

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Original Article

Smart Partnership in The South: The History of Tanzania-Malaysia Economic Engagements, 1960-2015

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ABSTRACT

The history of Tanzania's and Malaysia's economic interactions and engagements is explored and examined in this paper. It is a qualitative study that examines Tanzania's historical contacts and relationships with Malaysia from 1960 to 2015. It does so using a descriptive and historical-analytical method. Tanzania and Malaysia had historically established very close commercial and cultural relationships with significant Southeast Asian maritime traders before connecting with European international trade from the 15th century onwards. However, the formal political relations between the two countries did not begin to exist until after they had gained their independence and had been successful in forging bonds and reciprocal ties in several political settings and possibilities within the South-South partnership. Between 1980 and 2015, the two countries' relations did, however, shift from a political posture to more economic collaboration. This came about because of Tun Mahathir Muhamad and Mwalimu Julius Nyerere's attempts to commission a South-South commission, which was charged with tackling the economic problems affecting the countries of the southern hemisphere. This example of the growing relations between Tanzania and Malaysia shows how similar ties between and among other southern nations may be beneficial for stronger regional cohesion.

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INTRODUCTION

A thorough investigation is necessary to determine the extent of Tanzania and Malaysia's cooperation given the recent expansion of their economic engagement and ongoing influence in the South-South framework and international arena (Ewelukwa, 2011). These two nations have a very long and complicated history together, despite not being geographically close to one another. The Indian Ocean, which connects them geographically, has long been recognised as the primary influence on the character of their interactions.

Tanzania developed very strong economic and cultural ties with significant Southeast Asian maritime traders long before connecting with European international trade because of its location in the eastern part of Africa bordering the Indian Ocean. While the Malay Archipelago's inhabitants served as trade brokers in the trade between the West and the East, traders from the Indian subcontinent, the Arabs, and the Persians dominated trade in the Indian Ocean. This connection between the two archipelagos—Malay and East Africa—was not just limited to commercial endeavours like the planting of banana, durian, and coconut plants; migration also changed the region's demographic dynamics (Hamid, 2009). Additionally, during the first century of the first millennium, this regional contact had a technological impact on the East African coast, such as the invention and use of the swen boat (galawa in Malay). Additionally, the fifteenth-century European mercantile projects had an impact on the economic and trading ties that had previously existed between some regions of Africa and the Malay Archipelago. The movement of migrants from Southeast Asia to the southern regions of Africa, especially around the Cape of South Africa, who were to be employed as workers and slaves, was made easier by the Portuguese dominance of the Indian Ocean commerce (Mayson, 1861; Ross, 1980)). International trade along the coasts of the Indian Ocean broke off contact between East Asia and East Africa, and the Western imperial enterprise that began in the late nineteenth century subjected both continents to colonialism as a result. Up until the second half of the 20th century, when the colonial masters were forced to cede freedom to their colonies in the South, the links between the two worlds remained unknown.

In 1957 and 1961, respectively, Tanzania and Malaysia won their independence from the British Empire. After gaining their independence, the two countries experienced notable political, social, and economic transformations (Nyagetera, 2018). Malaysia has made enormous economic progress and has maintained a strong presence in the Tiger Cub Economies, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as a significant Muslim nation, and as an emergent middle power investor in Africa. Tanzania has been politically stable and a key member of the Southern African Development Community and East Africa Cooperation, but its economic development has lagged. However, the two nations have joined several forums for cooperation, including the South-South Cooperation, the G77, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the United Nations as a global organisation.

Setting the Research Agenda

Historians and experts in international relations pay little attention to the contacts and relationships between nations from the South. In this sense, the relationship between Tanzania and Malaysia is not an exception. The majority of the literature in existence and individual intellectuals focus on a particular facet of the global issue and frequently on their nations or regions (Nyerere, 1990). Due to the effects and dynamics of Western Imperialism on Africa since the fifteenth century to the present, the literature that is currently available places a lot of emphasis on and significantly contributes to Tanzania's relations with Western nations like the United States of America (USA), Britain, France, and South Africa. Even though the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the South-South countries place a strong emphasis on cooperation among the group's members, attention has been focused more on the bloc's larger members, such as Brazil,

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South Africa, India, and Sino-African relations, while relations between Africa and smaller nations like Malaysia are ignored, despite their important roles as trading partners, shared cultural identities, interests, and colonial legacies. For example, despite the changes Malaysia has seen since gaining its independence in 1957 as a new middle power investor and a new member of the Asian Tiger countries, the USA, Western Europe, Japan, and China continued to receive greater attention. Following its independence and in the wake of China's participation in Africa, Malaysian businesses and decision-makers have established a significant presence across Africa, including Tanzania. According to data, Malaysia invested $19 billion in Africa in 2011 and was the continent's largest Asian investor through foreign direct investment (FDI), surpassing China and India (MacPherson, 2015).

All these facts are mostly ignored by regional and Western scholars according to Steinecke (2016). However, this is not a recent problem in historiography. The issue is a result of the colonial scholarly mindset, which ignores the long history of interactions and collaboration between southern nations while praising the success of contact between the West and the rest of the world. The underlying circumstances within the international community were directly passed down from previous colonial relations to the states of tropical Africa as they attained independence beginning in 1957. This meant that, from a strategic perspective, they persisted within Western Europe's sphere of influence. The majority continued to function essentially as client nations on the outskirts of the Western economic system, which meant that they were still seen to be economically backward (Hoskyns, 1968). As a result, this study aims to explore Tanzania's and Malaysia's economic ties from a Southern viewpoint and with a fair alternative approach to colonial academics, which has long dictated and influenced the course of our historical narratives in the southern areas.

