	30.8	16.9	7.7	6.2	2.12	1.19
The Office of CID Police is effective in fighting corruption	23.1	16.9	18.5	26.2	15.4	2.93	1.41
The Office of Accountant General is effective in promoting accountability	30.8	24.6	29.2	9.2	6.2	2.35	1.19
The Anti-Corruption Court is doing a good job in fighting corruption	27.7	30.8	20	10.8	10.8	2.46	1.29
The Local Government Public Accounts Committee is effective in promoting accountability	23.1	32.3	29.2	7.7	7.7	2.44	1.15
The Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee is effective in promoting accountability in the public sector	23.1	36.9	21.5	10.8	7.7	2.43	1.18
State House Anti-Corruption Unit is effective in fighting corruption in the public sector	38.5	27.7	18.5	6.2	9.2	2.20	1.27
The media is doing a good job in fighting corruption in the public sector	43.1	20	20	10.8	6.2	2.16	1.26
Social media has been influential in the fight against corruption	41.5	18.5	15.4	18.5	6.2	2.29	1.34
Religious institutions are doing a good job of promoting ethical morals in society	38.5	36.9	13.8	9.2	1.5	1.98	1.02
Civil society institutions are doing a good job of fighting corruption in the public sector	35.4	26.2	24.6	9.2	4.6	2.21	1.16
In order to fight corruption government need to reduce the so many offices put in place to promote accountability	35.4	24.6	13.8	13.8	12.3	2.43	1.41

Source: Primary Data, 2023

Table 3 presents findings on the effectiveness of institutional frameworks established by the government to enhance accountability in the public sector. Like the technical staff, councillors also remained sceptical about the effectiveness of the IGG and CID Police office (Mean = 2.61 and 2.93) respectively. These findings point to the fact that the role of the IGG and Police towards fighting corruption in the public sector is not clearly understood by the political staff in local governments. In addition, the councillors also agreed that the other institutional frameworks are

doing a good job of enhancing accountability in the public sector.

DISCUSSION

In December 2019, the Government of Uganda launched the Zero Tolerance to Corruption Policy (ZTCP) and the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) 2019/20-2023/24 to tackle the growing corruption problem. The NACS provides a framework for implementing the ZTCP, which aims to establish anti-corruption institutions, prevent corruption, encourage public participation, foster integrity, and promote individual commitment.

These institutions include the Inspectorate of Government (IGG), CID-Police, Director of Public Prosecution (DPP), Office of Auditor General (OAG), Anti-Corruption Court, State House Anti-Corruption Unit, Public Accounts Committee of Parliament, the Media, religious institutions, among others. However, five to six years down the road, some of the institutions are doing a commendable job whereas others are in limbo impacting the progress of having a corrupt free society.

According to study findings, a number of institutional frameworks established by the government are effective in enhancing accountability in local governments. The office of the Auditor General, Accountant General, the Anti-Corruption Court, the Local Government and Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, the State House Anti-Corruption Unit, the media, religious institutions and civil society organizations were found instrumental players towards ensuring that local government entities are accountable in the way they deliver services as well as exercising the powers granted on to them on behalf of the polity.

The reasons for the effectiveness of the above frameworks could be partly explained by the fact that they are well structured, resourced financially and have the manpower to help them execute their mandate. Specifically, the office of the Auditor General is well supported by the government and their audit reports are highly respected by the different stakeholders because they in most cases perform their work objectively.

The other effective institutional framework is the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PAC) which holds all government entities accountable in response to issues raised in the Auditor General's Report. The fact that parliament plays an oversight role in addition to approving local government budgets among other entities (ministries, departments and agencies), they can deny funding to an entity that doesn't properly account for the resources allocated to them. Such oversight and approval powers make the institution effective

because it holds the financial allocation of an entity in its hands.