METHODOLOGY AND METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

The historical relationships between Tanzania and Malaysia are examined in this qualitative study using a descriptive and historical-analytical method. Both primary and secondary sources are used in this investigation. Governmental records and bilateral agreements, such as Memorandums of Understanding and commercial contracts, are among the key sources. To obtain raw, authentic, and trustworthy data from first-hand accounts or eyewitness testimony, the study also used archival sources, including visits to the national archives of Tanzania and Malaysia to obtain information from circulars and diplomatic documents, among other sources. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with Tanzanian students studying in Malaysia as well as with representatives from the foreign ministries of Tanzania and Malaysia. Secondary sources, found in libraries like the Main Library of International Islamic University Malaysia and the University of Dar es Salaam Library, were another significant source of information that was very helpful for literature reviews and analyses conducted by various strategic institutions. The information contained in these secondary sources, which include dissertations, theses, newspapers, periodicals, books, magazines, maps, pictures, and journal articles related to this study, was also very important. Additionally, the data were validated and examined utilising inductive reasoning and textual analysis of both primary and secondary sources.

Data Analysis and Presentation

Following independence, political cooperation between Tanzania and Malaysia flourished on a variety of levels and forums. Early on, rather than concentrating primarily on economic cooperation, the two nations tended to prioritise political cooperation. Due in large part to Malaysia's change in foreign policy during Tun Mahathir Muhamad's administration, these two nations did not begin to engage significantly in economic relations until the late 1980s (1981-2003). In line with his vision, Mahathir wanted to encourage economic cooperation among third-world nations that were dealing with similar problems. As an illustration, the social, political, and economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s slowed down economic development in developing nations.

The fact that Tanzania changed its economic policies from socialism and self-reliance (Ujamaa na Kujitegemea), as outlined in Mwalimu Nyerere's 1967 Arusha Declaration, to a more liberalised economy that aimed to promote social services for the benefit of the populace, another significant factor in the two countries' engagement (Biermann, & Wagao, 1986). The socialist orientation of Tanzania's Ujamaa policy, which it

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had been enforcing for 20 years, had mostly proven to be ineffective and destroyed the country's economy. Tanzania's economy, for instance, was about to collapse as Mwalimu Nyerere left office (Kilian, 2001). According to data, between 1974 and 1984, the GDP grew at an average pace of 2.6 percent per year while the population increased at a quicker rate of 3.4 percent each year (The Economist, 1986). Again, the rural and urban populations were starving since their income and wages had already fallen by the early 1980s, despite Tanzania's minimum wage regulations (Addison, 1986). In addition, the government owed more than three billion US dollars in foreign debt, while necessities were insufficient, and the currency was expensive. Finally, agricultural output significantly decreased, and it was generally believed that Nyerere's socialist Ujamaa ambitions had failed on the economic front (Bianco, 1992). These difficulties significantly hampered Tanzania's foreign policy because most nations were hesitant to invest in a country that was on the verge of collapse. It was President Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1984-1995) who came to the rescue when his administration made some critical decisions toward the liberalisation of the economy to pave the way for interim economic development. Many claimed at the beginning of this economic shift that President Mwinyi was hesitant to depart from his predecessor's ideas since he was a devout supporter of Mwalimu Nyerere. However, Ali Hassan Mwinyi and his allies urged political and economic changes to open the market and reevaluate socialist ideologies.

In comparison to Mwalimu Nyerere, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi made great efforts to improve Tanzania's connections with the world community. He worked to loosen import quotas, supported small businesses, and enlisted the help of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in internal economic reforms. Even though it was being forced by foreign donors, he also made significant progress by creating multi-party democracy. Former President Mwinyi, popularly known as Mzee Rukhsa (Everything Goes), pushed for the liberalisation of the economy as well as beliefs, morals, and values (Cowen & Laakso, 2002).

The president of Tanzania, Ali Hassan Mwinyi made a choice to liberalise the country's economy, which was a positive move that presented the possibility of long-term, concrete bilateral cooperation between Tanzania and Malaysia. For bilateral negotiations, Prime Minister Tun Mahathir Muhamad travelled to Tanzania's capital city of Dar es Salaam in 1991 (Cooksey, 2017). In his speech, Prime Minister Tun Mahathir Muhamad praised President Mwinyi for adopting a free-market philosophy and pledged Malaysia's support for Tanzania's advancements in several sectors where Malaysia possessed the necessary knowledge and resources, including the oleochemical and rubber industries.[1] He also promised that Tanzania, home to some of the most breathtaking natural tourist attractions in the world, will make the most of its tremendous investment prospects in the tourism sector. The two nations decided to have more discussions about all aspects of their bilateral relations and to sign agreements on economic, technical, scientific, and cultural cooperation. These decisions heralded a new era of productive cooperation between the two nations and helped to improve their relationship.

BILATERAL TRADE BETWEEN TANZANIA AND MALAYSIA

Foreign trade is very crucial to the economic growth of a nation. While Malaysia has emerged from a traditional agricultural economic society into a semi-industrial country with a well-developed and middle-class society while Tanzania was still struggling to shift from socialist policies, which put much emphasis on traditional sectors. The nature of relationships and economic links between the two countries have altered along with the shift from an agricultural economy to a semi-industrial one. Tanzania began receiving Malaysian industrial goods. In a ten-year period, trade between the nations also grew significantly. For instance, Tanzania imported goods for US$ 1665 million in 1985, but in just four years, the import price increased to US$ 2370 million in 1988. The commerce was further encouraged in 1989 when Tanzania began to track and reap the benefits of both commodities exported to and imported from Malaysia. According to UN data (See Table I), Tanzania only imported US$

[1] Mahathir Bin Mohamad, Dinner Given by His Excellency Mr Ali Hassan Mwinyi President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Speech, Dar es salaam, October 23, 1991.

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6,957.96 million worth of Malaysian goods in 1989, while exports were US$ 1,177.77 million. The import, however, nearly doubled to US$ 1,177.77 million in 1995, while the export hit a new high of US$ 18,612.05 million (See Table I).

Table 1: Malaysian trade with Tanzania (in Million US$)

Year	Total export	Total export to Malaysia	Percentage of total export	Total import	Total imports from Malaysia	Percentage of total import
1989	25,048,246.27	1,177.77	0.25	22,480,953.34	6,957.96	0.03
1990	29,453,209.60	4,902.03	0.01	29,245,597.70	4,954.20	0.02
1991	34,347,755.52	3,258.66	0.01	36,581,322.75	4,135.53	0.01
1992	40,768,495.62	2,215.68	0.01	39,788,384.26	5,625.41	0.01
1993	47,127,175.17	4,870.19	0.01	45,389,967.36	4,683.81	0.01
1994	58,842,644.48	9,535.21	0.02	59,085,991.94	11,079.92	0,02
1995	73,778,151.42	18,612.05	0.03	77,045,596.16	23,710.22	0.03

Source*: International Trade Yearbook,* (United Nations: 1995-1999), and *External trade Statistics* 1988, 1989, 2000, 2001, 2003 (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics)

Figure 1: Tanzanian Imports to Malaysia for all products between 1995 and 2015 (in Millions of US$)



When Malaysia exported a total of US$ 1,177.77 million in 1989, imports of Tanzanian products were first noted. However, things have been quickly shifting year after year, and the trade has become stronger as a result. Records reveal that since the 1990s, trade between the two nations has dramatically improved. Tanzanian exports to Malaysia, for instance, surged from US$ 1,177.77 million in 1989 to US$ 18,612.05 million in 1995. In 2005, Malaysian exports to Tanzania increased to more than $170 million. The total amount of trade between Tanzania and Malaysia has, nevertheless, grown significantly from the 1990s to the 2000s. Animal fats and vegetable oils were Malaysia's top exports in 2000, accounting for a total export value of RM50,792,000. Tanzania br ought in RM44,540,000 million exports, with manufactured items dominating the list.[2]

[2] *External trade Statistics* 1988, 1989, 2000, 2001, 2003 (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics).

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Figure 2: Malaysian imports to Tanzania for all products between 1995 and 2015 (in Millions of US$)



The data from the figure above demonstrates that, in the early stages of bilateral trade between Tanzania and Malaysia, imports of commodities from Tanzania were relatively low and did not reach the levels of other developing nations like China, India, and South Africa, which were Tanzania's main trading partners. Tanzanian exports to Malaysia reached a peak of about $25 million in 1995 and rose to over $55 million the following year. Since 1997, importation has dropped precipitously to less than $10 million. The import trade was minimal until 2003, when it began to pick up, reaching a high of over US$ 40 million in 2006–2007. However, imports fell precipitously in 2008, falling to less than $5 million. This may be related to the 2008 global financial crisis, which had an impact on countries' purchasing power, including Malaysia and Tanzania. Following the end of the global financial crisis, Malaysia's imports of Tanzanian goods increased impulsively beginning in 2012 and peaked at US$ 130 million in 2015. (See graph II).

According to data from the WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution) on Malaysian exports to Tanzania from 1998 to 2015, the country's exports to Tanzania did not even approach US$ 100 million in the ten years (from 1995 to 2005). Tanzania's exports began to increase in 2005 and topped $175 million in exports to Tanzania in 2008. However, starting in 2009, the export drastically decreased to US$ 75 million. The 2008 global economic crisis, which had an impact on financial institutions across the world, including Malaysia, is thought to be the cause of this dramatic decline in trade export volume. Reduced output of raw resources is a direct result of this situation. Up until 2012, when Malaysian exports began to rise, the situation persisted. The export increased to $390 million in US dollars between 2013 and 2015. Tanzania received the most merchandise from Malaysia at this time. By the end of 2015, though, it had already begun to decline to US$ 160 million (WITS, 2015).

Commodities of Import and Export between Tanzania and Malaysia

Tanzania received exports of a wide range of products from Malaysia between the 1980s and 2015. These included raw materials as well as consumer, intermediate, and capital products. All these things, some of which are made-to-order (manufactured) industrial goods, were sent to Tanzania. They included machinery and transportation equipment, office equipment, digital and automatic data processing devices, parts and accessories, telecommunication, sound recording and reproducing devices, television receivers, electrical apparatus and machinery, telephones, home furnishings, clothing accessories, jewellery made of precious metals, and jewellery for use in recording and reproducing sound (WITS, 2015). Tanzania continues to receive agricultural exports from Malaysia such as

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fats, including palm oil and its fractions as well as vegetable and animal fats. These commodities' total volume increased yearly. For instance, Malaysia exported US$ 205244.85 thousand worth of goods to Tanzania in 2015 while importing US$ 134151.17 million worth of goods. Consumer items account for most of Malaysia's exports to Tanzania, accounting for around 46% of the total export, while raw materials account for 76% of Tanzania's imports into Malaysia. As Tanzania depends on imported vegetable oil from Malaysia, the second-largest producer of palm oil, vegetables make up most of all raw materials (see *Table 2*), accounting for a high volume of 71% of the total.