The other effective institution in enhancing accountability in the public sector is the Statehouse Anti-Corruption Unit. One of the plausible reasons for their success stems from the fact that they are under the office of the Presidency and therefore enjoy political support in terms of executing their mandate as well as being properly facilitated in terms of resources therefore, they have to perform their duties without interference. Secondly, the institution (Statehouse Anti-Corruption Unit) is usually headed by security personnel whose method of work doesn't accommodate zigzag ways that open room for corruption.

The other effective institutional arrangement towards enhancing accountability in the public sector is the civil society organizations. By virtue of their formation and operations, they are lobbyists and advocates of good governance and as a result, their method of work promotes transparency. Secondly, civil society organizations are not bound or tied by government bureaucratic structures that create red tape and back-passing which are significant avenues of corruption. The funding of civil society organizations is yet another factor that explains their effectiveness since the majority are sponsored by international organizations that are strict with issues of accountability and transparency.

However, it is interesting to note that study findings indicated that respondents remained sceptical about the effectiveness of the office of CID Police and IGG's Office in the fight against corruption in the local governments. This suggests that the police (CID) unit and the IGG's Office are not doing enough with regard to enhancing accountability and fighting corruption to the expectations of members of the public. The above ineffectiveness of the two institutions towards fighting corruption in the public sector could be a result of a lack of support in terms of manpower and finances required to enable them to follow up with public officers alleged to misuse public resources. The other reason that can be

attributed to the ineffectiveness of the two institutions could be limited political support from the office of the President to fully empower them to follow up on corruption scandals.

CONCLUSIONS

Generally, a number of institutional frameworks established by the government are doing a good job towards enhancing accountability in the public sector. The office of the Auditor General, Accountant General, the Anti-Corruption Court, the Local Government and Parliamentary Public Accounts Committees, the State House Anti-Corruption Unit, the media, religious institutions and civil society organizations are instrumental players in the fight against corruption in the public sector.

The offices of CID Police and IGG's Office are not doing enough towards enhancing accountability and the fight against corruption in the local governments and the public sector in general. The ineffectiveness of the office of CID Police stems from the fact that as an institution, police lack public trust because they are generally taken to be a corrupt institution by the nature of their operations of soliciting bribes. As a result, it is difficult to use a corrupt institution to fight corruption.

The IGG's office is ineffective towards enhancing accountability and fighting against graft due to structural issues. First and foremost, their roles are identical to those of the State House Anti-Corruption Unit among other institutions. As a result, there is duplication of roles and responsibilities. Secondly, IGG's office is not well facilitated in terms of manpower let alone facing numerous hurdles from powerful government elites who are untouchable because of being close to the sources of power. Even the political statements made by the president also hinder the IGG's efficacy in fighting and combating corruption in the country.

Recommendations

- There is a need to empower and review the mandate of the different institutional frameworks established to fight against corruption in the public sector. This is because there seem to be numerous offices performing similar mandates notably similar to the office of the CID Police and the IGG. In the end, the duplication of activities leaves the two offices confused about what steps they should take towards fighting corruption through the enhancement of good accountability practices.
- Secondly, the offices of CID Police and IGG need to be strengthened with resources so as to develop their capacities to be able to follow up with suspected corrupt officials. This is because at the moment they seem skeletal and therefore unable to follow up the numerous scandals in the country. Besides, there is a need to institute an independent police unit in charge of integrity and accountability since the office of CID Police is overstretched with investigating many cases and issues in and around the country which makes them ineffective in following up accountability cases.
- Media houses should further their role of information availability to members of the public by digging out and exposing wrongful actions by public officers. This can be attained by enhancing the capacity of investigative journalists to be able to work underground and expose the corrupt alongside their dubious actions/ activities.
- Accountability is a moral issue, religious institutions should take the lead in advocating and teaching acceptable morals in society/communities so as to provide a ground upon which proper child upbringing is encouraged. This is because, at the moment, morals have dwindled in society and yet religious institutions are not doing enough. In addition, religious institutions should out

rightly refuse to associate with corrupt public officials so as to send the right signals to all public officials. This is because religious institutions condone corrupt practices by accepting offers from the corrupt in addition to giving them front seats in prayer places.

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