Table 2: Value of products imported and exported by Tanzania from Malaysia along with their product share, for the year 2015

Product Group	Export (US$ Thousand)	Import (US$ Thousand)	Export Product Share (%)	Import Product Share (%)
All Products	29184.52	168923.17	100	100
Capital goods	0.71	13785.65	0	8.16
Consumer goods	680.35	93944.19	2.33	55.61
Intermediate goods	924.29	61149.34	3.17	36.2
Raw materials	27579.17	3.94	94.5	0
Animal	53.48	41.35	0.18	0.02
Chemicals	0	2149.82		1.27
Food Products	5933.08	355.5	20.33	0.21
Footwear	0	15.09		0.01
Fuels	0	288.32		0.17
Hides and Skins	0	6309.49		3.74
Mach and Elec	0.71	26683.62	0	15.8
Metals	0.05	1432.55	0	0.85
Minerals	21740.36	2.58	74.49	0
Miscellaneous	0	2766.31		1.64
Plastic or Rubber	0	13443.58		7.96
Stone and Glass	1.71	126.81	0.01	0.08
Textiles and Clothing	1056.81	624.22	3.62	0.37
Transportation	0	2362.82		1.4
Vegetable	384.26	111689.57	1.32	66.12
Wood	14.05	631.55	0.05	0.37

Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), 2015 (World Bank)

As we see from the table above, Tanzania is the exporter of raw materials to Malaysia. From 2012 to 2015, the export trade to Malaysia increased and it is attributed to the recovery from the global financial crisis and the Malaysian commitment to help Tanzania through partnership programs that were undertaken between the two countries. In 2015 alone, the volume of trade by-products was 29189.52 thousand USD for export and 168923.17 thousand USD, minerals and other raw materials recorded high (see table II). Also, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade, Tanzanian exports to Malaysia of machinery, nuclear reactors, and boilers were equal to US$ 714 in 2015. However, both export and import trade started to decline in the last quarter of 2015 and the reason might be the shift of Tanzanian economic policies introduced by the newly elected president John Magufuli who also announced that he would not continue the Malaysian partnership program of 'Big result Now'.

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Table 3: Value of products imported and exported by Malaysia from Tanzania along with their product share, for the year 2015

Product Group	Export (US$ Thousand)	Import (US$ Thousand)	Export Product Share (%)	Import Product Share (%)
All Products	205244.85	134151.17	100	100
Capital goods	25152.61	12.04	12.25	0.01
Consumer goods	95560.84	49.28	46.56	0.04
Intermediate goods	84112.03	31895.73	40.98	23.78
Raw materials	231.02	102177.36	0.11	76.17
Animal	1154.04	92.68	0.56	0.07
Food Products	682.53	20282.61	0.33	15.12
Mach and Elec	25376.51	12.04	12.36	0.01
Metals	1212.17	31761.21	0.59	23.68
Minerals	0	81652.33	0	60.87
Miscellaneous	4790.68	16.75	2.33	0.01
Plastic or Rubber	14619.47	5.33	7.12	0
Vegetable	146455.09	309.88	71.36	0.23
Wood	2002.88	18.34	0.98	0.01

Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), 2015 (World Bank)

Bilateral Investments and Technology Transfer

The modern global economy has a significant component of investments made in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). Global financial organisations like the IMF and WB have urged developing nations to create an atmosphere that will attract transnational firms and multinational enterprises from other countries to invest there. The justification offered here is that there is a clear link between foreign investment and a long-term high trajectory of economic growth. Tanzania and Malaysia have both adopted the strategy of promoting FDI flow in their respective nations and have subsequently endeavoured to offer significant advantages to foreign investors. The intriguing aspect of technology transfer to Tanzania through FDI is that South-South technology transfer is becoming increasingly important in contrast to the typical North-South flows. Tanzania has welcomed new investments from Southeast Asian nations since 1980, primarily from Malaysia, India, and China. These investments involve the transfer of technological know-how and management abilities, as well as a new working style and attitude (UNCTD, 2002).

The biggest advantage of FDI nourishment has been the peace and security that Tanzania and Malaysia have experienced. Additionally, both nations actively participate in the main international agreements that safeguard foreign investment, such as the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the MIGA of the World Bank (ICSID). Tanzanian Investment Centre is aware that the government recognises the reputation that results from offering a protected FDI framework above the requirements of the 1997 Act, which is understood by potential international investors and Tanzanian joint-venture partners (Rugumamu, 1988). Although there have been few Malaysian businesses operating in Tanzania, it has been very challenging to track the number of significant projects because there are no records on the amount of FDI flows because the two countries have not signed two of the most crucial treaties: the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and the Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs), which is the investment treaty. As an example, in 1991, Prime Minister Tun Mahathir Mohamad travelled to Dar es Salaam with several enterprises to increase cooperation with Tanzania.

One of these businesses was Mechmar Corporation, which held 70% of the shares and later, in a joint venture with VIP of Tanzania, which held 30% of the shares, signed a 20-year power purchase agreement (PPA) with the Tanzanian government in May 1995, during the country's power crisis. The International Bank of Malaysia (T) Ltd, which began operations in February 1998 for greenfield operations, is another business that is still in operation today in Tanzania. 18 experts, one of whom was a

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Malaysian national, made up the bank's modest personnel. Except for one specialist employed in the IT section, all eight were graduates, including two from the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM). The remaining four were University of Dar-es-Salaam graduates. For a two- to three-month professional development program, staff members were dispatched to Malaysia. In conjunction with the Association of Bankers, which holds yearly professional programs, other training and exercises have also been conducted within the nation (Tanzania). Attempts have been made to open additional branches around Dar es Salaam and in adjacent regions as part of International Bank of Malaysia (T) Ltd's modest but steady expansion to better serve its small- and medium-sized company clients (UNCTD, 2002).

Tanzania's government awarded the Malaysian business Iris Corp Bhd a five-year, US$ 149 million (about Sh. 200.2 billion) contract in 2011 to produce 25 million National Identification Cards (IDs) for Tanzanian people. Two years later, Tanzania's Gro Energy and Infotech Investments announced a US$ 800 million mammoth contract to establish one of the first and largest ammonia-based chemical production plants in East Africa as a joint venture with Huchems Fine Chemicals, a Malaysian chemicals company (Voice of Tanzania, 2013). Previously in 1993, Mechmar had already been engaged with the Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited (TANESCO) since it had finished another 2.75-megawatt wood-fuel plant for the Commonwealth Development Corporation in Tanzania.

Despite the absence of a formal bilateral agreement between Tanzania and Malaysia, the Bank of Tanzania has been trying to track FDI flows since 1998. The report published in 2001 reveals that while the long-term investment stayed at US$ 35.3 million, the FDI stock climbed from US$ 2.8 million in 1998 to US$ 4.5 million in 1999. It has doubled from US$ 2.4 million in 1998 to US$ 4.8 million in 1999 in the field of Suppliers Credit. In general, FDI stock for the two years (1998–1999) was US$ 85.1 million (See *Table 4*).

Table 4: Stock of FDI from Malaysia – 1998-99 (in Million US$)

Year	Equity	Long-term	Short-term	S/Credit	Total
1998	2.8	35.3	-	2.4	40.5
1999	4.5	35.3	-	4.8	44.6
Total	7.3	70.6	-	7.2	85.1

Source: PCF surveys. Tanzania Investment Report (Bank of Tanzania, 2001)

In a similar vein, the stock of non-FDI liabilities rose from US$ 83.8 million in 1998 to US$ 104.1 million in 1999. For the stock of non-FDI liabilities in either year (1998 or 1999), there were no data for Direct Equity or Supplier Credits. While the entire amount of FDI's non-liabilities over the past two years was already US$ 195.5 million. The stock of both FDI and non-FDI liabilities has expanded significantly, according to the figures above. Additionally, data shows that a significant percentage of foreign private capital invested in Tanzania came from FDI-related sources, while non-FDI overtook FDI-related stock in 1999, which accounted for 52.41 percent of total stock and 57.14% of total liabilities (See *Table 5*).

Table 5: Stock of Non-FDI Liabilities from Malaysia-1998-99 (in Million US$)

Year	Equity	Long-term	Short-term	S/Credit	Total
1998	-	83.8	-	-	83.8
1999	-	104.1	-	7.6	111.7
Total	-	187.9		7.6	195.5

Source: PCF surveys. Tanzania Investment Report (Bank of Tanzania, 2001)

Smart Partnership and the Langkawi Dialogue

It is recognised and appreciated that the Malaysian government is working to affect social welfare and economic growth in the developing world. The notion and consensus that people in the global South urgently require economic development serves to support these initiatives (Van Ginneken, 2003). This statement is accurate for all kinds of things, including entities, people, businesses, and nation-states. However, there has always been

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disagreement over the most effective means of achieving such progress on both the social and economic fronts. History has taught us that a great number of development models have been popularised to be the best and finest in comparison to others, and all of these efforts have been made to produce a high standard of living and the welfare of society. Because of this, a consensus among the region's and the world's stakeholders has recently evolved that, among many other factors, the inclusive participation of different groups in society is a prerequisite for attaining sustainable development (Van Ginneken, 2003). As cooperation has always been a fundamental aspect of any human civilisation, Smart Partnership Dialogue is one instance. In every aspect of life, including business, politics, and social activities like sporting events, we link up with others. Of course, this includes choosing a life partner with whom to get married, establish a home, and have a family. Overall, partners provide each other with the kind of progressive development that an individual cannot provide for itself. However, the profits are not always split evenly because one partner can stand to gain more than the other.

Since the contribution to the partnership may not always be equal, the goal of a wise partnership should be to optimise and balance the benefits for all parties involved.[3]

In 1995, the Malaysian government launched the Langkawi International Dialogue (LID) smart collaboration program. The establishment of local, regional, and international centres within the Global South, Commonwealth Nations, and elsewhere has since catalysed the expansion of smart partnership relations between nations and the various commercial sectors. This partnership concept originated in Malaysia and is based on the principle of "prosper thy neighbour" for situations when everyone benefits (Rubiolo, 2016). Since that time, the Langkawi Dialogue has continued to serve as a significant forum for the free exchange of opinions, ideas, and information among the participating nations while providing a fresh perspective on some practices through the conduct of dialogue series that promote the principles and application of the "Smart Partnership" tactics to innovative teamwork between the government and other sectors that support socioeconomic activities.

Tanzanian Involvement in the Langkawi Dialogue

The Smart Partnership International Dialogues have been hosted alternately by the Malaysian government and friendly African nations since their founding in Langkawi, Malaysia, in 1995. Additionally, the Malaysian Industry-Government Group for High Technology (MIGHT) and the Commonwealth Partnership for Technology Management (CPTM) jointly organise the conversations. Tanzania has been participating in and attending these international gatherings, and President Jakaya Kikwete agreed to host the 2013 dialogue during the last dialogue, which took place in June 2011 in Putrajaya, Malaysia (World Bank Group, 2017). The 2011 dialogue selected the Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC) as the next hub for Smart Partnership Dialogue arranged to take place from 24th – 28th May 2013 in Dar es Salaam. CPTM became the co-organiser of the international dialogue and was assigned to start with the National Smart Partnership Dialogue, starting from the district, regional up to the national level in January 2013.

The theme for the Global 2013 Smart Partnership Dialogue was "Leveraging Technology for Africa's Socioeconomic Transformation: The Smart Partnership Way" (Ferdinand, 2012). The dialogue's main goal was to increase government interaction with all facets of society to gather information, know-how, proficiency, and expertise for solving contemporary problems related to sustainable development. The discussion also covered legislative frameworks, technology inclusion, and strategies for utilising innovation to hasten sustainable economic development on the African continent and elsewhere (ibid). It was anticipated that a conversation on socioeconomic revolution know-how would help the international community and possibly inspire global involvement.[4]

[3] Mahathir Bin Mohamad, "The 1997 Langkawi International Dialogue" (Speech, The Berjaya Langkawi Beach & Resort, Langkawi, Kedah July 28, 1997).

[4] Statement by H.E. Ambassador Hussein Haniff Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations at the plenary of the 68th Session of The United Nations General Assembly, New York, 25 October 2013.

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In addition to Datuk Seri Idris Jala, Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Ali Hamsa, Chief Secretary to the government, and former Prime Minister Tun Mahathir Mohamad, the delegation of 28 businesses and enterprises was led by Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Tun Abdul Razak. Everyone was expected to encourage business and investment between Tanzania and Malaysia (AllAfrica, 2013). Other 14 heads of state or governments from the African and Asian continents also participated in the discussion. In the dialogue sessions, Malaysia discussed its policies and the path it is taking to realise its goal of becoming a fully developed country by 2020 with the participants. Government Transformation Program (GTP), Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI), Key Performance Index (KPI), Economic Transformation Program (ETP), and National Key Results Area (NKRA) were among the newly adopted policies and directions (Selva, 2013). When the Langkawi International Dialogue was held in Putrajaya in 2011, then-Prime Minister Najib Tun Abdul Razak stated that Tanzania had expressed interest in the ETP Malaysia blueprint. Following the discussion, Malaysia was prepared to assist Tanzania in developing its Economic Transformation Program (ETP). The fact that several other African nations were interested in following the ETP, which sought to double Malaysia's per capita income from US$ 7,000 (RM 22,113) in 2010 to US$ 15,000 (RM47,385) by 2020, was welcomed by the Prime Minister. He highlighted, however, that Tanzania will be given priority before the initiative is expanded to other nations (Ibid). On his side, Idris Jala, Minister in the Prime Minister's Department who was part of the entourage, said that Malaysia was already assisting Tanzania in providing technology for managing a government. "This is a huge credit to Malaysia as Tanzania has preferred the Malaysian prototypical and not the Western model for elevating its socioeconomic progress" (*New Strait Times*, 2013, p. 1) said Idris, who was entrusted by the Malaysian government to supervise the Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU). On his final day of the visit, Najib Tun Abdul Razak spoke to the journalists that the Malaysian firms had created over RM680 million worth of business in East Africa following the 2013 GSPD. He highlighted potential business areas that were in halal cleansing services for logistics, design, and building of renewable energy plants, energy generation, agriculture, oil and gas, and palm oil-based products (Ibid). He stated that United Engineers Malaysia Berhad (UEM) was in talks with Tanzanian counterparts to build a toll road linking its cities to other cities in neighbouring nations in the area. Additionally, it was mentioned that the Tanzanian government had asked Khazanah Nasional Berhad to build a speciality hospital there so that Tanzanians might benefit from healthcare services (*Daily New*, 2013, p .1).

A year before the GSPD, the government of Tanzania was contemplating tapping Malaysian expertise in its palm oil industry, particularly to produce biofuels. The Tanzanian Investment Centre had already identified more than 160,000 hectares of land suitable for oil palm and jatropha cultivation. Together with oil palm, jatropha is a plant that grows in wastelands from which the jatropha vegetable oil is produced that could be used as biofuel. Patricia Mhondo, the investment promotion manager of the Tanzania Investment Centre, said that "the choice for Malaysia was because (it is) ranked as the second largest crude palm oil producer in the world. At the moment, there was only six percent of the cultivated land in Tanzania was under palm oil plants, and that is why the government was looking for Malaysian know-how to raise palm oil cultivation" (*New Strait Times*, 2013, p. 1). She said that because of this urgent need, Tanzania has already formed a National Bio-fuels Task Force that is entrusted with promoting the sector (Ibid).

Aside from the palm oil sector, the investment opportunities were also considering other sectors like tourism, manufacturing, health, power, mining, agriculture infrastructure such as roads, airports, seaports, education, as well as information and communications technology. Soong Siew Hoong, who was the secretary general of the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Malaysia (ACCCIM) at the time, said that the chamber was keen to help launch a trade and investment team in Tanzania (*Daily New*, 2013, p. 1). This move aimed to raise trade and investment opportunities between the East African states and Malaysia to transfer skills and required expertise.

'Big Result Now' and the Malaysian Support for the Tanzanian Development Vision 2025

After a protracted period of the governmental battle for a result-based strategy that would support the Tanzanian government's goals for

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economic reform, "Big Result Now" was finally implemented. The Tanzanian Development Vision 2025 (TDV 2025) was created in the late 1990s to direct economic and social development efforts to transform Tanzania's economy from a traditional agricultural economy into a varied and semi-industrialised economy equivalent to a middle-income economy to be reached by 2025, effectively articulates these government's development aspirations. In its first National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRT) phase one from 2005 to 2010, the government also developed the methods that would aid in realising this objective. Positive effects were produced by the implementation of NSGRT I, which increased both domestic and international investment and increased economic growth by 7% annually. Additionally, it improved the collection of domestic taxes, enhanced foreign reserves, and stabilised the cost of goods and services. The NSGRT I contributed to the improvement of public social services like healthcare, infrastructure, and education, particularly basic and secondary education, as well as the provision of water and other essential services (Janus & Keijzer, 2015).

Despite the above-mentioned successes of NSGRT I, the Tanzanian government also discovered that many sectors lacked policy implementation plans, there were several issues with monitoring, and there was a low degree of accountability for achieving the results intended to realise the TDV 2025.[5] Therefore, the government was forced to look for a more comprehensive strategy or a results-based approach that would go hand in hand with NSGRT phase two to help achieve its development vision for 2025.[6] The President's Office Planning Commission (POPC) was tasked by President Jakaya Kikwete in 2010 with developing novel approaches to enhance the provision of government services. As a result, the Malaysian model was selected as the most suitable for Tanzania after extensive research and analysis across numerous nations, including Kenya, South Africa, South Korea, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Therefore, President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete was invited to the Langkawi International Dialogue in June 2011 by Malaysia's then-Prime Minister Najib Tun Abdul Razak. The Malaysian Premier presented his country's experience adopting "Big Fast Results" (BFR) in its national transformation to improve the delivery of public services and spur economic growth.[7]

Malaysia's Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU), an organisation within the Prime Minister's Office, has been tasked with running "Big Fast Results." Under the national reform program, which is further divided into the Economic Transformation Program (ETP) and the Government Transformation Program (GTP), the PEMANDU proposed its implementation model (*President's Delivery Bureau*, 2011). The package showed a significant impact within the first three years of implementation in several areas, including the development of human capital, crime, poverty, corruption, rural basic infrastructure and transport, education, wholesale, and retail, as well as health care. Impressed, President Kikwete assured the Malaysian Premier that Tanzania was prepared to follow his plan.

In November 2011, five months later, a delegation from Tanzania attended a BFR Seminar in Malaysia hosted by PEMANDU to study more about the BFR 8-Steps of Transformation Methodology. Wholeheartedly, Tanzania embraced the BFR model by creating the President's Delivery Bureau like Malaysia's PEMANDU to supervise applied actions that would deliver results. This model was named the 'Big Result now' and has been portrayed as a "South-South learning exchange". Up till 2013, the BFR Institute in Malaysia sent about 24 specialists to Tanzania to help with the program's execution. The Tanzanian government committed US$ 8.7 billion over three years for Action Plans as part of Phase I of the BRN program's implementation to support at least six important national priority sectors that would promote economic growth. Agriculture, transportation, energy, resource mobilisation, water, and education were among these industries (Janus & Keijzer, 2015).

[5] President's Office Public Service Management, "The Effectiveness of Public Policies in Tanzania Final Report", *Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF)*, August 2010.

[6] Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, *National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty II*, July 2010.

[7] TDV25, "Tanzania Big Results Now: The Road Map" *President's Delivery Bureau*, 2011.

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Najib Tun Abdul Razak praised the Malaysian-adopted blueprint of Tanzania's economic transformation initiative rather than the western model when he visited the country in 2013 for the Global Smart Partnership Dialogue (Selva, 2013). "The Tanzanian government invited Idris Jala (Minister in the Prime Minister's Department) four times to brief their cabinet members", Najib Tun Abdul Razak said on the sidelines of the Global Smart Partnership Dialogue (Santos, 2015). On his side, Idris Jala said that the Malaysian side was impressed with the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), as even ministers have their own KPIs. "We ran cabinet workshops and labs for agriculture, water, port, resources mobilisation and education in helping them to draw up the program" (ibid, p. 2), said Idris who was with an international oil company before joining the Malaysian cabinet. He further noted that Tanzania has vast economic potential as it has a gas reserve of 35 trillion cu ft, and Malaysia was keen to help (ibid, p. 2).

Since the BRN's deployment in 2013 and 2014, the model was advanced alongside the nation's development processes and advancement. 2.36 million more people from rural areas had access to clean water, and 193,420 more households had electricity, according to a remarkable record of tangible outcomes. Records indicate that by tackling major sector bottlenecks, agricultural productivity increased by 77% up until phase one's conclusion. The ultimate grade for education was 81% because BRN had increased the standard of instruction, particularly in basic and secondary institutions. The ultimate score in the energy sector, where BRN was successful in unlocking important power generation projects to enhance electricity generation capacity, was 79 percent. Intending to improve the economic situation and foster public-private partnerships, the resource mobilisation sector received a score of 54%, while the transportation sector was able to realise Tanzania's potential as a logistical hub for East and Central Africa. The score for the water sector, which enhanced rural households' access to portable domestic supplies, was 80%. The sectorial score was generally 72% of the target (Department for International Development, 2014).

Through Islam, Tanzania and Malaysia have kept growing their economic ties. Tanzania has a sizeable Muslim population of roughly 36%, despite neither being an OIC member nor having many Muslims in the country. These Muslim citizens have profited from Islamic initiatives in Malaysia in the halal and Islamic banking sectors. Tanzanian banks recently established Islamic branches to serve their Muslim clients who do not choose traditional banking services (Selva, 2013). The first Islamic bank, AMANA Bank, debuted in Dar es Salaam in 2006 and afterwards built offices in a few other towns. For Muslims in Tanzania, Islamic insurance is yet another promising industry. To further liberalise the nation's financial sector, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs and the Tanzanian Insurance Regulatory Authority (TIRA) investigated the possibility of introducing Islamic insurance known as Takaful in 2011.

Another area where Tanzanians benefited from Malaysia is the flow of remittances that helped Tanzania's economy thrive. Tanzania is one of the countries that has benefited from the increase in remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa in recent decades. Through both official and unofficial routes, diasporas who reside and work in Malaysia transfer money to their families back home in Tanzania. Tanzania has benefited most from remittances from Malaysia compared to the latter since Malaysia has made significant investments in Tanzania. Since there are no records that may be used to monitor the remittances from Malaysia to Tanzania, it is difficult to determine the precise quantity of remittances that flow to Tanzania (Hansen, 2010, p. 8). Additionally, there is no structure in place that could assist in determining the best approach to control the remittance flow through an awareness of the interests, skills, channels, and forms of remittances transferred to Tanzania from the diaspora. The effectiveness of remittances in reducing poverty and fostering economic progress in Tanzania is thus very difficult to pinpoint in terms of existing barriers. Official statements from the Tanzanian High Commission in Kuala Lumpur, however, have given more clarity and understanding of the effects of remittances on Tanzania's economic growth.[8] Remittances from Malaysia are still essential to the Tanzanian community, according

[8] Ramadhani Dau, Interview by Fadhili Mtani, High commissioner of Tanzania, Kuala Lumpur, March 14th, 2019.

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to the broad consensus in this area. This is because they have increased the amount of disposable income that is used for things like health, investments, education, consumption, and company creation. Remittances are more likely to have an immediate effect on the income recipient since they are sent directly to the recipients, in contrast to other forms of international aid and financial flows like FDI. As a result, remittances from Malaysia have not only improved the receivers' quality of life but also contributed to alleviating Tanzania's extreme and pervasive poverty.

CONCLUSION

According to the aforementioned survey, Tanzania and Malaysia continue to share a warm and important relationship in terms of business. The emergence of leaders from both nations who were focused on the economy and the economic changes they implemented both had an impact on the degree of economic cooperation. Tanzania was compelled to switch from a socialist to a liberal economy in the 1980s because of requirements laid forth by the IMF and WB. Once more, the study discovered that Tanzania and Malaysia's level of bilateral investments increased in the 1990s following Prime Minister Tun Mahathir Mohamad's trip to Tanzania, where he and President Ali Hassan Mwinyi decided to expand economic ties. The investment climate in both countries has not, however, been adequately leveraged by the two nations. For instance, even though the two nations are at peace and in harmony, they have not signed a bilateral trade or investment agreement. There have only been a small number of Malaysian businesses working in Tanzania since the 1990s; there are no known instances of Tanzanian businesses operating in Malaysia. Any attempts at official economic collaboration between the two nations are hampered by this condition.

Technical cooperation and smart collaborations, among other things, helped Malaysia to make an impact on Tanzania between 2011 and 2015. Tanzania has participated in the Langkawi International Debate since 1995, but it was not until it chose to host the discussion in Dar es Salaam in 2013 and embraced the Malaysian concept of "Big Result Now" that it started to benefit. Tanzania obtained technical help and manpower from the Malaysian government despite World Bank funding. The program increased efficiency in administration, production, public service delivery, employment, and poverty reduction. President Magufuli's decision to abandon the 'Big Result Now' in 2015 was both a technical and diplomatic mistake. This "Malaysian Model" offer lessons which can be adapted to the Tanzanian environment. The idea here is not to replicate the model. Rather, the idea is to extract specific lessons from the Malaysian experience that may be relevant to the common and at the same time diverse circumstances of many African countries. These lessons can range from institutional changes to specific industrial and trade policy measures to mechanisms of attracting and disciplining FDI with greater development potential to devising more effective "reciprocal control mechanisms" between states and businesses, to enhancing bargaining power vis-à-vis other development partners from the South. The conclusions made here have been gathered from larger research that has examined the links between Malaysia and Tanzania.

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